by Machlup
[Front Matter and Foreword]: This segment contains the front matter, table of contents, and the foreword by Abraham L. Gitlow for the 13th Charles C. Moskowitz Lectures. It introduces the central theme: 'The Outlook for the Major Competing Economic Systems.' The foreword summarizes the contributions of Jan Tinbergen on the 'optimum regime' for social welfare, Abram Bergson's comparative analysis of Soviet and Western productivity, and the critiques provided by Fritz Machlup and Oskar Morgenstern regarding the measurement of welfare and the impact of redistribution on incentives. [Some Features of the Optimum Regime: Aim and Interdisciplinary Approach]: Jan Tinbergen introduces his lecture by advocating for the 'depolarization' of economic systems through objective scientific reasoning rather than emotional or doctrinaire views. He argues that finding the 'best' social order requires an interdisciplinary approach rooted in welfare economics. He redefines the central problem of welfare economics not as a search for economic variables, but as a search for the optimal set of institutions and their behavior equations, emphasizing that the choice of a social welfare function involves an ethical starting point. [Survey of Approaches to Social Welfare and Restrictions]: Tinbergen categorizes different approaches to defining social welfare based on the choice of the welfare function and the restrictions (technical or ethical) applied. He distinguishes between weighted and unweighted sums of individual welfare and discusses the components of individual welfare: variables (situation), parameters (capabilities/needs), and coefficients (human nature). He explores how these definitions impact the optimal income distribution and the role of free markets versus central planning, particularly in the presence of external effects or the requirement of 'justice' (equality of personal welfare). [Critique of Traditional Welfare Economics and Public Tasks]: Tinbergen provides a critical appraisal of traditional welfare economics, noting that its focus on uniform pricing and anti-monopoly measures is only valid if accompanied by optimal income redistribution. He argues that a system of taxes and subsidies is an essential part of the optimum order. He also discusses the shift of tasks from private to public authorities, suggesting that the nature of the production process (such as high fixed costs) rather than the goods themselves often determines whether a service should be public or private. [Proposed Interdisciplinary Approach and the Lump-Sum Capability Tax]: Tinbergen outlines his preferred method for determining the optimal social order, using an unweighted sum of individual welfare values and the Weber-Fechner law (logarithmic utility of income). He proposes a 'lump-sum tax' based on capability tests rather than actual income to maintain work incentives while achieving redistribution. While acknowledging current limitations in testing accuracy and tax morals, he suggests this as a future goal to ensure that income differences primarily reflect professional and personal needs rather than innate talent or luck. [Concluding Remarks on Optimal Social Order]: Machlup concludes his discussion on the optimal social order by emphasizing an interdisciplinary approach to welfare economics. He argues for government intervention in cases of individual myopia and suggests that a just order may involve socialist features like wealth taxes and income based on need. He posits that a lump-sum tax based on capability could make society more egalitarian and efficient, and calls for a common scientific language between Western and Eastern social scientists to facilitate coexistence. [Notes and Bibliography (Machlup)]: A list of sixteen bibliographic references and notes supporting Machlup's lecture, including works by Tinbergen, Leontief, and the Club of Rome regarding income equality, world dynamics, and welfare economics. [Productivity Under Two Systems: The USSR Versus the West - Introduction]: Abram Bergson introduces a comparative study of economic merit between socialism (USSR) and capitalism (USA and Western Europe). He defines productive efficiency as the degree to which a country realizes its theoretical output capacity given its factors and technology. He distinguishes between simple productivity (output per worker) and factor productivity (output per unit of labor and capital combined), noting that while they are not identical to efficiency, they serve as vital indicators for appraising different economic systems. [Methodology and Comparative Productivity in the General Economy]: Bergson details his methodology for comparing productivity, utilizing 'gross material product' to exclude service sectors where output is merely measured by inputs. Using 1960 data and building on Edward Denison's work, he finds the US leads in productivity, followed by Northwest Europe, with the USSR and Italy at the bottom. He adjusts for labor quality (education, age, and sex), which narrows the gap between the US and other nations but maintains the relative ranking of the USSR as comparable to Italy. [Factors Influencing Productivity: Effort, Unemployment, and Scale]: This section examines non-capital factors affecting productivity, such as labor effort, unemployment, and capital utilization. Bergson notes that while the USSR claims to have abolished unemployment, it suffers from structural and frictional types. He observes that Soviet productivity remains low despite high capital utilization (shift work) and potentially favorable economies of scale. He concludes that Soviet productive efficiency is likely matched or surpassed by even the least efficient Western nations. [Productivity and the Stage of Economic Development]: Bergson explores whether the USSR's low productivity is a result of its socialist system or its stage of development. He uses capital stock per worker and the share of non-farm employment as indicators. He notes an 'incongruity' in the Soviet data: high capital stock per worker but low non-farm employment, likely due to inefficient, capital-intensive industrial projects. He also argues that centralist planning becomes increasingly burdensome and less efficient as an economy grows more complex. [Industrial Productivity Comparisons]: By isolating 'industry' (manufacturing, mining, transport, etc.) from agriculture, Bergson finds that the USSR's performance appears more favorable, matching Italy and the UK in labor productivity. However, when adjusted for factor productivity and development stage (capital stock per worker), the Soviet industrial performance still lags behind the Western pattern. He concludes that while Soviet industrial efficiency is higher than its general economy efficiency, it remains low by Western standards. [General Conclusions and Technical Regression Data]: Bergson summarizes that Soviet socialism is neither 'colossally wasteful' nor 'extraordinarily efficient,' but falls within the middle of those extremes. He notes that the USSR has historically compensated for productivity lags through high investment rates at the cost of the consumer. The section concludes with a technical note providing regression data (coefficients of correlation and t-values) for the relationship between factor productivity, development indicators, and the presence of socialism. [Notes to Productivity Under Two Systems]: Detailed footnotes for Bergson's essay, discussing sources such as the CIA and TSU, clarifying the exclusion of housing and defense from gross material product, and addressing the technicalities of US dollar price valuation versus foreign national prices. [Appendix: Sources and Methods on Comparative Productivity]: A technical appendix detailing the statistical methodology and data sources used to compare productivity between the United States, the USSR, and several Western European nations. It provides specific calculations for adjusting employment data based on hours worked, education levels, age, and sex, while also defining 'gross material product' and 'industry' for cross-country consistency. The section includes numerous data tables (A-1 through A-11) covering factor inputs, capital stocks, inventories, and output valuations in US factor costs and market prices. [Abbreviations and Bibliography]: A list of abbreviations for international organizations and a comprehensive bibliography of academic sources cited in the text, focusing on Soviet economic planning, international price comparisons, and productivity growth. [The Best Society: Efficiency and Equality (Fritz Machlup)]: Fritz Machlup provides a critical commentary on the papers by Bergson and Tinbergen, focusing on the tension between productive efficiency and distributive justice. He critiques Tinbergen's egalitarianism, arguing that the pursuit of income equality is often rooted in envy and that interpersonal utility comparisons lack scientific validity. Machlup also highlights the practical dangers of 'test-and-tax' schemes on potential income and cites Stalin to demonstrate that even socialist leaders recognized the necessity of wage differentials for economic productivity. [Social Aspirations and Optimality (Oskar Morgenstern)]: Oskar Morgenstern critiques the preceding speakers, questioning the reliability of productivity data in an economy increasingly dominated by intangible services rather than physical output. He challenges Tinbergen's concept of an 'optimum' as mathematically ill-defined and argues that society cannot be formalized through scientific axioms alone. Morgenstern concludes that social organizations depend on values and preferences that cannot be reduced to a single stable system of equal income distribution without risking dictatorship.
This segment contains the front matter, table of contents, and the foreword by Abraham L. Gitlow for the 13th Charles C. Moskowitz Lectures. It introduces the central theme: 'The Outlook for the Major Competing Economic Systems.' The foreword summarizes the contributions of Jan Tinbergen on the 'optimum regime' for social welfare, Abram Bergson's comparative analysis of Soviet and Western productivity, and the critiques provided by Fritz Machlup and Oskar Morgenstern regarding the measurement of welfare and the impact of redistribution on incentives.
Read full textJan Tinbergen introduces his lecture by advocating for the 'depolarization' of economic systems through objective scientific reasoning rather than emotional or doctrinaire views. He argues that finding the 'best' social order requires an interdisciplinary approach rooted in welfare economics. He redefines the central problem of welfare economics not as a search for economic variables, but as a search for the optimal set of institutions and their behavior equations, emphasizing that the choice of a social welfare function involves an ethical starting point.
Read full textTinbergen categorizes different approaches to defining social welfare based on the choice of the welfare function and the restrictions (technical or ethical) applied. He distinguishes between weighted and unweighted sums of individual welfare and discusses the components of individual welfare: variables (situation), parameters (capabilities/needs), and coefficients (human nature). He explores how these definitions impact the optimal income distribution and the role of free markets versus central planning, particularly in the presence of external effects or the requirement of 'justice' (equality of personal welfare).
Read full textTinbergen provides a critical appraisal of traditional welfare economics, noting that its focus on uniform pricing and anti-monopoly measures is only valid if accompanied by optimal income redistribution. He argues that a system of taxes and subsidies is an essential part of the optimum order. He also discusses the shift of tasks from private to public authorities, suggesting that the nature of the production process (such as high fixed costs) rather than the goods themselves often determines whether a service should be public or private.
Read full textTinbergen outlines his preferred method for determining the optimal social order, using an unweighted sum of individual welfare values and the Weber-Fechner law (logarithmic utility of income). He proposes a 'lump-sum tax' based on capability tests rather than actual income to maintain work incentives while achieving redistribution. While acknowledging current limitations in testing accuracy and tax morals, he suggests this as a future goal to ensure that income differences primarily reflect professional and personal needs rather than innate talent or luck.
Read full textMachlup concludes his discussion on the optimal social order by emphasizing an interdisciplinary approach to welfare economics. He argues for government intervention in cases of individual myopia and suggests that a just order may involve socialist features like wealth taxes and income based on need. He posits that a lump-sum tax based on capability could make society more egalitarian and efficient, and calls for a common scientific language between Western and Eastern social scientists to facilitate coexistence.
Read full textA list of sixteen bibliographic references and notes supporting Machlup's lecture, including works by Tinbergen, Leontief, and the Club of Rome regarding income equality, world dynamics, and welfare economics.
Read full textAbram Bergson introduces a comparative study of economic merit between socialism (USSR) and capitalism (USA and Western Europe). He defines productive efficiency as the degree to which a country realizes its theoretical output capacity given its factors and technology. He distinguishes between simple productivity (output per worker) and factor productivity (output per unit of labor and capital combined), noting that while they are not identical to efficiency, they serve as vital indicators for appraising different economic systems.
Read full textBergson details his methodology for comparing productivity, utilizing 'gross material product' to exclude service sectors where output is merely measured by inputs. Using 1960 data and building on Edward Denison's work, he finds the US leads in productivity, followed by Northwest Europe, with the USSR and Italy at the bottom. He adjusts for labor quality (education, age, and sex), which narrows the gap between the US and other nations but maintains the relative ranking of the USSR as comparable to Italy.
Read full textThis section examines non-capital factors affecting productivity, such as labor effort, unemployment, and capital utilization. Bergson notes that while the USSR claims to have abolished unemployment, it suffers from structural and frictional types. He observes that Soviet productivity remains low despite high capital utilization (shift work) and potentially favorable economies of scale. He concludes that Soviet productive efficiency is likely matched or surpassed by even the least efficient Western nations.
Read full textBergson explores whether the USSR's low productivity is a result of its socialist system or its stage of development. He uses capital stock per worker and the share of non-farm employment as indicators. He notes an 'incongruity' in the Soviet data: high capital stock per worker but low non-farm employment, likely due to inefficient, capital-intensive industrial projects. He also argues that centralist planning becomes increasingly burdensome and less efficient as an economy grows more complex.
Read full textBy isolating 'industry' (manufacturing, mining, transport, etc.) from agriculture, Bergson finds that the USSR's performance appears more favorable, matching Italy and the UK in labor productivity. However, when adjusted for factor productivity and development stage (capital stock per worker), the Soviet industrial performance still lags behind the Western pattern. He concludes that while Soviet industrial efficiency is higher than its general economy efficiency, it remains low by Western standards.
Read full textBergson summarizes that Soviet socialism is neither 'colossally wasteful' nor 'extraordinarily efficient,' but falls within the middle of those extremes. He notes that the USSR has historically compensated for productivity lags through high investment rates at the cost of the consumer. The section concludes with a technical note providing regression data (coefficients of correlation and t-values) for the relationship between factor productivity, development indicators, and the presence of socialism.
Read full textDetailed footnotes for Bergson's essay, discussing sources such as the CIA and TSU, clarifying the exclusion of housing and defense from gross material product, and addressing the technicalities of US dollar price valuation versus foreign national prices.
Read full textA technical appendix detailing the statistical methodology and data sources used to compare productivity between the United States, the USSR, and several Western European nations. It provides specific calculations for adjusting employment data based on hours worked, education levels, age, and sex, while also defining 'gross material product' and 'industry' for cross-country consistency. The section includes numerous data tables (A-1 through A-11) covering factor inputs, capital stocks, inventories, and output valuations in US factor costs and market prices.
Read full textA list of abbreviations for international organizations and a comprehensive bibliography of academic sources cited in the text, focusing on Soviet economic planning, international price comparisons, and productivity growth.
Read full textFritz Machlup provides a critical commentary on the papers by Bergson and Tinbergen, focusing on the tension between productive efficiency and distributive justice. He critiques Tinbergen's egalitarianism, arguing that the pursuit of income equality is often rooted in envy and that interpersonal utility comparisons lack scientific validity. Machlup also highlights the practical dangers of 'test-and-tax' schemes on potential income and cites Stalin to demonstrate that even socialist leaders recognized the necessity of wage differentials for economic productivity.
Read full textOskar Morgenstern critiques the preceding speakers, questioning the reliability of productivity data in an economy increasingly dominated by intangible services rather than physical output. He challenges Tinbergen's concept of an 'optimum' as mathematically ill-defined and argues that society cannot be formalized through scientific axioms alone. Morgenstern concludes that social organizations depend on values and preferences that cannot be reduced to a single stable system of equal income distribution without risking dictatorship.
Read full text