[Front Matter and Publication Details]: Title page, copyright information, and publication details for the collection of Joseph A. Schumpeter's political speeches edited by Seidl and Stolper. [Preface (Vorwort)]: The editors introduce the volume, highlighting Schumpeter's largely unknown role as a politician and finance minister in 1919. They describe the source materials (media, cabinet protocols, letters to Count Harrach) and the editorial principles regarding orthography and corrections, concluding with acknowledgments to archives and staff. [Table of Contents (Inhaltsverzeichnis)]: Detailed table of contents listing the six main chapters covering currency problems, financial goals, the Treaty of Saint-Germain, socialization, and Schumpeter's resignation, followed by an appendix of letters. [Introduction: Schumpeter as Finance Minister of the Republic of German-Austria]: A comprehensive introductory essay analyzing Schumpeter's tenure as Finance Minister. It connects his policy decisions to his theoretical work 'The Crisis of the Tax State' (1918). Key themes include his opposition to the 'Anschluss' with Germany in favor of a Danube Confederation, his strategy to use a wealth tax (Vermögensabgabe) to curb inflation and preserve state credit, and his complex relationship with the Social Democrats regarding socialization. Schumpeter argues that while socialism may be inevitable, the immediate post-war period required private enterprise to restore productivity. [Excerpts from the Diary of Friedrich von Wieser]: Diary entries from economist Friedrich von Wieser providing a contemporary, often critical, perspective on Schumpeter's personality and political standing. Wieser describes Schumpeter as brilliant but vain and frivolous, noting his shifting reputation among political parties and academic circles during his ministry. [Chapter 1: Currency Problems of Food and Raw Material Supply]: This chapter focuses on the desperate need for foreign currency to import food and raw materials. It includes Schumpeter's interactions with workers' councils, his views on selling domestic assets (stocks and art) to secure credit, and the controversy surrounding the 'Dollar Loan.' Schumpeter argues that a healthy money market is essential for a healthy labor market and defends the use of unconventional financial maneuvers to prevent starvation. [Chapter 2: General Financial Policy Objectives]: This section details Schumpeter's broad financial program, including his inaugural speeches and budget presentations. He addresses the 'three blocks' hindering recovery: war bonds, currency instability, and federal/state financial relations. Schumpeter advocates for a one-time wealth tax to eliminate the money overhang, a tax amnesty to encourage honest reporting, and warns that the harsh terms of the Treaty of Saint-Germain threaten the state's survival. He also discusses the mechanics of deficit financing through treasury bills rather than simple money printing. [Fundamental Remarks on the Currency Question]: Schumpeter analyzes the post-war currency crisis, identifying the primary evils as price revolution and exchange rate fluctuation. He argues that while commodity scarcity is a factor, the massive increase in the money supply (inflation) caused by war financing is the fundamental cause of currency devaluation. He distinguishes between productive credit and the 'paper money' character of current banknotes used for state consumption, emphasizing that currency stability requires active intervention rather than waiting for automatic post-war corrections. [The Impact of War Loans and Taxation on Inflation]: This section examines how different methods of state financing affect inflation. Schumpeter argues that only taxes and loans drawn from existing circulation counteract inflation, whereas bank-financed state needs exacerbate it. He defines 'currency devaluation' as a loss of purchasing power specifically caused by monetary sphere disturbances, which unlike commodity-driven price increases, will not self-correct after the war. [Purchasing Power Parity and International Exchange Rates]: Schumpeter discusses the relationship between domestic inflation and international exchange rates. He introduces the concept of a 'new parity' based on the relative purchasing power of currencies. He argues that even without a gold standard, a stable exchange rate is possible if the money supply is limited, but Austria's excessive banknote emission has fundamentally shifted the parity, necessitating a reduction in circulation to restore the currency. [Financial Optimism and the Danube Confederation]: An editorial introduction discussing the conflicting visions for post-war Austria. It contrasts Karl Renner's idea of a multinational federation with Otto Bauer's drive for 'Anschluss' with Germany as a prerequisite for socialism. The text highlights Schumpeter's opposition to the Anschluss and his advocacy for a 'Danube Confederation'—an economic and currency union of the former Austro-Hungarian states—to preserve Vienna's role as a financial center. [Schumpeter's Views on Free Trade, Peace, and Socialization]: This section details Schumpeter's shifting stance on socialization and his geopolitical outlook. It references his work 'Sociology of Imperialisms,' arguing that only a free economy ensures a peaceful society. It also describes a diplomatic conflict where Schumpeter's public optimism about Austria's financial future clashed with State Chancellor Renner's negotiation strategy in St. Germain, leading Renner to accuse Schumpeter of making the delegation look like 'swindlers'. [State Secretary Schumpeter on Future Economic Tasks (Press Address)]: In his first address to the press as State Secretary of Finance (March 1919), Schumpeter expresses optimism regarding Austria's recovery. He argues that Vienna must remain the financial heart of the region despite political separation. He discusses the global rise in interest rates and the necessity of choosing between a free entrepreneurial system or total socialization, warning that a middle ground of 'ruining' industry through uncertainty is untenable. He notably references Lenin's realization that high-level expertise is required even in a socialized economy. [Fulfillment of Hungary's Financial Obligations to German-Austria]: Schumpeter addresses the financial tensions with the Hungarian Soviet Republic. He insists on the protection of Austrian capital and property rights in Hungary, arguing that even a revolutionary state must act as a 'reliable businessman' to maintain international credit. He expresses confidence that an agreement will be reached regarding the compensation of Austrian owners of socialized Hungarian industries. [Free Trade and Lasting Peace (University Lecture)]: A major lecture delivered at the University of Vienna (April 1919) regarding the economic causes of war. Schumpeter argues that while the war was not caused by economic necessity, mercantilist and protectionist policies created an aggressive atmosphere. He advocates for free trade as the only path to lasting peace and warns against the 'war economy' organizations that persist after the conflict. He emphasizes that Austria's reconstruction depends on foreign capital, which requires maintaining private property and entrepreneurial freedom. [Economic Integration of Successor States]: Schumpeter critiques the economic barriers erected by the new successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He describes the creation of separate customs and currency zones for small populations as 'ridiculous' and 'criminal,' arguing that economic necessity will eventually force a return to cooperation, such as a customs or currency convention. [War Loans and the Capital Levy (Konzerthaus Speech)]: A significant speech (May 1919) addressing the 'War Loan' problem and the proposed 'Capital Levy' (Vermögensabgabe). Schumpeter categorically rules out state bankruptcy, asserting that Austria will honor its debts to maintain creditworthiness. He explains that the Capital Levy is necessary to stabilize the currency and reduce the 'cancer' of paper money inflation. He also suggests that the levy could facilitate socialization if the state accepts corporate shares as payment, thereby gaining influence over key industries without direct expropriation. [The Industrial Future of German-Austria (Handelskammer Speech)]: Schumpeter discusses the future of Austrian industry (May 1919), emphasizing that the state cannot live on subsidies forever and must return to work. He defends Vienna's role as a financial metropolis for the Balkans and the Danube basin. He argues for a clear distinction in policy: industries that are to be socialized should be dealt with quickly, while the rest must be granted radical economic freedom and tax incentives to attract foreign capital. He identifies the development of water power as the key to future industrial growth. [Interview with 'Le Temps': The Financial Liquidation of the Empire]: An interview with a French correspondent (published June 1919) where Schumpeter discusses the 'financial liquidation' of the Empire. He argues that Austria's survival depends on a fair distribution of the old Empire's debts and the protection of Austrian-owned assets in the successor states. The text includes a critique of Italy's alleged desire to keep Austria 'independent but non-viable' and contrasts the economic benefits of the 'Anschluss' with the political preference for independence. [Financial and Economic Outlooks (Die Woche)]: A concise summary of Schumpeter's position in 'Die Woche' (June 1919). He argues that the Capital Levy must be used exclusively to pay down debt, not for current spending. He reiterates that since total socialization is technically impossible, Austria must embrace a capitalist recovery path, relying on the 'merchant' class to secure raw materials and credit from the West. [The Savings Banks and the Capital Levy]: Schumpeter addresses the Association of German Savings Banks (June 1919), noting that 40% of their deposits are tied to war loans. He promises that the Capital Levy will rescue these institutions by accepting war loans at a favorable rate. He also discusses the necessity of state-backed credit for industry to prevent a collapse worse than that of 1873 and argues against the 'devaluation' of banknotes as a solution. [Reactions to the Peace Negotiations in Saint-Germain]: An introduction to the reactions following the harsh peace conditions presented on June 2, 1919. The Entente's draft treated small German-Austria as the sole legal successor to the Empire's debts while seizing its assets. Schumpeter describes these conditions as a 'death sentence' and a 'state bankruptcy' imposed from outside, arguing that the Capital Levy would be pointless if it only served the enemy. [Schumpeter on Wilson and the Peace Conferences]: An interview (May 1910) where Schumpeter provides a character portrait of Woodrow Wilson based on his time as an exchange professor in the US. He praises Wilson's moral standing and banking reforms. He expresses hope that Wilson will ensure Austria's survival and discusses the 'Anschluss' question, suggesting that immediate union with Germany would require significant concessions from Germany to be viable. [The Ruinous Nature of the Draft Peace Conditions]: Schumpeter warns the public (June 1919) that the Entente's financial conditions are 'ruinous' and intended to 'destroy German-Austria.' He states that the Capital Levy cannot be presented to parliament until the final conditions are known, as it would be impossible to carry out if it merely served the victors rather than national recovery. [Economic Death Sentence: The St. Germain Draft]: In a lecture to the National Economic Society (June 1919), Schumpeter deconstructs the St. Germain draft. He highlights three fatal points: the liquidation of foreign assets, the arbitrary calculation of exchange rates for foreign obligations (using October 1918 rates), and the incentivizing of capital flight. He argues that these terms violate international private law and will inevitably lead to social collapse and Bolshevism. [Protest Against the 'Peace of Destruction']: A report on a mass protest meeting (August 1919) featuring Schumpeter and Ignaz Seipel. Schumpeter mocks the Entente's demands—such as the delivery of 15,000 cows while Austria receives condensed milk—as 'absurd.' He argues that the Entente is destroying the very foundations of international credit by making private property 'outlawed' and calls for a commission where all successor states share the debt burden fairly. [Socialization and the Capital Levy: The Schumpeter-Bauer Conflict]: A detailed historical introduction to the ideological conflict between Schumpeter and Otto Bauer. While both saw socialism as an eventual destiny, they differed on the timing and method. Bauer wanted the Capital Levy to fund socialization, while Schumpeter wanted it strictly for debt reduction. The text covers the 'Alpine Montan Affair,' where Schumpeter was accused of facilitating the sale of Austria's largest iron company to Italian investors to stabilize the currency, thereby thwarting Bauer's socialization plans. It also reveals Schumpeter's secret involvement in supporting the Hungarian counter-revolution to stop the spread of Bolshevism. [The Program of the New State Secretary (Initial Interview)]: Schumpeter's initial program (March 1919) as State Secretary. He identifies the war loan and currency devaluation as the two 'boulders' to be overcome. He proposes a one-time large Capital Levy and the creation of monopolies to increase state influence, while emphasizing that the primary goal is to make life in the new state 'tolerable' for its citizens. [The Capital Levy as a Rescue Action]: Schumpeter explains (March 1919) that the Capital Levy is not a 'harassment' but a 'rescue' to restore the purchasing power of the 'wage crown.' He argues that as long as private industry is maintained, it must not be ruined by bureaucratic interference, though he remains open to socialization where it makes sense. [The Plan for a Socialization Bank]: Schumpeter discusses the budget provisorium (July 1919) and the plan for a 'Socialization Bank.' This institute would prepare the Capital Levy, manage the compensation for socialized companies, and provide credit to industrial organizations. He also insists that the new Central Bank must be independent and forbidden from doing business with the state. [A Query to Dr. Schumpeter: The Stagnation of Industry]: A public letter (July 1919) questioning Schumpeter on how reconstruction is possible when the threat of socialization and the 'property freeze' prevent any entrepreneur from investing. It argues that the lack of clear rules is the primary cause of economic paralysis and unemployment. [Reconstruction and the Relationship between Vienna and the Provinces]: In a speech in Graz (July 1919), Schumpeter defends the high state spending as necessary to prevent Bolshevism. He argues against provincial separatist tendencies, noting that the provinces depend on Vienna's tax power. He reiterates that the Capital Levy will rescue the war loan holders and that the state's goal is to make the country 'habitable' again within 3 to 5 years. [Stock Market Orgies: The Alpine Montan Scandal]: A scathing article from the 'Arbeiter-Zeitung' (August 1919) attacking Schumpeter and the banker Richard Kola. It accuses them of driving up the stock price of the Alpine Montan company while it was idle, in order to sell it to Italian investors. This 'orgie' is presented as a betrayal of the socialization program, making the company too expensive for the state to acquire and placing a key national resource in foreign hands. [Cabinet Protocol Annex: Financial Planning]: A strictly secret annex to the cabinet protocol (July 8, 1919) regarding preparatory measures for the Capital Levy, socialization, and industrial promotion. [Bericht über die Maßnahmen zur Vorbereitung der Finanzierung der Vermögensabgabe, der Sozialisierung und der Industrieförderung]: This segment contains a detailed report by State Secretary Joseph Schumpeter regarding the financial preparations for a capital levy (Vermögensabgabe), socialization projects, and industrial support in post-WWI Austria. Schumpeter argues against a purely state-run credit institute due to high costs and lack of creditworthiness, proposing instead a 'mixed-economy' (gemischtwirtschaftlich) model. He details the restructuring of the 'Credit-Institute für Verkehrs-Unternehmungen und öffentliche Arbeiten' into a semi-state entity by acquiring a majority share and removing the influence of the Lower Austrian Escompte-Gesellschaft. The report also references similar German proposals by Rudolf Wissell and outlines the appointment of state officials to the institute's board to ensure public interest is maintained. [Streng vertraulicher Anhang zum Kabinettsprotokoll Nr. 88: Sozialisierungsbank und Alpine-Hausse]: This segment covers the confidential cabinet meeting of July 15, 1919, focusing on two main controversies: the transformation of a credit institute into a 'Socialization Bank' and the sharp rise in Alpine Montangesellschaft stock prices (Alpine-Hausse). State Secretary Otto Bauer expresses concern that the state's involvement with the private Bankhaus Cola and the public recognition of high stock prices undermined the socialization of the Alpine company by making it too expensive for the state to acquire. Schumpeter defends his actions, arguing that high stock prices benefit the state through the capital levy and that the cooperation with Bankhaus Cola was necessary for currency stabilization in Zurich. The discussion concludes with a call for legislation to prevent the flight of domestic industrial assets to foreign owners. [Darlehensgewährung an die Stadt Graz]: A brief report by State Secretary Schumpeter regarding an emergency loan of 2 million Kronen granted to the city of Graz due to urgent credit needs. [Beilage A: Umgestaltung des Credit-Institutes für Verkehrs-Unternehmungen]: A detailed memorandum defending the restructuring of the Credit-Institute into a semi-public entity. Schumpeter addresses rumors of bankruptcy, explains the strategic necessity of the institute for implementing socialization and property taxes, and discusses internal bureaucratic tensions and the opposition from private banks. [Beilage B: Referat über das Regierungskommuniquee betr. die Alpinen-Hausse]: Schumpeter justifies a government communiqué regarding the sharp rise in Alpine Montan shares. He argues that the state benefits from higher stock prices for tax purposes (property tax and securities tax) and defends the government's right to intervene against speculative 'baisse' parties to protect the public and state credit. [Beilage C: Personalverhältnisse beim Kreditinstitute für öffentliche Arbeiten]: A report on the staffing of the new Credit-Institute. Schumpeter argues for a 'personal union' where active state officials serve on the board to ensure alignment with government policy. He justifies providing these officials with additional private-sector-style compensation to retain talent and ensure performance, despite potential public criticism of the salary levels. [Vertraulicher Anhang: Die Rolle der Firma Kola und Devisenpolitik]: A highly confidential report detailing the government's use of the private firm Kola & Co. to absorb foreign currency from the black market to stabilize the Krone in Zurich. It also addresses Kola's purchase of Alpine Montan shares for foreign investors, which Schumpeter views as beneficial for attracting foreign capital and increasing the valuation of domestic assets. [Die Untersuchung der Alpine-Montan-Affäre durch den Kabinettsrat]: An editorial note explaining the establishment of a committee to investigate the Alpine-Montan affair. It describes the committee's composition, its meetings, and the archival history of the confidential reports, noting that these sensitive documents were often kept separate from official cabinet minutes. [Cabinet Minutes: Foreign Currency Seizure and the Bratusch Report]: Official minutes from the Cabinet Council regarding the seizure of foreign currency from the liquidating War Ministry and the presentation of State Secretary Bratusch's report. The report investigates the surge in Alpine-Montan shares and the activities of the banking house Kola & Co., concluding that Schumpeter's personal honor was not compromised and the state suffered no financial damage. [Report of State Secretary for Justice Dr. Richard Bratusch]: A detailed report by Dr. Bratusch addressing public and press allegations regarding the government's role in the Alpine-Montan stock surge. It examines whether the Finance Ministry facilitated speculation, the impact on socialization efforts, and the relationship with the firm Kola & Co., ultimately defending Schumpeter's choice of a 'skilled stock market technician' for state currency procurement. [Cabinet Discussion on Establishing the Investigation Committee]: Transcript of the cabinet debate leading to the formation of an investigation committee. Otto Bauer emphasizes the need to protect the government's honor against rumors, while Schumpeter defends his secretive currency procurement strategy as necessary for food imports and national credit, despite the political friction caused by his use of private firms. [Committee Meeting of August 28, 1919: Schumpeter's Defense]: Schumpeter provides a detailed defense of his financial policies to the committee, explaining why he bypassed the 'inefficient' Devisenzentrale in favor of private brokers like Kola to build a state currency reserve. He also addresses specific allegations regarding tax leniency for individuals like Wittgenstein and Kranz, dismissing them as standard administrative practice or corrections of injustice. [Committee Hearing of September 1, 1919: Testimony of Banker Kola]: The committee hears testimony from banker Kola regarding the technical execution of the Alpine-Montan share sales to Italian investors and the subsequent delivery of foreign currency to the state. Kola explains the origins of the market 'contremine' and attributes the attacks against him and the Finance Ministry to the 'bread envy' (Brotneid) of the major banks. [Committee Hearing: Testimony of Minkus and Sztankovits]: Testimonies from the President of the Giro- und Kassenverein and the Director of the Devisenzentrale. Sztankovits confirms that Kola's currency deliveries were made at fair market rates rather than black market prices and discusses the role of major banks in fueling negative press coverage due to professional jealousy over the state's use of a private firm. [Examination of Director Otto and Dr. Mosing regarding Alpine Montan Shares]: Records of the examination of Director Otto and Oberfinanzrat Dr. Mosing regarding the delivery of foreign currencies and the speculative rise of Alpine Montan shares. Dr. Mosing provides a detailed timeline of the stock price movements, the role of the Eskomptegesellschaft, and the rumors of foreign buyers (Czech, Italian) that fueled the market volatility in mid-1919. [Analysis of the Alpine Price Increase and the Role of Kola]: Dr. Schumpeter and Dr. Mosing discuss the underlying reasons for the Alpine share price increase, attributing it to an initial undervaluation by the Eskomptegesellschaft. They explore the hostility of the banking establishment toward the private banker Kola and the role of the press in disseminating rumors about government involvement. [Examination of Wilhelm Kux: Alpine Shares and Foreign Sales]: The committee examines Wilhelm Kux, Director of the Eskompte-Gesellschaft, regarding the Alpine share boom and the legality of selling domestic shares to foreigners. Schumpeter challenges Kux's legal view that such sales require state approval, clarifying the distinction between purchasing shares domestically and exporting securities. [The Case of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Asset Protection]: A pivotal discussion regarding the 'Ludwig Wittgenstein case' where Schumpeter explains his decision to help Wittgenstein secure his American assets to prevent their seizure by foreign powers, which would have resulted in massive compensation claims against the Austrian state. The segment also addresses rumors of a 2 million payment to the 'Volkswehr' and the use of 'Schleiergesellschaften' (shell companies) to protect Austrian wealth abroad. [Final Statements on the Disposition Fund and Committee Findings]: The examination concludes with Schumpeter defending his use of unconventional financial agents like Dr. Kranz for state interests and clarifying his opposition to Kola's Alpine transactions. Dr. Bratusch summarizes the committee's findings, concluding that the Ministry of Finance did not initiate the Alpine share purchases and that Schumpeter had explicitly discouraged the transaction. [Untersuchungsbericht zur Firma Kola und Alpine-Aktien]: This segment concludes an investigative report regarding the financial transactions between the State Office for Finance and the banker Richard Kola. It justifies the choice of Kola as a skilled exchange technician despite opposition from major banks, addresses legal questions regarding the sale of securities to foreign entities, and includes a 'Separativotum' by State Secretary Eldersch. Eldersch argues that Schumpeter's handling of the Alpine-Montan shares damaged socialization efforts, a claim Schumpeter refutes by citing existing obstacles to socialization and the irrelevance of stock prices for compensation sums. [Richard Kolas Rückblick ins Gestrige: Die Geschichte der Regierungskäufe in Alpine]: A memoir excerpt by Richard Kola detailing his strategic acquisition of Alpine Montan-Gesellschaft shares on behalf of the Austrian government. Kola describes his vision of attracting foreign capital (specifically Italian) through equity exports to stabilize the state's currency. He recounts his negotiations with skeptical bankers like Maxime Kraßny, his secret operations from Zurich, and the eventual successful purchase of 200,000 shares, which granted him significant influence over the company despite the initial resistance of the Viennese financial establishment. [Renner: Schulden kann man nicht sozialisieren]: A contemporary press report and analysis of State Chancellor Karl Renner's speech in Hietzing (October 1919). Renner argues that a collapsed state burdened by debt cannot lead in socialization efforts, creating a sharp contrast with Otto Bauer's radical plans. The text analyzes the failure of Bauer's 'economic royal thought' (Königsgedanke), the limitations of the small Austrian republic, and the shift toward a more pragmatic financial policy focused on attracting foreign capital rather than class-based socialization. [Schumpeters Finanzplan und Demission: Historischer Kontext]: This editorial introduction provides the historical and political backdrop for Schumpeter's financial plan and his subsequent resignation. It discusses the diplomatic shifts following the Treaty of St. Germain, the failure of the 'Anschluss' movement, and the internal power struggle between Schumpeter and Otto Bauer. The text outlines four variants of Schumpeter's plan, focusing on the 'Vermögensabgabe' (capital levy) as a tool for economic recovery versus Bauer's vision of using it for socialization. It highlights the herculean effort Schumpeter made to draft the plan alone, despite lack of support from his ministry's staff. [Die politische Diffamierung Schumpeters und der Fall Alpine-Montan]: This section examines the political fallout of Schumpeter's tenure, including the 'muzzling' of his financial plan by the government and the aggressive smear campaign led by the Social Democratic 'Arbeiter-Zeitung'. It also touches upon Schumpeter's later correspondence with historian Charles Gulick regarding the Alpine-Montan affair, showing Schumpeter's detached, academic perspective decades later. The segment serves as a bridge to the primary source documents (press reports and speeches) that follow. [Schumpeters Reden zur Länderfinanzreform und Agrarpolitik]: A collection of Schumpeter's speeches and interviews from September 1919 addressing specific interest groups. He discusses the necessity of a unified financial plan between the state and federal lands (Länder), referencing the Miquel tax reform. To the agricultural sector, he promises that the 'Vermögensabgabe' will not threaten the existence of farms or livestock, emphasizing that land should be valued based on long-term yield rather than inflated war-time prices. He also advocates for the protection of 'Kriegsanleihe' (war bonds) to maintain public credit. [Beamtenforderungen und die Vorlage des Finanzplans im Kabinett]: This segment covers Schumpeter's interactions with state employees regarding salary reforms and the formal introduction of his financial plan to the Cabinet. It contrasts Schumpeter's approach with Otto Bauer's radical proposals for the 'expropriation of expropriators' and a progressive tax on unearned income. Press reports describe the tension within the Cabinet as Schumpeter presents a 3-4 year plan for balancing the budget through tax increases and a capital levy, while Bauer pushes for socialization-linked measures. [Details des Schumpeter-Finanzplans: Steuern und Kredit]: A detailed breakdown of Schumpeter's financial program as reported by the press. The plan aims to eliminate the 6-7 billion crown deficit over four years by adjusting state income to the depreciated value of the currency. Key measures include a reorganized income tax, increased inheritance and consumption taxes (sugar, beer, spirits, tobacco), and a new turnover tax. The 'Vermögensabgabe' is presented as a tool to restore credit, offering relief to those who provide foreign currency (valuta) or subscribe to domestic loans. [Kabinettsberatungen und die drohende Krise]: This segment documents the critical Cabinet meetings in early October 1919. While official communiqués spoke of 'fundamental agreement,' the reality was a deep rift between Schumpeter and Bauer. The text describes the 'diluted' form of the capital levy (spread over 30 years) and the emergence of Richard Reisch as a potential successor. Schumpeter is increasingly isolated, eventually being prevented from presenting his plan to the Main Committee of the National Assembly, signaling the end of his political influence. [Der Sturz Schumpeters: Presseangriffe und Rücktritt]: This segment captures the final days of Schumpeter's term, characterized by a fierce campaign in the Social Democratic press. The 'Arbeiter-Zeitung' publishes a scathing article ('Der Fall Schumpeter') accusing him of inactivity, lack of character, and having no real plan. Conversely, the 'Neue Freie Presse' criticizes the government's 'unprecedented' treatment of a scholar and the lack of political courtesy in the new republic. Schumpeter finally resigns on October 17, 1919, without ever having defended his plan before the full National Assembly. [Schumpeters Finanzprogramm: Vortrag vor der Christlichsozialen Vereinigung]: Following his resignation, Schumpeter presents his full financial plan to the Christian Social Union. He establishes the absolute principle that no more paper money should be printed for state needs. He outlines a strategy to restore credit by linking the capital levy to private credit provision, proposes a new independent central bank (Notenbank) forbidden from lending to the state, and details a rigorous austerity program combined with tax reforms to balance the budget within four years. [Protokoll der Kabinettssitzung vom 16. Juli 1919: Vermögensabgabe]: A strictly confidential cabinet protocol detailing the early debates on the 'Vermögensabgabe'. Schumpeter argues for a subjective method of assessment, while Otto Bauer advocates for an objective method involving the issuance of 'Gratisaktien' (free shares) to facilitate socialization and preserve operating capital. The discussion covers the valuation of agricultural land, the treatment of war bonds (Kriegsanleihe), and the potential for a 25% levy on banknotes to curb inflation. Bauer views the levy as a 'regulated form of state bankruptcy'. [Schumpeters Finanzplan: Kabinettsprotokoll vom 29. September 1919]: The transcript of Schumpeter's major presentation to the Cabinet. He describes the state's financial situation as 'desperate' and 'hopeless' but argues that a formal state bankruptcy must be avoided to preserve credit. His core thesis is that the state must accept the currency's devaluation (to roughly 10% of pre-war value) and adjust all wages, prices, and taxes to this new level. He proposes a massive increase in state employee salaries to match the new price level while effectively wiping out the wealth of the 'Rentner' (rentier) class through the capital levy. [Measures for Currency Stabilization and the Role of the Central Bank]: Schumpeter outlines five specific measures to stabilize the Krone, including converting foreign holdings into securities and encouraging demand for the currency through exports. He also discusses the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Bank and the necessity of establishing a new German-Austrian central bank that is strictly prohibited from lending to the state, focusing instead on pure discount business. [The Capital Levy (Vermögensabgabe): Principles and Methods]: Schumpeter presents the capital levy as the cornerstone of financial recovery, debating the merits of subjective versus objective taxation methods. He argues for valuing productive assets based on yield rather than panic-driven market prices and rejects the 'objective' method (direct state seizure of assets) because it would destroy private credit, which is essential for securing foreign loans. [Capital Levy and Credit Policy: Incentivizing Foreign Exchange]: This section details how the capital levy should be used to force or incentivize citizens to provide foreign credit to the state. Schumpeter proposes specific exemptions for those who subscribe to foreign currency loans or internal 4% loans, aiming to recover capital that fled Austria starting in 1906 and to manage the burden of war debt. [Cabinet Discussion on the Financial Plan: Schumpeter, Remmer, and Bauer]: A transcript of a confidential cabinet discussion from October 1, 1919. Schumpeter, Remmer, and Otto Bauer debate the financial plan. Bauer criticizes Schumpeter's reliance on indirect taxes and his passive acceptance of the Krone's low exchange rate, arguing instead for a higher stabilization point (15 centimes) and using the capital levy for socialization and securing large-scale foreign loans through asset-backed securities. [Cabinet Debate Continued: Socialization, Agriculture, and Labor]: The debate continues with contributions from Renner, Resch, Stökler, Eldersch, and Hanusch. Key themes include the political impossibility of high indirect taxes on the working class, the need to protect agricultural operating capital while taxing large estates, and the fear that stabilizing the currency at such a low level will lead to social revolution and the destruction of the export industry. [Correspondence with Professor Charles A. Gulick and Count Otto Harrach]: This segment contains a 1944 letter from Schumpeter to Professor Gulick clarifying his role in the Alpine-Montan Corporation affair and the failure of the capital levy. It also includes an introduction to Schumpeter's wartime correspondence with Count Otto Harrach, highlighting Schumpeter's conservative political ideas, his antipathy toward Prussia, and his views on the 'Bohemian question'. [Letter to an Excellency: Austrian Sovereignty and the German Alliance (January 25, 1916)]: In this letter dated January 25, 1916, Schumpeter discusses the delicate balance between Austria-Hungary's alliance with Germany and its need for independent war aims. He criticizes the perception of the Monarchy as a mere annex of Prussia and warns that excessive compliance with Germany is alienating non-German Austrians. He proposes that the government rally public opinion around specific Austrian goals to regain international authority and internal stability, suggesting that Austria could act as a mediating force for peace since it is not directly involved in the Anglo-German rivalry. [Letter to an Excellency: Middle Eastern Interests and the Bohemian Question]: Schumpeter continues his correspondence by admitting he underestimated Austria's potential in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, agreeing that the Monarchy could compete with Germany in these regions. He also addresses the 'Bohemian Question,' advocating for a policy of reconciliation and mildness toward the Czech people to integrate them into the state idea, rather than the radical German nationalist approach of stigmatization. He concludes by touching upon the importance of financial stability for the future power of the Conservative Party. [Letter to an Excellency: Relations with the United States and Submarine Warfare (February 1, 1916)]: Schumpeter thanks his correspondent for a literary gift and laments the lack of diplomatic cultivation between Austria-Hungary and the United States. He warns that the escalation of submarine warfare will alienate the U.S. and strengthen British resolve, ultimately making the Monarchy more dependent on the German Empire. He emphasizes the need for Austria to cooperate with neutral actions to maintain its political individuality. [Letter to an Excellency: Distribution of Political Memoranda (January 14, 1917)]: Schumpeter sends copies of two memoranda written in 1916, which had previously been shared with Prince Jaroslav Thun and other conservative figures. He expresses the importance of fostering active political discussion within conservative circles to determine the future of the Monarchy. [Letter to an Excellency: Trialism and the Conservative Press (February 9, 1917)]: Schumpeter discusses the strategic timing for Austria to assert its own path separate from Germany. He expresses regret over the failure to convene delegations at the start of the war and critiques the current government's inability to lead public opinion. He supports the idea of 'Trialism' (including a special status for the Bohemian Crown) as a solution of European significance. Furthermore, he outlines a plan for a high-quality conservative newspaper to compete with the 'Jewish press' and master modern political techniques to promote old-Austrian interests. [Letter to an Excellency: Social Democracy and the Mission to Sweden (May 1917)]: Schumpeter warns of the rising influence of Social Democracy and the danger of them being seen as the sole architects of peace. He proposes a private mission to Sweden under the guise of academic research to gather information and establish unofficial contacts with Western European and neutral circles. He requests an introduction to Foreign Minister Count Czernin to discuss the feasibility of this trip. [Letter to an Excellency: Meeting Arrangements (May 17, 1917)]: A brief concluding note where Schumpeter thanks his correspondent for forwarding his memorandum to the Foreign Minister and confirms his availability for a meeting in Vienna to discuss the matters further. [Correspondence with Count Harrach (June 1917 – February 1918)]: A series of letters from Schumpeter to Count Harrach discussing the deteriorating internal situation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Schumpeter advocates for a conservative political organ, reconciliation with Slavic parties (specifically the Czechs in Bohemia), and warns against the dangers of a 'civilian cabinet' subservient to German-nationalist dictates. He explores constitutional reconstructions to alleviate the friction caused by dualism and suggests a government of independent conservative men to navigate the crisis. [Personenregister (Index of Persons)]: A comprehensive alphabetical index of persons mentioned in the volume 'Politische Reden'. It includes brief biographical descriptions and professional functions for individuals active around 1919, such as Otto Bauer, Karl Renner, and various ministers, bankers, and academics. Note: Joseph Alois Schumpeter is excluded from the list as he appears on nearly every page. [Sachregister (Subject Index) - A to Z]: A detailed subject index covering the major economic, political, and social themes of the work. Key entries include 'Abstempelung' (currency stamping), 'Anschluss' (annexation), 'Sozialisierung' (socialization), 'Vermögensabgabe' (capital levy), and 'Währung' (currency). It provides a roadmap to Schumpeter's specific policy proposals and economic analyses during the post-WWI transition period.
Title page, copyright information, and publication details for the collection of Joseph A. Schumpeter's political speeches edited by Seidl and Stolper.
Read full textThe editors introduce the volume, highlighting Schumpeter's largely unknown role as a politician and finance minister in 1919. They describe the source materials (media, cabinet protocols, letters to Count Harrach) and the editorial principles regarding orthography and corrections, concluding with acknowledgments to archives and staff.
Read full textDetailed table of contents listing the six main chapters covering currency problems, financial goals, the Treaty of Saint-Germain, socialization, and Schumpeter's resignation, followed by an appendix of letters.
Read full textA comprehensive introductory essay analyzing Schumpeter's tenure as Finance Minister. It connects his policy decisions to his theoretical work 'The Crisis of the Tax State' (1918). Key themes include his opposition to the 'Anschluss' with Germany in favor of a Danube Confederation, his strategy to use a wealth tax (Vermögensabgabe) to curb inflation and preserve state credit, and his complex relationship with the Social Democrats regarding socialization. Schumpeter argues that while socialism may be inevitable, the immediate post-war period required private enterprise to restore productivity.
Read full textDiary entries from economist Friedrich von Wieser providing a contemporary, often critical, perspective on Schumpeter's personality and political standing. Wieser describes Schumpeter as brilliant but vain and frivolous, noting his shifting reputation among political parties and academic circles during his ministry.
Read full textThis chapter focuses on the desperate need for foreign currency to import food and raw materials. It includes Schumpeter's interactions with workers' councils, his views on selling domestic assets (stocks and art) to secure credit, and the controversy surrounding the 'Dollar Loan.' Schumpeter argues that a healthy money market is essential for a healthy labor market and defends the use of unconventional financial maneuvers to prevent starvation.
Read full textThis section details Schumpeter's broad financial program, including his inaugural speeches and budget presentations. He addresses the 'three blocks' hindering recovery: war bonds, currency instability, and federal/state financial relations. Schumpeter advocates for a one-time wealth tax to eliminate the money overhang, a tax amnesty to encourage honest reporting, and warns that the harsh terms of the Treaty of Saint-Germain threaten the state's survival. He also discusses the mechanics of deficit financing through treasury bills rather than simple money printing.
Read full textSchumpeter analyzes the post-war currency crisis, identifying the primary evils as price revolution and exchange rate fluctuation. He argues that while commodity scarcity is a factor, the massive increase in the money supply (inflation) caused by war financing is the fundamental cause of currency devaluation. He distinguishes between productive credit and the 'paper money' character of current banknotes used for state consumption, emphasizing that currency stability requires active intervention rather than waiting for automatic post-war corrections.
Read full textThis section examines how different methods of state financing affect inflation. Schumpeter argues that only taxes and loans drawn from existing circulation counteract inflation, whereas bank-financed state needs exacerbate it. He defines 'currency devaluation' as a loss of purchasing power specifically caused by monetary sphere disturbances, which unlike commodity-driven price increases, will not self-correct after the war.
Read full textSchumpeter discusses the relationship between domestic inflation and international exchange rates. He introduces the concept of a 'new parity' based on the relative purchasing power of currencies. He argues that even without a gold standard, a stable exchange rate is possible if the money supply is limited, but Austria's excessive banknote emission has fundamentally shifted the parity, necessitating a reduction in circulation to restore the currency.
Read full textAn editorial introduction discussing the conflicting visions for post-war Austria. It contrasts Karl Renner's idea of a multinational federation with Otto Bauer's drive for 'Anschluss' with Germany as a prerequisite for socialism. The text highlights Schumpeter's opposition to the Anschluss and his advocacy for a 'Danube Confederation'—an economic and currency union of the former Austro-Hungarian states—to preserve Vienna's role as a financial center.
Read full textThis section details Schumpeter's shifting stance on socialization and his geopolitical outlook. It references his work 'Sociology of Imperialisms,' arguing that only a free economy ensures a peaceful society. It also describes a diplomatic conflict where Schumpeter's public optimism about Austria's financial future clashed with State Chancellor Renner's negotiation strategy in St. Germain, leading Renner to accuse Schumpeter of making the delegation look like 'swindlers'.
Read full textIn his first address to the press as State Secretary of Finance (March 1919), Schumpeter expresses optimism regarding Austria's recovery. He argues that Vienna must remain the financial heart of the region despite political separation. He discusses the global rise in interest rates and the necessity of choosing between a free entrepreneurial system or total socialization, warning that a middle ground of 'ruining' industry through uncertainty is untenable. He notably references Lenin's realization that high-level expertise is required even in a socialized economy.
Read full textSchumpeter addresses the financial tensions with the Hungarian Soviet Republic. He insists on the protection of Austrian capital and property rights in Hungary, arguing that even a revolutionary state must act as a 'reliable businessman' to maintain international credit. He expresses confidence that an agreement will be reached regarding the compensation of Austrian owners of socialized Hungarian industries.
Read full textA major lecture delivered at the University of Vienna (April 1919) regarding the economic causes of war. Schumpeter argues that while the war was not caused by economic necessity, mercantilist and protectionist policies created an aggressive atmosphere. He advocates for free trade as the only path to lasting peace and warns against the 'war economy' organizations that persist after the conflict. He emphasizes that Austria's reconstruction depends on foreign capital, which requires maintaining private property and entrepreneurial freedom.
Read full textSchumpeter critiques the economic barriers erected by the new successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He describes the creation of separate customs and currency zones for small populations as 'ridiculous' and 'criminal,' arguing that economic necessity will eventually force a return to cooperation, such as a customs or currency convention.
Read full textA significant speech (May 1919) addressing the 'War Loan' problem and the proposed 'Capital Levy' (Vermögensabgabe). Schumpeter categorically rules out state bankruptcy, asserting that Austria will honor its debts to maintain creditworthiness. He explains that the Capital Levy is necessary to stabilize the currency and reduce the 'cancer' of paper money inflation. He also suggests that the levy could facilitate socialization if the state accepts corporate shares as payment, thereby gaining influence over key industries without direct expropriation.
Read full textSchumpeter discusses the future of Austrian industry (May 1919), emphasizing that the state cannot live on subsidies forever and must return to work. He defends Vienna's role as a financial metropolis for the Balkans and the Danube basin. He argues for a clear distinction in policy: industries that are to be socialized should be dealt with quickly, while the rest must be granted radical economic freedom and tax incentives to attract foreign capital. He identifies the development of water power as the key to future industrial growth.
Read full textAn interview with a French correspondent (published June 1919) where Schumpeter discusses the 'financial liquidation' of the Empire. He argues that Austria's survival depends on a fair distribution of the old Empire's debts and the protection of Austrian-owned assets in the successor states. The text includes a critique of Italy's alleged desire to keep Austria 'independent but non-viable' and contrasts the economic benefits of the 'Anschluss' with the political preference for independence.
Read full textA concise summary of Schumpeter's position in 'Die Woche' (June 1919). He argues that the Capital Levy must be used exclusively to pay down debt, not for current spending. He reiterates that since total socialization is technically impossible, Austria must embrace a capitalist recovery path, relying on the 'merchant' class to secure raw materials and credit from the West.
Read full textSchumpeter addresses the Association of German Savings Banks (June 1919), noting that 40% of their deposits are tied to war loans. He promises that the Capital Levy will rescue these institutions by accepting war loans at a favorable rate. He also discusses the necessity of state-backed credit for industry to prevent a collapse worse than that of 1873 and argues against the 'devaluation' of banknotes as a solution.
Read full textAn introduction to the reactions following the harsh peace conditions presented on June 2, 1919. The Entente's draft treated small German-Austria as the sole legal successor to the Empire's debts while seizing its assets. Schumpeter describes these conditions as a 'death sentence' and a 'state bankruptcy' imposed from outside, arguing that the Capital Levy would be pointless if it only served the enemy.
Read full textAn interview (May 1910) where Schumpeter provides a character portrait of Woodrow Wilson based on his time as an exchange professor in the US. He praises Wilson's moral standing and banking reforms. He expresses hope that Wilson will ensure Austria's survival and discusses the 'Anschluss' question, suggesting that immediate union with Germany would require significant concessions from Germany to be viable.
Read full textSchumpeter warns the public (June 1919) that the Entente's financial conditions are 'ruinous' and intended to 'destroy German-Austria.' He states that the Capital Levy cannot be presented to parliament until the final conditions are known, as it would be impossible to carry out if it merely served the victors rather than national recovery.
Read full textIn a lecture to the National Economic Society (June 1919), Schumpeter deconstructs the St. Germain draft. He highlights three fatal points: the liquidation of foreign assets, the arbitrary calculation of exchange rates for foreign obligations (using October 1918 rates), and the incentivizing of capital flight. He argues that these terms violate international private law and will inevitably lead to social collapse and Bolshevism.
Read full textA report on a mass protest meeting (August 1919) featuring Schumpeter and Ignaz Seipel. Schumpeter mocks the Entente's demands—such as the delivery of 15,000 cows while Austria receives condensed milk—as 'absurd.' He argues that the Entente is destroying the very foundations of international credit by making private property 'outlawed' and calls for a commission where all successor states share the debt burden fairly.
Read full textA detailed historical introduction to the ideological conflict between Schumpeter and Otto Bauer. While both saw socialism as an eventual destiny, they differed on the timing and method. Bauer wanted the Capital Levy to fund socialization, while Schumpeter wanted it strictly for debt reduction. The text covers the 'Alpine Montan Affair,' where Schumpeter was accused of facilitating the sale of Austria's largest iron company to Italian investors to stabilize the currency, thereby thwarting Bauer's socialization plans. It also reveals Schumpeter's secret involvement in supporting the Hungarian counter-revolution to stop the spread of Bolshevism.
Read full textSchumpeter's initial program (March 1919) as State Secretary. He identifies the war loan and currency devaluation as the two 'boulders' to be overcome. He proposes a one-time large Capital Levy and the creation of monopolies to increase state influence, while emphasizing that the primary goal is to make life in the new state 'tolerable' for its citizens.
Read full textSchumpeter explains (March 1919) that the Capital Levy is not a 'harassment' but a 'rescue' to restore the purchasing power of the 'wage crown.' He argues that as long as private industry is maintained, it must not be ruined by bureaucratic interference, though he remains open to socialization where it makes sense.
Read full textSchumpeter discusses the budget provisorium (July 1919) and the plan for a 'Socialization Bank.' This institute would prepare the Capital Levy, manage the compensation for socialized companies, and provide credit to industrial organizations. He also insists that the new Central Bank must be independent and forbidden from doing business with the state.
Read full textA public letter (July 1919) questioning Schumpeter on how reconstruction is possible when the threat of socialization and the 'property freeze' prevent any entrepreneur from investing. It argues that the lack of clear rules is the primary cause of economic paralysis and unemployment.
Read full textIn a speech in Graz (July 1919), Schumpeter defends the high state spending as necessary to prevent Bolshevism. He argues against provincial separatist tendencies, noting that the provinces depend on Vienna's tax power. He reiterates that the Capital Levy will rescue the war loan holders and that the state's goal is to make the country 'habitable' again within 3 to 5 years.
Read full textA scathing article from the 'Arbeiter-Zeitung' (August 1919) attacking Schumpeter and the banker Richard Kola. It accuses them of driving up the stock price of the Alpine Montan company while it was idle, in order to sell it to Italian investors. This 'orgie' is presented as a betrayal of the socialization program, making the company too expensive for the state to acquire and placing a key national resource in foreign hands.
Read full textA strictly secret annex to the cabinet protocol (July 8, 1919) regarding preparatory measures for the Capital Levy, socialization, and industrial promotion.
Read full textThis segment contains a detailed report by State Secretary Joseph Schumpeter regarding the financial preparations for a capital levy (Vermögensabgabe), socialization projects, and industrial support in post-WWI Austria. Schumpeter argues against a purely state-run credit institute due to high costs and lack of creditworthiness, proposing instead a 'mixed-economy' (gemischtwirtschaftlich) model. He details the restructuring of the 'Credit-Institute für Verkehrs-Unternehmungen und öffentliche Arbeiten' into a semi-state entity by acquiring a majority share and removing the influence of the Lower Austrian Escompte-Gesellschaft. The report also references similar German proposals by Rudolf Wissell and outlines the appointment of state officials to the institute's board to ensure public interest is maintained.
Read full textThis segment covers the confidential cabinet meeting of July 15, 1919, focusing on two main controversies: the transformation of a credit institute into a 'Socialization Bank' and the sharp rise in Alpine Montangesellschaft stock prices (Alpine-Hausse). State Secretary Otto Bauer expresses concern that the state's involvement with the private Bankhaus Cola and the public recognition of high stock prices undermined the socialization of the Alpine company by making it too expensive for the state to acquire. Schumpeter defends his actions, arguing that high stock prices benefit the state through the capital levy and that the cooperation with Bankhaus Cola was necessary for currency stabilization in Zurich. The discussion concludes with a call for legislation to prevent the flight of domestic industrial assets to foreign owners.
Read full textA brief report by State Secretary Schumpeter regarding an emergency loan of 2 million Kronen granted to the city of Graz due to urgent credit needs.
Read full textA detailed memorandum defending the restructuring of the Credit-Institute into a semi-public entity. Schumpeter addresses rumors of bankruptcy, explains the strategic necessity of the institute for implementing socialization and property taxes, and discusses internal bureaucratic tensions and the opposition from private banks.
Read full textSchumpeter justifies a government communiqué regarding the sharp rise in Alpine Montan shares. He argues that the state benefits from higher stock prices for tax purposes (property tax and securities tax) and defends the government's right to intervene against speculative 'baisse' parties to protect the public and state credit.
Read full textA report on the staffing of the new Credit-Institute. Schumpeter argues for a 'personal union' where active state officials serve on the board to ensure alignment with government policy. He justifies providing these officials with additional private-sector-style compensation to retain talent and ensure performance, despite potential public criticism of the salary levels.
Read full textA highly confidential report detailing the government's use of the private firm Kola & Co. to absorb foreign currency from the black market to stabilize the Krone in Zurich. It also addresses Kola's purchase of Alpine Montan shares for foreign investors, which Schumpeter views as beneficial for attracting foreign capital and increasing the valuation of domestic assets.
Read full textAn editorial note explaining the establishment of a committee to investigate the Alpine-Montan affair. It describes the committee's composition, its meetings, and the archival history of the confidential reports, noting that these sensitive documents were often kept separate from official cabinet minutes.
Read full textOfficial minutes from the Cabinet Council regarding the seizure of foreign currency from the liquidating War Ministry and the presentation of State Secretary Bratusch's report. The report investigates the surge in Alpine-Montan shares and the activities of the banking house Kola & Co., concluding that Schumpeter's personal honor was not compromised and the state suffered no financial damage.
Read full textA detailed report by Dr. Bratusch addressing public and press allegations regarding the government's role in the Alpine-Montan stock surge. It examines whether the Finance Ministry facilitated speculation, the impact on socialization efforts, and the relationship with the firm Kola & Co., ultimately defending Schumpeter's choice of a 'skilled stock market technician' for state currency procurement.
Read full textTranscript of the cabinet debate leading to the formation of an investigation committee. Otto Bauer emphasizes the need to protect the government's honor against rumors, while Schumpeter defends his secretive currency procurement strategy as necessary for food imports and national credit, despite the political friction caused by his use of private firms.
Read full textSchumpeter provides a detailed defense of his financial policies to the committee, explaining why he bypassed the 'inefficient' Devisenzentrale in favor of private brokers like Kola to build a state currency reserve. He also addresses specific allegations regarding tax leniency for individuals like Wittgenstein and Kranz, dismissing them as standard administrative practice or corrections of injustice.
Read full textThe committee hears testimony from banker Kola regarding the technical execution of the Alpine-Montan share sales to Italian investors and the subsequent delivery of foreign currency to the state. Kola explains the origins of the market 'contremine' and attributes the attacks against him and the Finance Ministry to the 'bread envy' (Brotneid) of the major banks.
Read full textTestimonies from the President of the Giro- und Kassenverein and the Director of the Devisenzentrale. Sztankovits confirms that Kola's currency deliveries were made at fair market rates rather than black market prices and discusses the role of major banks in fueling negative press coverage due to professional jealousy over the state's use of a private firm.
Read full textRecords of the examination of Director Otto and Oberfinanzrat Dr. Mosing regarding the delivery of foreign currencies and the speculative rise of Alpine Montan shares. Dr. Mosing provides a detailed timeline of the stock price movements, the role of the Eskomptegesellschaft, and the rumors of foreign buyers (Czech, Italian) that fueled the market volatility in mid-1919.
Read full textDr. Schumpeter and Dr. Mosing discuss the underlying reasons for the Alpine share price increase, attributing it to an initial undervaluation by the Eskomptegesellschaft. They explore the hostility of the banking establishment toward the private banker Kola and the role of the press in disseminating rumors about government involvement.
Read full textThe committee examines Wilhelm Kux, Director of the Eskompte-Gesellschaft, regarding the Alpine share boom and the legality of selling domestic shares to foreigners. Schumpeter challenges Kux's legal view that such sales require state approval, clarifying the distinction between purchasing shares domestically and exporting securities.
Read full textA pivotal discussion regarding the 'Ludwig Wittgenstein case' where Schumpeter explains his decision to help Wittgenstein secure his American assets to prevent their seizure by foreign powers, which would have resulted in massive compensation claims against the Austrian state. The segment also addresses rumors of a 2 million payment to the 'Volkswehr' and the use of 'Schleiergesellschaften' (shell companies) to protect Austrian wealth abroad.
Read full textThe examination concludes with Schumpeter defending his use of unconventional financial agents like Dr. Kranz for state interests and clarifying his opposition to Kola's Alpine transactions. Dr. Bratusch summarizes the committee's findings, concluding that the Ministry of Finance did not initiate the Alpine share purchases and that Schumpeter had explicitly discouraged the transaction.
Read full textThis segment concludes an investigative report regarding the financial transactions between the State Office for Finance and the banker Richard Kola. It justifies the choice of Kola as a skilled exchange technician despite opposition from major banks, addresses legal questions regarding the sale of securities to foreign entities, and includes a 'Separativotum' by State Secretary Eldersch. Eldersch argues that Schumpeter's handling of the Alpine-Montan shares damaged socialization efforts, a claim Schumpeter refutes by citing existing obstacles to socialization and the irrelevance of stock prices for compensation sums.
Read full textA memoir excerpt by Richard Kola detailing his strategic acquisition of Alpine Montan-Gesellschaft shares on behalf of the Austrian government. Kola describes his vision of attracting foreign capital (specifically Italian) through equity exports to stabilize the state's currency. He recounts his negotiations with skeptical bankers like Maxime Kraßny, his secret operations from Zurich, and the eventual successful purchase of 200,000 shares, which granted him significant influence over the company despite the initial resistance of the Viennese financial establishment.
Read full textA contemporary press report and analysis of State Chancellor Karl Renner's speech in Hietzing (October 1919). Renner argues that a collapsed state burdened by debt cannot lead in socialization efforts, creating a sharp contrast with Otto Bauer's radical plans. The text analyzes the failure of Bauer's 'economic royal thought' (Königsgedanke), the limitations of the small Austrian republic, and the shift toward a more pragmatic financial policy focused on attracting foreign capital rather than class-based socialization.
Read full textThis editorial introduction provides the historical and political backdrop for Schumpeter's financial plan and his subsequent resignation. It discusses the diplomatic shifts following the Treaty of St. Germain, the failure of the 'Anschluss' movement, and the internal power struggle between Schumpeter and Otto Bauer. The text outlines four variants of Schumpeter's plan, focusing on the 'Vermögensabgabe' (capital levy) as a tool for economic recovery versus Bauer's vision of using it for socialization. It highlights the herculean effort Schumpeter made to draft the plan alone, despite lack of support from his ministry's staff.
Read full textThis section examines the political fallout of Schumpeter's tenure, including the 'muzzling' of his financial plan by the government and the aggressive smear campaign led by the Social Democratic 'Arbeiter-Zeitung'. It also touches upon Schumpeter's later correspondence with historian Charles Gulick regarding the Alpine-Montan affair, showing Schumpeter's detached, academic perspective decades later. The segment serves as a bridge to the primary source documents (press reports and speeches) that follow.
Read full textA collection of Schumpeter's speeches and interviews from September 1919 addressing specific interest groups. He discusses the necessity of a unified financial plan between the state and federal lands (Länder), referencing the Miquel tax reform. To the agricultural sector, he promises that the 'Vermögensabgabe' will not threaten the existence of farms or livestock, emphasizing that land should be valued based on long-term yield rather than inflated war-time prices. He also advocates for the protection of 'Kriegsanleihe' (war bonds) to maintain public credit.
Read full textThis segment covers Schumpeter's interactions with state employees regarding salary reforms and the formal introduction of his financial plan to the Cabinet. It contrasts Schumpeter's approach with Otto Bauer's radical proposals for the 'expropriation of expropriators' and a progressive tax on unearned income. Press reports describe the tension within the Cabinet as Schumpeter presents a 3-4 year plan for balancing the budget through tax increases and a capital levy, while Bauer pushes for socialization-linked measures.
Read full textA detailed breakdown of Schumpeter's financial program as reported by the press. The plan aims to eliminate the 6-7 billion crown deficit over four years by adjusting state income to the depreciated value of the currency. Key measures include a reorganized income tax, increased inheritance and consumption taxes (sugar, beer, spirits, tobacco), and a new turnover tax. The 'Vermögensabgabe' is presented as a tool to restore credit, offering relief to those who provide foreign currency (valuta) or subscribe to domestic loans.
Read full textThis segment documents the critical Cabinet meetings in early October 1919. While official communiqués spoke of 'fundamental agreement,' the reality was a deep rift between Schumpeter and Bauer. The text describes the 'diluted' form of the capital levy (spread over 30 years) and the emergence of Richard Reisch as a potential successor. Schumpeter is increasingly isolated, eventually being prevented from presenting his plan to the Main Committee of the National Assembly, signaling the end of his political influence.
Read full textThis segment captures the final days of Schumpeter's term, characterized by a fierce campaign in the Social Democratic press. The 'Arbeiter-Zeitung' publishes a scathing article ('Der Fall Schumpeter') accusing him of inactivity, lack of character, and having no real plan. Conversely, the 'Neue Freie Presse' criticizes the government's 'unprecedented' treatment of a scholar and the lack of political courtesy in the new republic. Schumpeter finally resigns on October 17, 1919, without ever having defended his plan before the full National Assembly.
Read full textFollowing his resignation, Schumpeter presents his full financial plan to the Christian Social Union. He establishes the absolute principle that no more paper money should be printed for state needs. He outlines a strategy to restore credit by linking the capital levy to private credit provision, proposes a new independent central bank (Notenbank) forbidden from lending to the state, and details a rigorous austerity program combined with tax reforms to balance the budget within four years.
Read full textA strictly confidential cabinet protocol detailing the early debates on the 'Vermögensabgabe'. Schumpeter argues for a subjective method of assessment, while Otto Bauer advocates for an objective method involving the issuance of 'Gratisaktien' (free shares) to facilitate socialization and preserve operating capital. The discussion covers the valuation of agricultural land, the treatment of war bonds (Kriegsanleihe), and the potential for a 25% levy on banknotes to curb inflation. Bauer views the levy as a 'regulated form of state bankruptcy'.
Read full textThe transcript of Schumpeter's major presentation to the Cabinet. He describes the state's financial situation as 'desperate' and 'hopeless' but argues that a formal state bankruptcy must be avoided to preserve credit. His core thesis is that the state must accept the currency's devaluation (to roughly 10% of pre-war value) and adjust all wages, prices, and taxes to this new level. He proposes a massive increase in state employee salaries to match the new price level while effectively wiping out the wealth of the 'Rentner' (rentier) class through the capital levy.
Read full textSchumpeter outlines five specific measures to stabilize the Krone, including converting foreign holdings into securities and encouraging demand for the currency through exports. He also discusses the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Bank and the necessity of establishing a new German-Austrian central bank that is strictly prohibited from lending to the state, focusing instead on pure discount business.
Read full textSchumpeter presents the capital levy as the cornerstone of financial recovery, debating the merits of subjective versus objective taxation methods. He argues for valuing productive assets based on yield rather than panic-driven market prices and rejects the 'objective' method (direct state seizure of assets) because it would destroy private credit, which is essential for securing foreign loans.
Read full textThis section details how the capital levy should be used to force or incentivize citizens to provide foreign credit to the state. Schumpeter proposes specific exemptions for those who subscribe to foreign currency loans or internal 4% loans, aiming to recover capital that fled Austria starting in 1906 and to manage the burden of war debt.
Read full textA transcript of a confidential cabinet discussion from October 1, 1919. Schumpeter, Remmer, and Otto Bauer debate the financial plan. Bauer criticizes Schumpeter's reliance on indirect taxes and his passive acceptance of the Krone's low exchange rate, arguing instead for a higher stabilization point (15 centimes) and using the capital levy for socialization and securing large-scale foreign loans through asset-backed securities.
Read full textThe debate continues with contributions from Renner, Resch, Stökler, Eldersch, and Hanusch. Key themes include the political impossibility of high indirect taxes on the working class, the need to protect agricultural operating capital while taxing large estates, and the fear that stabilizing the currency at such a low level will lead to social revolution and the destruction of the export industry.
Read full textThis segment contains a 1944 letter from Schumpeter to Professor Gulick clarifying his role in the Alpine-Montan Corporation affair and the failure of the capital levy. It also includes an introduction to Schumpeter's wartime correspondence with Count Otto Harrach, highlighting Schumpeter's conservative political ideas, his antipathy toward Prussia, and his views on the 'Bohemian question'.
Read full textIn this letter dated January 25, 1916, Schumpeter discusses the delicate balance between Austria-Hungary's alliance with Germany and its need for independent war aims. He criticizes the perception of the Monarchy as a mere annex of Prussia and warns that excessive compliance with Germany is alienating non-German Austrians. He proposes that the government rally public opinion around specific Austrian goals to regain international authority and internal stability, suggesting that Austria could act as a mediating force for peace since it is not directly involved in the Anglo-German rivalry.
Read full textSchumpeter continues his correspondence by admitting he underestimated Austria's potential in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, agreeing that the Monarchy could compete with Germany in these regions. He also addresses the 'Bohemian Question,' advocating for a policy of reconciliation and mildness toward the Czech people to integrate them into the state idea, rather than the radical German nationalist approach of stigmatization. He concludes by touching upon the importance of financial stability for the future power of the Conservative Party.
Read full textSchumpeter thanks his correspondent for a literary gift and laments the lack of diplomatic cultivation between Austria-Hungary and the United States. He warns that the escalation of submarine warfare will alienate the U.S. and strengthen British resolve, ultimately making the Monarchy more dependent on the German Empire. He emphasizes the need for Austria to cooperate with neutral actions to maintain its political individuality.
Read full textSchumpeter sends copies of two memoranda written in 1916, which had previously been shared with Prince Jaroslav Thun and other conservative figures. He expresses the importance of fostering active political discussion within conservative circles to determine the future of the Monarchy.
Read full textSchumpeter discusses the strategic timing for Austria to assert its own path separate from Germany. He expresses regret over the failure to convene delegations at the start of the war and critiques the current government's inability to lead public opinion. He supports the idea of 'Trialism' (including a special status for the Bohemian Crown) as a solution of European significance. Furthermore, he outlines a plan for a high-quality conservative newspaper to compete with the 'Jewish press' and master modern political techniques to promote old-Austrian interests.
Read full textSchumpeter warns of the rising influence of Social Democracy and the danger of them being seen as the sole architects of peace. He proposes a private mission to Sweden under the guise of academic research to gather information and establish unofficial contacts with Western European and neutral circles. He requests an introduction to Foreign Minister Count Czernin to discuss the feasibility of this trip.
Read full textA brief concluding note where Schumpeter thanks his correspondent for forwarding his memorandum to the Foreign Minister and confirms his availability for a meeting in Vienna to discuss the matters further.
Read full textA series of letters from Schumpeter to Count Harrach discussing the deteriorating internal situation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Schumpeter advocates for a conservative political organ, reconciliation with Slavic parties (specifically the Czechs in Bohemia), and warns against the dangers of a 'civilian cabinet' subservient to German-nationalist dictates. He explores constitutional reconstructions to alleviate the friction caused by dualism and suggests a government of independent conservative men to navigate the crisis.
Read full textA comprehensive alphabetical index of persons mentioned in the volume 'Politische Reden'. It includes brief biographical descriptions and professional functions for individuals active around 1919, such as Otto Bauer, Karl Renner, and various ministers, bankers, and academics. Note: Joseph Alois Schumpeter is excluded from the list as he appears on nearly every page.
Read full textA detailed subject index covering the major economic, political, and social themes of the work. Key entries include 'Abstempelung' (currency stamping), 'Anschluss' (annexation), 'Sozialisierung' (socialization), 'Vermögensabgabe' (capital levy), and 'Währung' (currency). It provides a roadmap to Schumpeter's specific policy proposals and economic analyses during the post-WWI transition period.
Read full text