by Schütz
[The Concept of Action and Performance]: Schütz defines 'action' as human conduct based on a preconceived project, distinguishing it from the 'act' which is the accomplished outcome. He introduces the 'voluntative fiat' as the mechanism that transforms a mere phantasy or project into a purpose or 'performance,' particularly in covert actions. The section also explores the concept of purposive refraining from action, where a decision not to act is itself considered a performance. [The Time Structure of the Project]: Drawing on John Dewey's definition of deliberation as a 'dramatic rehearsal,' Schütz analyzes the temporal structure of projecting. He argues that actors anticipate the completed 'act' in the Future Perfect Tense (modo futuri exacti) rather than the ongoing process of acting. This projection is limited by the actor's current 'knowledge at hand,' which inherently contains empty horizons and uncertainty because the actor will have changed by the time the project is materialized. [In-Order-To and Because Motives]: Schütz distinguishes between two types of motives: the 'in-order-to motive,' which refers to the future state of affairs the actor intends to bring about, and the 'because motive,' which refers to the past experiences that determined the project. He explains that while the actor lives in the 'in-order-to' perspective, the 'because' motive is only accessible through a retrospective glance. This distinction clarifies the confusion between subjective and objective viewpoints in social science and philosophy regarding free will and determinism. [Fancying, Projecting, and the Foundation of Practicability]: This section differentiates 'mere fancying' (thinking in the optative mode) from 'projecting' (thinking in the potential mode), where the latter is constrained by the reality of the world and the actor's knowledge of practicability. Schütz identifies two foundations for this practicability: the 'world taken for granted,' which provides a frame of typical experiences shared socially, and the 'biographically determined situation,' which dictates the actor's specific interests and what is within their actual or potential reach. [Doubling, Questioning, and Husserl's Possibilities]: Schütz explores how doubt arises when conflicting interests compel an actor to choose between elements of the world previously taken for granted. He utilizes Husserl’s distinction between 'open possibilities' (unhampered anticipations) and 'problematic possibilities' (competing beliefs with specific weights). Choice is defined not as a preference emerging from indifference, but as the emergence of a unified preference from competing problematic possibilities that arise in a situation of doubt. [Choosing Among Objects and Projects]: Schütz contrasts choosing between physical objects within reach (which coexist in outer time) with choosing between projects of action (which are produced successively in inner time or 'durée'). He critiques the 'as if' methodology in social sciences that treats choices as pre-constituted alternatives. Referencing Bergson, he argues that the ego changes through the very process of deliberation, meaning projects are not static points but a dynamic evolution of the self. [Leibniz's Theory of Volition and the Art of Deliberation]: Schütz details Leibniz's theory of volition, which replaces the simple balance-scale metaphor of choice with a complex system of 'antecedent,' 'intermediate,' and 'final' volitions. Leibniz describes deliberation as a mechanical-like concourse of various inclinations (weights) processed by reason. Schütz notes that for Leibniz, as for Husserl and Bergson, the decision-making process is a living flux of consciousness where reason attempts to transform confused knowledge into distinct knowledge to reach a 'decretory' fiat. [The Problem of Weight and Conclusion]: The final section addresses how 'weight' is assigned to possibilities through pre-existing systems of interest and higher-order plans (e.g., a 'plan for life'). Schütz concludes by summarizing the transition from the world taken for granted to a situation of doubt and back to empirical certainty through decision. He poses two final questions for social science: how we understand the motives of fellow men despite different biographical situations, and how the social scientist can objectively study these subjective processes. [Extracto (Spanish Summary)]: A Spanish language summary of the paper's main arguments regarding the concept of action, the temporal structure of projects (modo futuri exacti), and the theories of Husserl, Bergson, and Leibniz on choice and volition.
Schütz defines 'action' as human conduct based on a preconceived project, distinguishing it from the 'act' which is the accomplished outcome. He introduces the 'voluntative fiat' as the mechanism that transforms a mere phantasy or project into a purpose or 'performance,' particularly in covert actions. The section also explores the concept of purposive refraining from action, where a decision not to act is itself considered a performance.
Read full textDrawing on John Dewey's definition of deliberation as a 'dramatic rehearsal,' Schütz analyzes the temporal structure of projecting. He argues that actors anticipate the completed 'act' in the Future Perfect Tense (modo futuri exacti) rather than the ongoing process of acting. This projection is limited by the actor's current 'knowledge at hand,' which inherently contains empty horizons and uncertainty because the actor will have changed by the time the project is materialized.
Read full textSchütz distinguishes between two types of motives: the 'in-order-to motive,' which refers to the future state of affairs the actor intends to bring about, and the 'because motive,' which refers to the past experiences that determined the project. He explains that while the actor lives in the 'in-order-to' perspective, the 'because' motive is only accessible through a retrospective glance. This distinction clarifies the confusion between subjective and objective viewpoints in social science and philosophy regarding free will and determinism.
Read full textThis section differentiates 'mere fancying' (thinking in the optative mode) from 'projecting' (thinking in the potential mode), where the latter is constrained by the reality of the world and the actor's knowledge of practicability. Schütz identifies two foundations for this practicability: the 'world taken for granted,' which provides a frame of typical experiences shared socially, and the 'biographically determined situation,' which dictates the actor's specific interests and what is within their actual or potential reach.
Read full textSchütz explores how doubt arises when conflicting interests compel an actor to choose between elements of the world previously taken for granted. He utilizes Husserl’s distinction between 'open possibilities' (unhampered anticipations) and 'problematic possibilities' (competing beliefs with specific weights). Choice is defined not as a preference emerging from indifference, but as the emergence of a unified preference from competing problematic possibilities that arise in a situation of doubt.
Read full textSchütz contrasts choosing between physical objects within reach (which coexist in outer time) with choosing between projects of action (which are produced successively in inner time or 'durée'). He critiques the 'as if' methodology in social sciences that treats choices as pre-constituted alternatives. Referencing Bergson, he argues that the ego changes through the very process of deliberation, meaning projects are not static points but a dynamic evolution of the self.
Read full textSchütz details Leibniz's theory of volition, which replaces the simple balance-scale metaphor of choice with a complex system of 'antecedent,' 'intermediate,' and 'final' volitions. Leibniz describes deliberation as a mechanical-like concourse of various inclinations (weights) processed by reason. Schütz notes that for Leibniz, as for Husserl and Bergson, the decision-making process is a living flux of consciousness where reason attempts to transform confused knowledge into distinct knowledge to reach a 'decretory' fiat.
Read full textThe final section addresses how 'weight' is assigned to possibilities through pre-existing systems of interest and higher-order plans (e.g., a 'plan for life'). Schütz concludes by summarizing the transition from the world taken for granted to a situation of doubt and back to empirical certainty through decision. He poses two final questions for social science: how we understand the motives of fellow men despite different biographical situations, and how the social scientist can objectively study these subjective processes.
Read full textA Spanish language summary of the paper's main arguments regarding the concept of action, the temporal structure of projects (modo futuri exacti), and the theories of Husserl, Bergson, and Leibniz on choice and volition.
Read full text