Einführung in die Methodenlehre der Nationalökonomie

[Title Page and Publication Details]: The title page and publication information for the third edition of Richard Kerschagl's 'Introduction to the Methodology of Economics', published in Vienna in 1948. It identifies Kerschagl as a professor at the University of World Trade in Vienna. [Table of Contents: Part I - The Theories]: The table of contents for the first part of the book, titled 'The Theories'. It lists 18 sections covering the history of economic methodology from the Physiocrats and Classicals through the Historical School (Roscher, Knies) and the Austrian School (Menger, Wieser, Böhm-Bawerk) to contemporary thinkers like Schumpeter, Spann, and Sombart. [Table of Contents and Preface to the Third Edition]: The segment contains the table of contents for the second part of the book, focusing on the main problems of methodology. It is followed by the author's preface to the 1948 third edition, where Kerschagl explains the publication delays caused by his imprisonment and dismissal during the Nazi era. He notes the expansion of the historical section to include Amonn, Sombart, and Englisch, and dedicates the work to his teacher, Friedrich von Wieser. [Introduction to the History of Economic Method]: Kerschagl introduces the history of economic method, discussing Schumpeter's view that methodology should follow rather than precede a system. He argues that method and subject matter are mutually dependent. A central theme is the tension between universalism (viewing the economy as an organic whole) and individualism (viewing it as an atomistic collection of elements). He justifies limiting the detailed study to the last two generations of economic thought due to their reliance on modern logic and philosophy. [Overview of Methodological Development from Antiquity to the 19th Century]: A concise historical sketch of economic methodology. It traces the roots from Aristotle's deduction and Archimedes' empiricism through Scholasticism to the rise of Mercantilism and Physiocracy. It highlights the dominance of deduction in Classical economics (Smith, Ricardo, Mill) and Marxism, the romantic universalism of Adam Müller, and the eventual reaction by the German Historical School (empiricism/induction) and the Austrian School (exact deduction/subjectivism). [The Methodology of the Physiocrats]: This section analyzes the Physiocratic distinction between 'ordre naturel' (the ideal, divinely ordained economic flow) and 'ordre positif' (actual human economic action). Kerschagl argues that while they used deductive reasoning based on self-interest, they also integrated empirical data. He highlights Quesnay's 'Tableau économique' as the first attempt to view the economy as an organic, interdependent whole and as an 'exact science' susceptible to mathematical demonstration. [The Methodology of the Classical School (Smith, Ricardo, Mill)]: Kerschagl examines the Classical school's methodology, identifying John Stuart Mill's 'Logic' as the definitive formulation of their deductive approach. He discusses Adam Smith's use of the division of labor as a primary premise and Ricardo's rigorous but often unsystematic deduction. The segment explores Mill's distinction between induction and deduction and his attempt to ground social sciences in causal-mechanical laws similar to the natural sciences. [The Methodology of the Historical School: Roscher and Knies]: This section covers the founders of the German Historical School. Wilhelm Roscher is presented as seeking 'physiological' laws of development while remaining skeptical of pure mathematical abstraction. Karl Knies is discussed regarding his principle of 'relativity'—the idea that economic theories are only valid for specific historical stages. Knies strongly rejects the mathematical method (Walras) and the atomistic isolation of motives, emphasizing the organic unity of the 'volksleben'. [Carl Menger and the Methodenstreit]: Kerschagl details Carl Menger's 'exact method,' which seeks to find strictly typical relations and laws of economic phenomena through isolation and abstraction, analogous to natural sciences. This leads into a detailed analysis of the 'Methodenstreit' (clash of methods) between Menger and Gustav Schmoller. The conflict centered on whether induction (Schmoller) or deduction (Menger) should be primary, and whether the economy should be viewed atomistically or as a full empirical reality. [The Methodology of the Austrian School: Wieser and Böhm-Bawerk]: An examination of the later Austrian School. Friedrich von Wieser's method is described as 'psychological-empirical,' relying on 'introspektion' (self-observation) to understand economic causality from within. He utilizes 'isolation' and 'idealization' (e.g., the homo oeconomicus). Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk is presented as more pragmatic, using whatever method leads to truth, though he defends the 'abstract-empirical' approach and the necessary 'border crossing' into psychology to explain value. [Joseph Schumpeter's Functional Methodology]: Kerschagl analyzes Schumpeter's attempt to move beyond the Methodenstreit by adopting a 'functional' rather than 'causal' approach. Schumpeter argues that pure economics should be a 'description of facts' regarding the dependencies between economic quantities, using mathematical functions to avoid the metaphysical baggage of 'cause and effect.' Kerschagl critiques this as an attempt to 'bypass the cliffs' of difficult methodological problems. [Teleology and Social Theory: Gruntzel and Stammler]: This segment explores the shift toward teleological (final) explanations in social science. Josef Gruntzel distinguishes between the 'objective-causal' world of nature and the 'subjective-teleological' world of human action (means and ends). Rudolf Stammler's influential theory is discussed, where he separates the 'causally effected' (nature) from the 'to be effected' (will/purpose). Stammler argues that social science is a science of purposes, where the 'necessity' is logical rather than mechanical. [Rickert's Value-Based Methodology and Oppenheimer's Sociology]: Heinrich Rickert's distinction between 'natural sciences' (generalizing/value-free) and 'cultural sciences' (individualizing/value-related) is applied to economics. Rickert argues that economics can be both, depending on the researcher's goal. Franz Oppenheimer's 'sociological economics' is then discussed, which combines induction for the 'structure of economic society' with deduction from the 'economic principle' (minimum means for maximum ends). [The Universalist Methodology of Othmar Spann]: Kerschagl presents Othmar Spann's 'universalist' method, which defines economy as the 'dedication of means to ends.' Spann rejects atomistic/individualist approaches (Classical/Austrian) in favor of an organic view where the whole precedes the parts. He replaces causal laws with 'laws of performance' (Leistungsgrößen) and 'laws of means-end validity.' For Spann, the central problem of economics is the relationship between the economy (means) and society (ends). [Modern Methodological Perspectives: Amonn, Sombart, and Englisch]: This segment reviews three modern thinkers. Alfred Amonn focuses on 'concept formation,' arguing that economic objects are mental constructs rather than independent realities. Werner Sombart distinguishes between 'judging' (normative), 'ordering' (natural-scientific), and 'understanding' (Verstehen/cultural-scientific) economics, advocating for the latter. Karel Englisch proposes a strictly teleological theory of state economy, distinguishing it from both causal and normative approaches by focusing on the 'rationality of the willed.' [The Problem of Reality in Economic Theory]: Kerschagl addresses the fundamental question of what constitutes 'reality' in economics. He critiques the various schools' approaches to reality (Schmoller's full empirical reality vs. Menger's laws of phenomena). He argues that science cannot represent the 'full' reality but must represent the 'essential' reality through concept formation. He discusses the role of 'idealization' and 'isolation' and how a universalist perspective views reality as a web of interdependencies. [Exactness, Quantification, and Calculability]: The author explores the concept of 'exactness' in economics, which requires logical consistency and objective verifiability. He discusses the limits of the mathematical method, particularly the difficulty of quantifying qualitative psychological values (intensities). He critiques Marx's attempt to quantify labor and the Austrian School's subjective value scales. He concludes that true calculability in the economy is primarily achieved at the level of prices in a market economy, rather than at the level of pure value. [Necessity and Economic Laws]: Kerschagl examines the concept of 'necessity' in economic laws. He contrasts the 'natural necessity' of causal events with the 'freedom' of human action. He argues that economic laws are not absolute but represent 'regularities' or 'probabilities.' He categorizes economic laws into three types: normative (what should be), teleological (means-end validity), and genetic-functional (how things happen). He emphasizes that even 'causal' laws in economics rely on the assumption of rational (teleological) behavior. [Synthesis: Causal vs. Teleological Methods in Economics]: In the final section, Kerschagl synthesizes the debate between causal and teleological methods. He argues that while teleology provides the 'logic of means and ends' and a clear boundary for the discipline, the causal method is essential for understanding 'genesis' and 'dynamics' (development). He concludes that a complete economic theory requires both: causal laws to explain the flow of events and teleological laws to evaluate the performance and purpose of those events within a social framework.