Classics in austrian economics a sampling in the history of a tradition Volume BU4KX78F

[Front Matter and Table of Contents]: Title pages, publication data, and comprehensive table of contents for the three-volume collection 'Classics in Austrian Economics'. It lists foundational works by Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, and Wieser in Volume I, interwar developments in Volume II, and the contributions of Mises and Hayek in Volume III. [Introduction: The History and Distinctiveness of the Austrian School]: Israel Kirzner provides an overview of the Austrian School's history from 1870 to 1970. He argues that while the school's distinctiveness seemed to fade by 1930 as its marginalist insights were absorbed into the mainstream, a deeper 'radical subjectivism' and focus on market processes—implicit in Menger and revived by Mises and Hayek during the socialist calculation debate—sets it apart from Marshallian and Walrasian equilibrium models. [Introduction: References and Acknowledgements]: A list of academic references cited in the introduction and an editorial note regarding original page numbers and copyright acknowledgements for the reprinted papers. [Acknowledgements and Volume I Opening]: Copyright permissions for various papers included in the collection and the title page for Volume I: The Founding Era, specifically introducing Carl Menger's work on the classification of economic sciences. [Toward a Systematic Classification of the Economic Sciences]: Carl Menger critiques the German Historical School for renouncing theoretical analysis in favor of mere description. He proposes a systematic classification of economic sciences based on different lines of inquiry: historical-statistical (concrete phenomena), theoretical (general laws), morphological (generic forms), and practical/applied (purposeful action). Menger argues for the necessary separation of these disciplines to achieve scientific clarity. [A Survey of the System of Economic Sciences]: Kirzner outlines a four-part system of economic sciences: historical sciences (statistics and history), morphology (classification of facts), economic theory (laws and causation), and practical or applied economics (principles for realizing economic aims). [The Classification of the Economic Sciences as Conceived by the Historical School]: Kirzner critiques the Historical School's methodology, specifically their confusion between economic history and sociology. He argues against the denial of applied economics as an independent discipline and defends the validity of sciences that provide procedures for attaining human goals under varying conditions. [The Utility and Scientific Status of Applied Sciences]: The text defends the independent significance of applied sciences, arguing that theoretical and historical knowledge alone are insufficient for practical action without the synthesis and inventiveness provided by applied disciplines. It rejects the notion that applied sciences are merely 'cookbooks' or unscientific studies. [Further Observations on the Historical School's Methodology]: Kirzner addresses the Historical School's rejection of practical sciences based on the 'is vs. ought' distinction. He argues that applied sciences are essential for progress and that restricting science to historical description ignores the role of human ingenuity and the need for solving new economic problems. [Rebuttal of Brentano and Kleinwächter]: Kirzner responds to attacks from Brentano and Kleinwächter regarding his methodological position. He defends the necessity of 'abstract' theory and methodological inquiry, specifically rebutting Brentano's claim that theory is useless if it cannot immediately 'conjure away' poverty or social danger. [The Relationship Between Theory, Applied Science, and Practice]: Kirzner clarifies that while theory does not 'control' life, it provides the laws that applied economics uses to design effective state interventions. He argues against the view that applied science should be restricted to describing past institutions, emphasizing the importance of creative synthesis for economic progress. [Notes and References for Kirzner's Methodological Survey]: A collection of 28 footnotes providing citations and supplementary arguments regarding the classification of sciences, the distinction between practice and practical science, and critiques of contemporary economists like Brentano and Kleinwächter. [The General Theory of the Good]: Menger establishes the causal foundation of economic goods. He defines 'goods-character' through four prerequisites: a human need, properties of the thing, human knowledge of the causal connection, and command over the thing. He also introduces the concept of 'imaginary goods' based on mistaken assumptions about needs or properties. [Relationships and Useful Actions as Goods]: Menger discusses whether 'relationships' (like goodwill, monopolies, and copyrights) should be classified as goods. He concludes that they are essentially useful human actions or inactions and should be categorized alongside material goods and labor services. [The Causal Connections between Goods: Orders of Goods]: Menger introduces the classification of goods by 'order' based on their distance from the satisfaction of human needs. Goods of the first order satisfy needs directly, while goods of higher orders (second, third, etc.) are used in the production of lower-order goods. [The Laws Governing Goods-character: Complementarity]: Menger explains that the goods-character of higher-order goods depends on the availability of complementary goods required for production. He uses the American Civil War cotton shortage and agricultural labor shortages in Hungary to illustrate how the absence of a complementary good causes other goods in the causal chain to lose their goods-character. [The Derivation of Goods-character from Lower to Higher Orders]: Menger demonstrates that higher-order goods derive their status from the lower-order goods they help produce. If the need for a first-order good (e.g., tobacco or quinine) disappears, all specialized higher-order goods in that specific production chain lose their goods-character, unless they can satisfy other needs. [Time and Error in the Production Process]: Menger explores the essential role of time and uncertainty in the transformation of higher-order goods into first-order consumption goods. He argues that because production takes time, it is inherently subject to causality and human error. Uncertainty regarding the quantity and quality of the final product arises from incomplete knowledge of causal elements or lack of control over environmental factors like weather. This uncertainty is a fundamental component of economic life and necessitates human foresight. [The Causes of Progress in Human Welfare]: Menger critiques Adam Smith's view that the division of labour is the primary cause of economic progress. While acknowledging its importance, Menger argues that the true driver of welfare is the increasing employment of goods of higher orders (capital goods) and the expansion of human knowledge regarding causal connections. Progress is defined by moving from a primitive collecting economy to one where men control natural processes to ensure the availability of consumption goods according to their needs. [Property and the Interdependence of Goods]: This section defines property as the entire sum of goods at an individual's command for the satisfaction of their needs. Menger emphasizes the mutual interdependence of goods, noting that life and welfare are preserved not by single goods but by specific combinations. He explains how this harmony of needs is reflected in the property of an individual and how the interdependence of goods becomes more distinct when viewing the economic system as a whole in a developed exchange economy. [Notes and Introduction to Economy and Economic Goods]: Contains translational and bibliographical notes for the preceding sections, followed by an introduction to the third chapter. Menger defines 'requirements' as the quantities of goods necessary to satisfy needs within a planned time period. He contrasts the immediate needs of primitive individuals with the long-term, large-scale advance provision characteristic of civilized society, emphasizing that successful provision requires knowledge of both requirements and available quantities. [Human Requirements for Goods of First and Higher Order]: Menger details how humans determine their requirements for both consumption goods (first order) and means of production (higher order). He explains that while requirements for first-order goods are determined by needs, requirements for higher-order goods are dependent on the availability of complementary goods. Using examples like the American Civil War's impact on the cotton industry, he illustrates how a lack of one complementary factor can render requirements for others 'latent.' The section also defines the time limits and sequential periods (I, II, III) involved in planning production. [The Determination of Available Quantities and Market Information]: Menger discusses how economizing individuals and societies gain knowledge of the quantities of goods at their disposal. In advanced economies, a specialized class of intermediaries (merchants) and business reports (e.g., Ellison and Haywood for cotton) provide data on stocks and 'floating cargo.' He notes the limitations of government censuses and the necessity of private market intelligence for judging prospective changes in stocks and their influence on price formation. [The Origin of Economic Goods and Property]: Menger defines economic goods as those where requirements exceed the available quantity. This disparity necessitates 'economizing'—choosing which needs to satisfy and conserving the good. He argues that property is not an arbitrary invention but a necessary social solution to the conflict of interests arising from scarcity. Abolishing property is impossible without first eliminating scarcity, as any redistribution would still face the problem of unsatisfied requirements and the need for protection against force. [Non-Economic Goods and the Transition to Economic Character]: This section examines non-economic goods—those available in quantities exceeding requirements (e.g., water from a large river). Because there is no need to conserve them, these goods are not objects of economy or property, leading to a natural state of 'communism.' Menger explains how goods transition from non-economic to economic character due to population growth, increasing needs, or restricted access. He also notes that superior quality can give specific units of a good economic character even if the general class of the good is superabundant. [The Laws Governing the Economic Character of Higher-Order Goods]: Menger establishes the law that the economic character of higher-order goods is derived from the economic character of the lower-order goods they produce. He rejects the idea that a product is economic because it was made from economic factors; rather, the factors are economic only if they serve to satisfy unsatisfied requirements for consumption goods. He concludes that human economic life begins and ends with man's needs, with the economic status of all production means being imputed from the value of their final satisfaction. [Wealth and the Paradox of Economic Goods]: Menger defines wealth as the sum of economic goods at an individual's command, distinguishing it from property and non-economic goods. He addresses the 'paradox of wealth,' explaining that while an increase in goods generally improves welfare, a transition of goods from economic to non-economic status (due to abundance) technically reduces 'wealth' as defined by scarcity, though it increases total satisfaction. [Public Wealth and the Concept of National Wealth]: This section examines the definitions of public and national wealth. Menger rejects legal fictions like 'trust funds' as economic wealth, but accepts the existence of corporate and governmental wealth based on actual economizing units. He argues that 'national wealth' is a problematic concept that should be understood as a complex composite of individual wealths rather than a single economizing unit's property. [Notes to Chapter 1 and Introduction to 'On the Origin of Money']: A collection of detailed endnotes clarifying Menger's terminology (specifically 'requirements' vs. 'demand') and citing historical economic literature. This is followed by the introduction to Menger's seminal essay 'On the Origin of Money,' where he identifies the 'mysterious' nature of why individuals accept seemingly useless metal disks in exchange for useful goods. [The Enigma of Money and Historical Theories of its Origin]: Menger explores the historical and philosophical attempts to explain money's origin. He critiques the prevailing 'convention' or 'legal' theories (held by Plato, Aristotle, and Roman jurists) which suggest money was created by state decree or social contract. Menger argues these theories are unhistorical and fail to explain the organic process by which certain commodities become universally accepted. [The Theory of Saleableness (Absatzfähigkeit)]: Menger introduces the concept of 'saleableness' (Absatzfähigkeit) as the key to understanding money. He argues that the primary obstacle in barter is the difficulty of finding a double coincidence of wants. He distinguishes between purchasing and selling prices, noting that commodities vary in the ease with which they can be disposed of at 'economic prices' (prices corresponding to the general economic situation). [Factors Determining the Saleableness of Commodities]: Menger details the specific factors that determine a commodity's degree of saleableness, including the number of interested buyers, purchasing power, divisibility, transportability, and market development. He also analyzes the spatial and temporal limits of saleableness, explaining why some goods are marketable across vast distances and times while others are restricted. [The Spontaneous Genesis of Media of Exchange]: Menger describes the spontaneous evolution of money through individual self-interest. Economizing individuals realize they can reach their goals more effectively by exchanging less saleable goods for more saleable ones, even if they don't need the latter for consumption. This practice becomes a habit, leading to the emergence of a general medium of exchange without the need for a central authority or social contract. [Differentiation Between Money and Wares]: Menger explains how the emergence of money creates a sharp distinction between 'money' and 'wares.' Money provides certain and immediate control over all market goods at economic prices, whereas other commodities (wares) involve uncertainty in time and price. This section also explains the economic disadvantage of 'compulsory sales' and the inherent superiority of the buyer (money-holder) over the seller in a monetary economy. [VIII. How the Precious Metals became Money]: Karl Menger explains why precious metals became the universal medium of exchange. He attributes this to their superior saleableness compared to other commodities, their geographical distribution, durability, divisibility, and low transport costs. He argues that money emerged not through state decree but through the self-interested actions of intelligent bargainers who recognized the utility of holding highly saleable goods to facilitate future exchanges. [IX. Influence of the Sovereign Power and Notes]: Menger discusses the role of the state in perfecting money through coinage and legal recognition, while maintaining that money is a social rather than state-originated institution. This is followed by bibliographic notes and linguistic references for the term 'money' in various languages. [The Historical vs the Deductive Method in Political Economy]: Böhm-Bawerk reviews Gustav Schmoller's tribute to Wilhelm Roscher, using it as a platform to address the 'Methodenstreit' between the Austrian School and the German Historical School. He defends the 'exact' or deductive method, arguing that while historical investigation is valuable for practical problems, fundamental theoretical questions regarding value, capital, and interest require abstract-deductive reasoning to interpret empirical facts correctly. [The Positive Theory of Capital and its Critics: Professor Clark's Views]: Böhm-Bawerk responds to John Bates Clark's distinction between 'concrete capital goods' and 'true capital' (a permanent fund). He argues that Clark's 'true capital' is a mystical abstraction and that all economic effects are produced by concrete goods. He defends his thesis that present goods have a higher value than future goods and critiques Clark's claim that capital 'annihilates' production periods, asserting that this only appears true in a static economy. [On the Relationship between the 'Third Reason' and the Two Other Reasons]: Böhm-Bawerk defends his 'third reason' for the higher valuation of present goods—the higher productivity of more time-consuming roundabout methods—against criticisms by Irving Fisher and Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz. He argues that this technical superiority is an independent cause of interest, not merely a 'disguised' version of the first two reasons (relative provision and psychological perspective). He provides detailed mathematical and schematic rebuttals to their claims of logical circularity. [Notes on Fisher's Objections and the Third Reason for Interest]: A series of detailed endnotes (42-61) addressing Irving Fisher's critiques of Böhm-Bawerk's interest theory. The author defends the 'third reason' (technical superiority of present goods) against Fisher's claim that it is merely a disguise for the first two reasons. It includes a discussion on the independence of 'getting more' versus 'getting earlier' and critiques Fisher's mathematical formalistic approach. [Analogies for Independent Reasons for Preference]: The author provides two non-economic analogies—a ship engine and siege batteries—to illustrate how two different advantages (e.g., speed vs. fuel savings) can be independent reasons for preference, even if they stem from the same physical change. This serves as a rebuttal to Fisher's argument that technical superiority is not an independent cause of interest. [Further Notes on Fisher's 'The Rate of Interest' and the Agio Theory]: Endnotes 62-99 providing a deep dive into Irving Fisher's 'The Rate of Interest'. The author analyzes Fisher's concepts of 'income stream' and 'time-shape', comparing them to the Austrian 'third reason'. It critiques Fisher's reliance on mathematical functionalism over causal interpretation and clarifies the relationship between Fisher's 'impatience theory' and Böhm-Bawerk's 'agio theory'. [On the Relationship of Costs to Value: Introduction and the Isolated Subject]: An early paper by Friedrich von Wieser (translated by William Kirby) exploring the relationship between production costs and the value of goods. Wieser introduces a model of an isolated economic subject with limited productive goods (second-order goods) and demonstrates how the subject must prioritize production based on the intensity of needs (marginal utility). [Wieser's Scale of Importance and the Law of Cost-Value Congruence]: Wieser develops a numerical model to show how the importance of first-order goods (consumption goods) is derived from the needs they satisfy. He explains that utility often declines unevenly across different categories of goods. He concludes that in an economically appropriate use, the value of a first-order good is congruent with the value of the productive goods required for its manufacture. [The Nature and Measure of Value: Rarity and Need]: Wieser explains the psychological and economic origins of value. He argues that value arises only when goods are rare relative to demand, causing the importance of needs to be transferred to the goods themselves. He distinguishes between the actual use of a good and its 'economically appropriate use', asserting that value is determined by the latter. [The Relationship Between Productive Goods and Their Products]: This section explores the analogy between productive (higher-order) goods and their products (first-order goods). It argues that the value of productive goods is derived from the importance of the need-satisfactions dependent on their most valuable potential products. The author establishes that while the existence of a productive good does not guarantee a specific product, economic concern impels the actor to use goods according to their value, creating an equilibrium between the value of resources and the value of the final product. [Value Determination in Continuous Production and Consumption]: The text shifts from single-instance production to real-life scenarios of continuous production and consumption. It examines how economic subjects smooth out differences between periods by maintaining stocks and adjusting production schedules. A key argument is developed regarding 'Category III' goods: if a product is lost but can be restored using available productive resources, its value is determined not by the original need it satisfied, but by the value of the least important need-satisfaction that must be sacrificed to enable its restoration. [The General Law of Value and the Role of Costs]: The author reinforces the general law of value, asserting that the magnitude of value is always rooted in the need-satisfaction at stake. He critiques the view that 'costs' (the value of higher-order goods) are the final basis of value, arguing instead that costs are themselves a manifestation of utility and value-judgments within a comprehensive economic unit. The section concludes by noting that value is not inherent in goods but is a changing relationship between goods and needs. [Changes in Economic Conditions and Production Organization]: This segment analyzes how changes in the economic situation (shifts in demand or resource availability) necessitate modifications in production. The economic subject must expand or restrict production until the value of the product aligns with the newly determined value of the productive good. The author emphasizes that past production costs do not influence present value; rather, current and future conditions dictate the economic equilibrium. [Principles of Value in Exchange Transactions]: The text applies the established principles of value to complex exchange economies. It distinguishes between value for producers (exchange value based on prices) and value for consumers (based on the cost of purchase/replacement). The author argues that while prices appear to be determined by production costs, value remains the ultimate basis of price. The section also briefly addresses how monopolies disrupt the standard relationship between production costs and consumer value. [Summary of Value and Production Principles]: A summary of the results regarding the relationship between productive goods and products. It reiterates that human effort is directed toward realizing the value of productive goods in the products they create. It acknowledges that these principles depend on correct economic insight and are subject to change as conditions evolve, serving as the bedrock for value and price theory. [Friedrich von Wieser: The Austrian School and the Theory of Value]: Friedrich von Wieser provides an overview of the Austrian School's doctrines, distinguishing them from the German historical school. He discusses the derivation of value from marginal utility and introduces the 'theory of imputation' (Zurechnung), which explains how the value of a joint product is attributed to its individual factors (land, labor, capital). He critiques socialist views on labor and explains how cost of production is ultimately a synthesis of utilities. [The Theory of Imputation and Productive Factors]: Wieser elaborates on the necessity of 'imputation' in economic calculation, comparing it to legal responsibility. He argues that land and capital must be recognized as collaborating factors alongside labor. He asserts that even in a socialistic state, the scarcity of better land would necessitate the recognition of rent to ensure economic efficiency and responsibility. [Interest, Capital Value, and Land Valuation]: Wieser addresses the problem of interest and the valuation of capital and land. He explains that the value of future goods is less than present goods, necessitating discounting. He defines capitalization as an abbreviated method of discounting to determine the present value of a perpetual rental, such as land rent. He also touches upon the internal debates within the Austrian school regarding interest theory. [Exchange Value, Price, and Social Stratification]: This section examines how individual estimates of value (value in use) translate into market prices (value in exchange). Wieser introduces 'marginal equivalence,' noting that prices are determined not just by utility but by the wealth and purchasing power of different social strata. He observes that production follows prices, which may divert it from purely economic aims due to social inequalities and monopolies. [Subjective vs. Objective Value and Socialistic Calculation]: Wieser distinguishes between subjective value (personal) and objective value (market ratios). He argues that even under socialism, a 'rate of value' would be necessary for economic procedure and the calculus of production. He contrasts his view with Jevons, emphasizing that value in the Austrian sense governs all economic decisions, not just market exchange. [Public Finance and Progressive Taxation]: Wieser briefly applies the theory of value to public finance, referencing Emil Sax's work. He argues that a just system of taxation should reflect the varying valuations of different social classes, justifying progressive taxation based on the surplus goods held by the wealthy. [The Theory of Urban Ground Rent: Preface]: Wieser introduces his theory of urban ground rent, which serves as a preface to a statistical study of Prague by Dr. W. Mildschuh. He explains the methodology of using tax assessment data to investigate land values and residential rents, noting the transition of Prague into a large modern city. [Ricardo's Theory and the Contrast with Urban Rent]: Wieser critiques David Ricardo's methodology, describing him as a practical man who simplified complex phenomena. He contrasts agricultural rent (based on unequal costs for equal prices) with urban rent (based on equal costs for unequal prices). He argues that while agricultural rent can exist in a self-sufficient economy, urban rent is purely a market phenomenon requiring a perfected theory of price formation. [The Source of Urban Rent: Location and Competitive Bidding]: Wieser dismisses transportation costs as the primary driver of urban rent. Instead, he identifies competitive bidding for limited, desirable locations as the source. Urban ground rent is defined as the premium paid over the basic cost of construction and the value of the land as arable land. He introduces a model of a town with concentric rings to analyze how different social strata compete for space. [Social Stratification and the Market in Residential Rents]: Wieser argues that the choice of residence is primarily a social decision reflecting status. Urban residential zones expand or contract based on the size of the social class inhabiting them. He rejects the 'brass law of rents' (rigidly restricted markets), noting that partial markets are fluid and that the rich only bid high enough to displace the next lower social stratum, rather than to their absolute maximum ability to pay. [Business Rents and the Rent of Intensity]: Wieser distinguishes business rents from residential rents, noting that business locations serve as advertising and are more restricted to traffic lanes. He introduces the 'rent of intensity,' where landlords increase capital investment (building higher or more luxuriously) to capture higher rents. He formulates a 'law of diminishing returns on residential quarters,' explaining how rent varies vertically within a building and how building regulations flatten the city's vertical profile. [The Large Modern City and Land Speculation]: Wieser analyzes the transformation of rent in the rapidly growing modern city. He discusses the impact of the 1873 crisis in Prague, noting that rents in better neighborhoods were more resilient than in workers' districts. He addresses land speculation, arguing that it is a product of the free market rather than a monopoly. He explains that tenement houses on the outskirts are built in anticipation of future demand and higher intensity use. [Conclusion: The Nature of Urban Rent and Public Policy]: The final section contrasts urban and agricultural rent, characterizing urban rent as 'undeserved income' that rises naturally with population growth. Wieser argues that urban rent is amenable to taxation because it burdens tenants according to their ability to pay. He concludes that while municipal intervention can mitigate some evils, the fundamental pressure of demand and social stratification sets limits on the ability of public policy to reduce rents. [Wieser's Critique of Schumpeter's Methodology]: Wieser reviews Joseph Schumpeter's 1908 book, 'The Nature and Substance of Theoretical Economics'. While praising Schumpeter's command of the material, Wieser critiques his rejection of the psychological method in favor of an 'external' observation model borrowed from the natural sciences. Wieser defends the 'internal' observation of consciousness as the most fruitful method for economics and questions Schumpeter's relegation of interest to 'dynamics'. [The Psychological Method vs. External Observation]: Wieser clarifies that the psychological method is not scientific psychology or physiology, but the analysis of the consciousness of the economic actor. He argues against Schumpeter's attempt to replace 'cause and effect' with 'function'. Wieser maintains that economists should use the language of common experience (explanation) rather than trying to adapt to the latest epistemological trends of the natural sciences. [Assumptions, Hypotheses, and Gossen's Law]: Wieser discusses the role of assumptions in economic theory, distinguishing between Schumpeter's 'hypotheses' and the psychological school's 'idealizing assumptions'. He uses Gossen's law of satiation as an example, arguing that it is a law known through inner experience, not an arbitrary formal assumption. He critiques Schumpeter's 'external' method of questioning consumers as impractical and inferior to introspection. [The Value Principle vs. The Cost Principle]: Wieser critiques Schumpeter's 'instrumentalist' view of the value principle. While Schumpeter uses the value principle because it is 'practical,' Wieser insists it is used because it is *true* and reflects the actual sense of economic actions. He concludes by praising Schumpeter's mental energy and youthful strength while warning that methodology should be the final, not the first, concern of a scientist. [Franz Čuhel: On the Theory of Needs]: This segment introduces Franz Čuhel's work on the theory of needs, specifically focusing on the commensurability of needs. Čuhel is noted for his pioneering work on ordinal utility, which influenced Ludwig von Mises. The text serves as a bridge between economic and psychological investigations into human requirements. [On the Commensurability of Needs: Preliminary Notions]: Čuhel introduces the concept of 'chreonomics' as an applied psychology that investigates changes in welfare and use needs. He argues that while economics begins where psychology ends, the economist must often derive their own principles regarding the intensity and comparability of desires when neighboring disciplines fail to provide them. [The Concept of Egence]: The author introduces 'egence' as a technical term for the two-dimensional quantity of desire, depending on both the duration of welfare increase and the intensity of the drive for satisfaction. He critiques Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, and Wieser for using terms like 'importance' or 'value' as if they were properties of states of welfare rather than dimensions of the desire itself. He further distinguishes between positive egence, negative egence (disegence), and potential versus current egences. [Comparability of Egences within a Single Person]: Čuhel argues that egences within a single individual are commensurable because humans make daily decisions of will between competing desires, which acts as a 'beam balance' for identifying the stronger egence. He rejects the idea that 'intensity of pleasure or pain' is the correct criterion for comparison, noting that feelings can be mixed or deadened by repetition while the drive of desire remains constant. [The Impossibility of Measuring Egences]: This section distinguishes between 'comparison' (scaling) and 'measurement'. Čuhel argues that egences cannot be measured in a cardinal sense because there is no constant unit of egence; due to Gossen's First Law (diminishing utility), the egence of a second or third unit of a good is not identical to the first, making it impossible to form true mathematical multiples. [Critique of Böhm-Bawerk on Numerical Measurement]: Čuhel provides a detailed rebuttal to Böhm-Bawerk's claim that the difference between intensities of needs can be measured numerically. He argues that Böhm-Bawerk confuses the sum of several unequal pleasures (like eating eight plums in succession) with a mathematical product of a single unit, concluding that ordinal ranking is sufficient for 'sensible' economic decisions. [Egence Scales and Scaling Methods]: The author proposes 'scaling' as the appropriate method for determining egences, using ordinal numbers rather than cardinal ones. He compares this to the Mohs scale of mineral hardness. He critiques Gustav Cassel's view that money provides a standard for measuring the intensity of needs, asserting that money only allows for the comparison of possession egences, not absolute measurement. [Measurability of Negative Egences (Disegences)]: Čuhel applies his scaling logic to negative egences (disegences), such as the reluctance to perform labor. He explains that positive egences can be indirectly determined by the amount of disegence (resistance) they are able to overcome, similar to measuring the power of a steam engine by the resistance it moves. [Interpersonal Incomparability of Egences]: The final section addresses the impossibility of comparing egences between different people. Since desires are only experienced within a single consciousness, there is no objective standard to compare Person A's hunger with Person B's. Čuhel notes that while economics uses fictions of equality for barter and price theory, the lack of interpersonal comparison creates significant theoretical hurdles for distributive systems, such as a communist economy. [VII. On the commensurability of future welfare and use needs]: This section examines how individuals compare future welfare and use desires against present ones. It argues that future desires influence present economic activity by creating a 'possession egence' in the present, which is then weighed against current use egences to determine the order of satisfaction for goods. [Notes to the Previous Chapters]: A comprehensive set of endnotes referencing key figures in the marginalist revolution and Austrian school. The notes discuss terminology (utility vs. desirability), the nature of sensations, the ranking of needs, and the psychological foundations of value as debated by Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, Wieser, Jevons, and Gossen. [On the 'Measurability' of Sensations by Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk]: Böhm-Bawerk responds to Franz Čuhel's criticisms regarding the numerical determination of sensation intensities. He distinguishes between strict 'measurement' and 'scalation' (like Mohs' scale of hardness), arguing that while objective measurement of feelings is impossible, humans perform subjective numerical estimations (summation of unequal gratifications) necessary for rational economic action. He also critiques the psychological view that sensation intensity can only be inferred from desire, asserting that sensations can be perceived and evaluated directly.