Pläne und Versuche der Währungssanierung

[Front Matter and Table of Contents]: Title pages and table of contents for Volume 165 of the Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, focusing on the history of currency stabilization plans and attempts in Italy, the Straits Settlements, Austria, and Greece. [Currency Decay and Reform in Italy (1866–1910): Causes and Early Plans]: Ernst Wilmersdoerffer analyzes the origins of the Italian currency crisis following national unification. He discusses the introduction of the forced currency (Zwangskurs) in 1866 due to war and passive balance of payments, and details Quintino Sella's early stabilization plans focused on balancing the budget and reducing debt to the national bank. [Italian Monetary Reforms: 1870–1881]: This section covers the legislative attempts to manage the Italian currency between 1870 and 1881. It details the Law of 1874 which created a bank consortium to limit state note circulation, and the major Reform of 1881 led by Agostino Magliani, which aimed to abolish the forced currency through a massive gold loan and the resumption of cash payments. [The Failure of Italian Stabilization and the Crisis of 1893]: Wilmersdoerffer describes the collapse of the 1881 reform due to agricultural crises, colonial expansion, and a trade war with France. The resulting immobilization of banks led to the Banca Romana scandal and the total failure of cash redemptions by 1893. Sidney Sonnino is credited with saving the state from bankruptcy through tax increases and currency controls, leading to a period of stability after 1900. [Currency Reform in the Straits Settlements (1903–1907): Introduction]: Richard Kiliani introduces the currency reform in the Straits Settlements. He argues that the success of the reform was rooted in the region's strong production (tin and jungle products) and active balance of payments. He contrasts the 'vassal' nature of colonial currency with the German post-war situation, emphasizing that production power is the prerequisite for stabilization. [The Straits Settlements Reform Process and the Gold Exchange Standard]: This section details the transition from a silver-based dollar system to a gold exchange standard in the Straits Settlements. Based on Sir David Barbour's 1903 report, the government demonetized foreign silver dollars and introduced a new Straits dollar fixed to gold. Kiliani explains the mechanism of maintaining the exchange rate through gold reserves in London and Singapore and the role of bank competition. [The 1907 Crisis and Socio-Economic Impacts in the Straits Settlements]: Kiliani analyzes the 1907 economic crisis where falling tin prices forced the government to support the currency using gold reserves. He critiques the reform's impact on prices, noting that the cost of living increased because the dollar was fixed at a high rate. He concludes that the reform succeeded due to the credit of the British Empire and the region's natural wealth, rather than pure monetary mechanics. [The Stabilization of the Austrian Krone (1919–1922): The Path to Collapse]: Friedrich Gaertner details the post-WWI collapse of the Austrian Krone. He discusses the failure of early financial plans, the introduction of the 'Index Law' in 1922 which tied wages to inflation (worsening the spiral), and the 'flight from the Krone' as the public sought real assets. By mid-1922, the currency was effectively lost, necessitating international intervention. [The League of Nations Intervention and the Seipel Reform in Austria]: This section describes the turning point in Austrian stabilization: Chancellor Seipel's appeal to the League of Nations in late 1922. It outlines the Geneva Protocols, which provided a 650 million gold krone loan guaranteed by European powers in exchange for strict fiscal reforms, the establishment of a new National Bank, and the appointment of an international General Commissioner to oversee the budget. [Technical Execution of Austrian Stabilization and the New National Bank]: Gaertner explains the technical measures taken to stabilize the Krone, including the cessation of the money press in November 1922 and the strict management of foreign exchange by the Devisenzentrale. He details the structure of the international loan, the involvement of the Morgan bank group, and the successful placement of dollar-denominated treasury bills to bridge the gap until the main loan was ready. [Economic Consequences of Austrian Stabilization (1923)]: The author reviews the first six months of stabilization in Austria. While the Krone remained stable, the country faced high unemployment and a shortage of operating capital. However, capital flight reversed, savings deposits grew, and the budget deficit was reduced according to the League of Nations plan. The role of the General Commissioner as a 'stubborn savings master' is highlighted as essential for overcoming political resistance to austerity. [The Greek Currency Question (1833–1914): Historical Background]: Dr. E. Pharmakides provides a history of the Greek Drachma from its inception in 1833. He discusses the long periods of forced currency (Zwangskurs) driven by fiscal deficits and war. He highlights the 1910 reform (Law ΓΧΜΒ) which introduced a Gold Exchange Standard, allowing the National Bank to stabilize the exchange rate by buying and selling gold and foreign devisen, which successfully maintained the Drachma's value through the Balkan Wars. [Greek Monetary Policy During and After WWI (1914–1923)]: Pharmakides analyzes the impact of WWI and the subsequent Asia Minor campaign on Greek currency. He explains how the depletion of foreign reserves and the cessation of Allied financial support led to a massive devaluation starting in 1919. To fund the war without total collapse, the government implemented a unique 'forced loan' in 1922 by physically cutting bank notes in half. The segment concludes with a detailed breakdown of the National Bank's note emission rights and the current state of the Drachma in 1923. [Greek Currency Legislation and Allied Credits]: This segment analyzes the Greek currency law ΓΧΜΒ and the composition of the National Bank of Greece's foreign reserves. It discusses how political events, specifically the return of King Constantine, led the Allies to block credits, rendering the law's stabilization mechanism ineffective and forcing the government to rely on paper money circulation. [Analysis of the Law ΓΧΜΒ and the Stabilization of the Drachma]: Somary evaluates the effectiveness of Law ΓΧΜΒ in stabilizing the Greek drachma. He argues that while the system worked during periods of favorable balance of payments, the exhaustion of reserves due to prolonged war conditions led to a forced exchange regime and eventual devaluation. [Prospects for Drachma Recovery and Economic Factors]: The author examines the potential for the drachma to return to its pre-war value. He identifies several positive factors, including psychological stabilization, the return of foreign exchange held by citizens, the exploitation of new provinces, remittances from Greeks in America, and the growth of the merchant marine, while noting the burden of refugee care. [Statistical Overview: Greek Note Circulation and Exchange Rates (1914-1923)]: A comprehensive statistical section providing data on the Greek money supply, domestic price indices, and exchange rates against the Dollar, Pound, and Franc from 1914 to 1923. It also includes a table of Greek foreign trade (imports/exports) in both paper and gold denominations. [The Concept of the Double Note: Introduction and Context]: This segment introduces Dr. Martha Stephanie Braun's work on the 'Double Note' (Doppelnote). It outlines the economic situation in Central Europe following World War I that led various theorists to propose a dual currency system—one based on gold for international trade and the existing depreciated paper currency for domestic use. [The Economic Crisis of 1919 and the Treaty of St. Germain]: Braun describes the catastrophic economic downturn in Austria during late 1919. Key factors included the harsh terms of the Treaty of St. Germain, the prohibition of union with Germany, the lack of raw materials like coal, and the rapid depreciation of the Austrian Krone against the Pound Sterling. [The Emergence of Double Note Projects: Benedikt and Landesberger]: This section details the early proposals for a dual currency system in Austria. It discusses the roles of Moriz Benedikt (editor of the Neue Freie Presse) and Julius von Landesberger in advocating for a new, gold-backed bank of issue to operate alongside the depreciated paper currency to stabilize trade and calculation. [Benedikt's Proposal for an Import Note]: Braun analyzes Moriz Benedikt's specific plan for an 'Import Note'. Benedikt argued that commerce could not wait for state budget balancing and required a stable medium of exchange. He proposed a private bank funded by American gold credits to issue notes specifically for import/export transactions, which would eventually stabilize the paper currency's value through a market-driven relation. [Landesberger's Bank Plans and Technical Implementation]: This segment explores Julius von Landesberger's technical refinements to the double note idea. He proposed a bank with separate 'Banking' and 'Issue' departments (modeled on the Bank of England), the use of foreign securities to build reserves, and the creation of an international 'Balutanote' to serve as a common European standard and clearing mechanism. [International Perspectives and the Vissering System]: Braun discusses the shift toward international solutions for the currency crisis, highlighting the proposals of Dutch financier Gerard Vissering. Unlike the Austrian proponents, Vissering favored a fictitious gold accounting unit ('Export Krone') and international control over trade and credits, rather than the physical circulation of gold notes, to prevent hoarding and stabilize the European economy. [Transformation and Overcoming of the Double Note Concept]: This section traces the evolution of the double note concept from its initial proposal by Bissering to its critical reception at the Brussels Financial Conference of 1920. It highlights the shift from international currency issuance toward credit organization (Ter Meulen project) and details the resistance from French representatives like Celier, who feared for national sovereignty. The text also outlines the specific economic demands for Austria, including free trade with successor states and the use of state assets as collateral for foreign credits. [The Rise of Deflationary Policy and Gold Accounting]: Somary discusses the shift in economic thought toward deflationary policies, citing Czechoslovakia's success in stabilizing its currency through fiscal discipline and export surpluses rather than new banking experiments. The section introduces the concept of 'Goldrechnung' (gold accounting) as a surrogate for stabilization and explores the debate between proponents of the double note (Neue Freie Presse) and its critics (Schwarzvald), who feared the displacement of good money by bad. [Critique of the Double Note System: Parallel Currency and Gresham's Law]: The author begins a systematic critique of the double note system, defining it as a form of parallel currency where two legal tenders exist without a fixed exchange rate. Drawing on the history of bimetallism and the theories of Helfferich and Mises, Somary argues that the distinction between double and parallel currencies is largely formal, as both are subject to Gresham's Law. He examines the role of paper money as a 'credit' taken by the state from its citizens through deception. [Production Deficits and the Inevitability of Inflation]: Somary analyzes the underlying economic causes of currency failure, specifically the 'production deficit' where consumption exceeds production, leading to capital erosion. He argues that a new gold note cannot stop inflation if the state continues to print paper money to cover its deficit. The section explores the risks of gold hoarding (thesaurierung) and the eventual collapse of the paper currency when faced with a stable alternative, referencing historical examples from the Napoleonic wars and the US Greenbacks. [The North Russian Experiment and Final Conclusions]: The chunk concludes with a case study of a practical attempt to introduce a double note in North Russia in 1918 under British advisor M. G. Young. The experiment failed due to psychological distrust, unfavorable export conditions, and the eventual flight of the government. Somary uses this to reinforce his thesis: currency reform is secondary to credit and production balance. He warns that a new note is merely a disguised form of credit and cannot heal an inherently sick economic organism. [The Redundancy of the Gold Note after Stabilization]: Somary argues that once a currency is stabilized through economic recovery and fiscal discipline, a separate gold note becomes redundant. Using the example of the Austrian National Bank in 1922, he explains that the form of the currency matters less than the underlying economic health and the elimination of production deficits. He critiques 'Banking Theory' and the idea of free money creation, suggesting that the focus should remain on the organic recovery of the national economy rather than formal currency distinctions. [The Problems of Free Money Creation and Banking Theory]: This section provides a technical critique of 'free money creation' as advocated by Bendixen and the Banking School. Somary argues that bank notes issued against bills of exchange are credit instruments, not true money, and are subject to value fluctuations based on interest rate policies and economic shifts. He discusses the limitations of a central bank cartel in managing the discount rate and references Ricardo's distinction between currency and credit to argue that only notes backed by actual goods (commodity money) can provide true stability. [Conclusion: The Path to Economic Reconstruction]: In the concluding section, Somary warns against monetary nihilism while emphasizing that isolated interventions—whether deflationary measures or new currency types—cannot fix a broken economy. He advocates for a holistic approach to economic policy that addresses production, labor laws, and trade barriers simultaneously. He concludes that the failure of the double-note plans highlights the need for a comprehensive understanding of economic interdependencies to correct the 'sins' of war and post-war economic management.