by Wieser et al
[Front Matter and Table of Contents]: The front matter and table of contents for a 1924 Festschrift celebrating the 200th birthday of Immanuel Kant. It lists contributors from various German and Austrian universities and outlines essays covering topics such as legal philosophy, ethics, history, and political theory from a Kantian perspective. [Pessimism and Optimism from a Kantian Standpoint]: Hans Vaihinger explores the tension between pessimism and optimism in Kant's philosophy. He traces Kant's development from early Leibnizian optimism to a later 'moral indignation pessimism' and the doctrine of 'radical evil.' Vaihinger discusses the influence of Kant's physical constitution, his pietistic upbringing, and his melancholic temperament on his worldview. He argues that Kant eventually transcends the pessimism-optimism dichotomy through a higher 'ethical idealism' or 'activism,' a philosophy of 'nevertheless' that finds absolute value in the good will despite the suffering and irrationality of the empirical world. [The Infinite in Novalis]: C. A. Emge analyzes the concept of the infinite in the works of Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg). The essay explores how Novalis views death not as an end but as an essential part of life that leads 'home.' It details the transition from resignation—the inability to grasp the unconditioned in empirical things—to a positive relationship with the infinite through symbolism and 'romanticizing.' Emge explains Novalis's 'magical idealism,' where the artist acts as a mediator, transforming the mundane into the mysterious and the finite into a symbol of the infinite, thereby reconciling the dualism between the empirical and the ideal. [Law and Criticism (After a Saying by Gottfried Keller)]: Max Salomon examines a specific quote from Gottfried Keller's 'Der grüne Heinrich' stating that 'Law is actually nothing but criticism.' The essay explores the relationship between the 'natural' and 'individual' productive life and the 'universal' and 'principled' nature of law. Salomon interprets Keller's view through a Kantian lens, arguing that law serves as the ethical 'criticism' or 'enabling' of life, transforming the raw impulses of the individual into a structured cultural order. He contrasts the 'genuine' universality of Roman law with what Keller perceived as the 'unauthentic' individualism of Germanic law. [Kant's Thoughts on Philosophical Intellectual Cultivation]: Arnold Kowalewski provides a historical and pedagogical overview of Kant's teaching career at the University of Königsberg. He describes Kant's early years as a student and private tutor, his innovative introduction of Physical Geography and Anthropology into the curriculum, and his fundamental belief that students should not learn 'philosophy' but rather 'how to philosophize.' The essay analyzes Kant's various lecture announcements (Einladungsschriften), highlighting his method of starting with empirical observations (psychology/geography) before moving to abstract metaphysics to better engage the students' natural intellectual development. [The 'Law' of History]: Erich Jung investigates the epistemological foundations of historical science. He argues that history cannot be understood through purely mechanical causality (causae efficientes) but requires the recognition of 'goal-oriented' or 'teleological' causes (causae finales) rooted in human will and character. Jung critiques the materialist conception of history, asserting that the true 'law' of history is found in the consistent character and goal-setting of great personalities and nations. He uses examples like Frederick the Great and Bismarck to show how the 'unswerving direction' of a character provides the necessary continuity for historical understanding. [True Politics and Morality]: Ludwig Waldecker discusses the Kantian maxim that 'True politics cannot take a step without first having paid homage to morality.' The essay situates Kant's political theory within the tradition of natural law and the transition from the absolutist 'welfare state' to the 'legal state' (Rechtsstaat). Waldecker explores how Kant rationalizes the state through the idea of the social contract and the autonomy of the will. He argues that for Kant, politics is not merely a technical problem of utility but is fundamentally grounded in the moral law, which provides the 'total norm' for social coexistence. [The Apriori in Law]: Erwin Riezler critiques the notion of 'apriori' legal principles. He examines Kant's claim that all legal propositions are laws of reason (apriori) and contrasts this with modern phenomenological approaches, specifically that of Adolf Reinach. Riezler argues that while formal logic applies to legal thinking, specific legal concepts (like property, contract, or liability) are empirical and teleological rather than apriori. He demonstrates through examples (such as the transfer of rights or the concept of causality) that what appears to be an 'apriori' legal truth is often either a tautology or a specific policy choice of a positive legal order. [Overview of Current Directions in German Legal Philosophy]: Wilhelm Sauer provides a comprehensive taxonomy of contemporary German legal philosophy on the occasion of Kant's 200th birthday. He categorizes various schools of thought, including the 'General Theory of Law,' legal sociology, and more philosophical branches like Neo-Kantianism (Stammler, Kelsen), legal phenomenology, and value-theory (Lask, Radbruch). Sauer emphasizes Kant's enduring influence on the field, noting that even non-juridical Kantian concepts have shaped how legal scholars approach the conditions of knowledge and the distinction between 'is' and 'ought.' [Encyclopedic Directions in Legal Theory]: This section examines the 'Encyclopedic Directions' of legal theory, specifically the 'Allgemeine Rechtslehre' (General Theory of Law) and 'Allgemeine Staatslehre' (General Theory of the State). The author critiques these approaches for their reliance on positive legal data and their lack of a unified, non-contradictory philosophical foundation, arguing that they often lose themselves in logical constructions without a clear orientation toward the purpose of law. [Extensions of General Legal Theory: History, Comparison, Sociology, and Policy]: The author analyzes four extensions of general legal theory: Legal Historicism (Savigny, Jhering), Comparative Law (Kohler), Legal Sociology (Ehrlich, Jellinek), and Legal Policy (v. Liszt). While acknowledging their practical utility for legislation and understanding social needs, the author argues they share the same fundamental flaws as the encyclopedic direction—namely, a lack of critical philosophical grounding and a tendency to confuse causal or descriptive analysis with the normative essence of law. [Legal Philosophy in the Strict Sense: Positivism and Phenomenalism]: This segment transitions to 'Legal Philosophy in the strict sense,' focusing on Neo-Kantian approaches. It critiques 'Positivism' (Schuppe, Rehmke) for its inability to move beyond initial problem-settings into a true system of knowledge due to a fear of metaphysics. It then addresses 'Phenomenalism' (Husserl, Reinach), praising its analysis of meaning but arguing that a mere 'vision of essence' (Wesensschau) cannot constitute a philosophical system without incorporating values and goals. [Psychologism and the Foundations of Logism]: The author discusses 'Psychologism,' which locates the legal experience in the inner life (legal feeling, public opinion). While it identifies the correct starting point (consciousness/experience), it lacks a normative scale. This leads to 'Logism,' which emphasizes logical consistency. The author distinguishes between mere 'correctness' (error-free thinking) and 'truth' (the ultimate goal of science), warning that pure logic is a tool, not the end goal of legal philosophy. [Formal and Transcendental Logism: Kelsen and the Marburg School]: This section covers 'Formal Logism' (Vaihinger's Fictionalism) and 'Transcendental Logism.' It highlights the Marburg School's influence on legal theory, particularly Kelsen's 'Normative Logism.' Kelsen's demand for 'methodological purity' is praised for its scientific rigor but critiqued for being too formalistic and failing to address the teleological and cultural dimensions of law, which belong to 'practical reason' rather than pure theoretical logic. [Aprioric Logism: The Work of Rudolf Stammler]: A detailed critique of Rudolf Stammler, the founder of modern German legal philosophy. The author credits Stammler with applying Kantian principles to law but argues his 'Apriorism' remains stuck in methodology. Stammler's distinction between the 'concept of law' (formal) and the 'idea of law' (regulative) is analyzed; the author suggests this dualism, while materializing 'correct law,' ultimately lacks the unity of a complete system. [Axiological Logism: Value Theory and Relativism]: The final section discusses 'Axiological Logism' (Southwest German School), focusing on value theory and cultural philosophy (Lask, Radbruch). The author critiques Radbruch's 'Relativism' as an 'abdication of philosophy,' where the choice between individual, collective, or objective values becomes a matter of personal confession rather than scientific knowledge. This transition marks the limit of Logism and points toward metaphysical considerations. [Legal Philosophy in the Broad Sense: Cultural Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Connections]: This section explores legal philosophy in its broader sense as a completion of the systematic worldview. It discusses Cultural Philosophy as an expanded theory of value, critiquing thinkers like Lasson, Berolzheimer, Kohler, and Mayer for their varying degrees of systematic grounding. The author argues that the relationship between culture and law must be clarified to make legal philosophy a practical 'legal policy' rather than an abstract discipline. [Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Law: Ethics, Logic, and Psychology]: The author examines how disciplines outside of legal philosophy—specifically Ethics, Logic, and Psychology—contribute to the understanding of law. It distinguishes between the normative approach of ethics (focused on justice and the individual) and the descriptive/causal approach of psychology (focused on mental processes). It also warns against confusing these interdisciplinary applications with 'logism' or 'psychologism' within legal philosophy itself. [Pedagogy, Aesthetics, Religion, and Nature in Legal Philosophy]: This segment covers specialized sub-fields: the pedagogy of legal education, the aesthetics of legal form and artistic representation, and the philosophy of religion as a way to grasp law through the eternal. It also critiques 'Natural Philosophy of Law' and biological theories (like Lombroso's), arguing that while law can be studied causally, its essence remains normative. [Sociology, Social Philosophy, and the Metaphysics of Law]: The author distinguishes between the descriptive Sociology of Law and the normative Social Philosophy of Law, which provides a higher systematic unity for legal concepts like community and justice. It concludes with the Philosophy of History and the Metaphysics of Law, the latter being described as a 'regulative idea' in the Kantian sense—an infinite task of placing law within a universal worldview. [Self-Interest in Adam Smith and Kant's Categorical Imperative: Part I]: Hellmuth Wolff begins an investigation into the relationship between Adam Smith's concept of self-interest and Kant's ethics. He reviews the history of scholarship (Oncken, Hasbach, Stolzmann) and addresses the 'Adam Smith Problem'—the alleged contradiction between Smith's 'Theory of Moral Sentiments' (sympathy) and 'Wealth of Nations' (egoism). Wolff suggests that the perceived gap between Smith and Kant might be bridgeable. [The Misjudgment of Smith's Self-Interest and the Historical School]: Wolff analyzes how the German Historical School and socialist thinkers like Marx criticized Smith's 'self-interest' as a purely materialistic or anti-social principle. He argues that this was a misinterpretation driven by the social problems of the industrial revolution. He asserts that Smith remained a moral philosopher throughout his life and that his economic theories were always grounded in his earlier ethical framework. [Smith's Path to Self-Interest from his Moral Theory]: Wolff demonstrates that for Smith, self-interest is a moral category derived from the 'self-love' inherent in human nature as created by God. He argues that Smith's 'Wealth of Nations' is effectively a 'practical ethics.' By comparing Smith to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Wolff shows that Smith views the pursuit of self-interest within the bounds of competition as a path to the common good, thus resolving the 'Adam Smith Problem.' [The Meaning of Economic Self-Interest in Adam Smith]: This section examines Adam Smith's concept of self-interest (self-love) as a social category rather than a purely individualistic drive. It argues that Smith's 'impartial spectator' serves as a logical figure analogous to Kant's legislator, weighing self-interest within moral and social boundaries. The author posits that Smith's economic theory is an extension of his ethics, aiming for social welfare through rational division of labor and regulated competition, rather than mere wealth accumulation. [Contact Points Between Smith's Self-Interest and Kant's Categorical Imperative]: A comparative analysis of Smith's principle of self-love and Kant's categorical imperative. The author explores why Kant did not develop a full economic theory, contrasting his formal-logical approach with Smith's integrated system of ethics, politics, and economics. While Smith's principle is viewed as a subjective, national-focused drive rooted in sentiment, Kant's imperative is presented as an objective, universal social principle. The section concludes that Smith should be viewed through the lens of a 'positivistic idealism' that seeks to moralize economic life. [Kant's Disciplinary Measure: The Conflict with Friedrich Wilhelm II]: Dr. Ludwig Spiegel analyzes the historical and legal context of the conflict between Kant and King Friedrich Wilhelm II regarding Kant's work on religion. The text examines the nature of royal authority in an absolute monarchy, Kant's formal obedience as a subject, and the controversial 'mental reservation' Kant employed in his promise to remain silent on religious matters. Spiegel argues that Kant's behavior must be understood within the personal, non-abstract legal framework of the 18th-century Prussian state. [Legal Idea and Legal Material: A Transcendental Logic of Law]: Gustav Radbruch explores the relationship between the 'legal idea' (form) and 'legal material' (substance) using transcendental logic. He critiques both pure natural law (which ignores material resistance) and historical materialism (which ignores formal autonomy). Radbruch argues that the material of law is not raw data but reality pre-formed by social concepts. He discusses how modern social law and economic democracy represent a re-approximation of legal form to social substance compared to the fictions of classical liberalism. [On Kant's Theory of Criminal Law]: Adolf Dyroff provides a detailed critique of Kant's penal theory, focusing on the concept of the 'categorical imperative of penal justice' and the principle of retribution (talion). The essay explores the tension between Kant's strict demand for justice—where punishment is a moral necessity independent of utility—and his broader legal philosophy based on external freedom. Dyroff discusses Kant's views on the right of pardon, dueling, and infanticide, noting where Kant's abstract formalism struggles with psychological and social realities. [The Theory of the Three Powers or Functions of the State]: Hans Kelsen presents a normative critique of the traditional theory of the three powers (legislative, executive, judicial). Starting from a Kantian definition of the state as a legal order, Kelsen argues that these are not separate 'powers' but stages in a unified process of law creation and concretization. He deconstructs the absolute distinction between law-making and law-application, showing that even administration and adjudication are forms of norm production. He concludes by critiquing the political tendency to view 'administration' as a sphere of 'free' activity outside the law. [Extraordinary State Functions: War as a Legal Act]: This segment examines the classification of war as an 'extraordinary' state function. The author argues that war is not outside the law but is a coercive legal act (Zwangsakt) defined by international or national legal orders. It clarifies that while the state is the subject of war, the objects of its coercive acts are always human beings (combatants), and critiques the prevailing view that exempts war and administration from strict legal categorization. [The Constitution: Logical and Positive Legal Perspectives]: The author introduces the 'Stufentheorie' (hierarchy of norms), defining state functions as a sequential process of law creation rather than a mere coordination of powers. It distinguishes between the 'constitution in a logical-legal sense' (the presupposed Grundnorm that establishes the unity of the legal order) and the 'constitution in a positive-legal sense' (the written laws governing legislation). The segment also discusses state identity, arguing that a state remains the same as long as constitutional changes follow the prescribed legal forms. [The Parallelism of Fact and Norm in the Hierarchy of Law]: This section describes the mechanics of the hierarchy of norms as a parallelism between physical-psychological acts (facts) and legal norms. Every higher norm defines the conditions under which a lower norm is created. The process terminates at two boundaries: the presupposed Grundnorm (pure norm without a prior factual act) and the final act of execution (pure fact that creates no further norm). [Positivist Basic Norm vs. Natural Law Social Contract]: The author compares the positivist concept of the 'Grundnorm' with the natural law tradition's 'social contract' (Urvertrag). While both seek a unified foundation for legal validity, the author critiques natural law for misinterpreting a logical hypothesis as a historical or factual contract. This segment argues that natural law's focus on individual will leads to contradictory fictions when trying to explain the objective validity of positive law, whereas the Grundnorm remains a formal, content-neutral logical requirement. [Formal and Material Concepts of the Constitution]: This segment distinguishes between the 'material' constitution (norms regarding top state organs and citizen-state relations) and the 'formal' constitution (laws that are harder to amend than ordinary legislation). It traces the historical development of these concepts from natural law's desire for legal stability and individual liberty. The author also deconstructs the 'pouvoir constituant' (constituent power), arguing it is not a mystical quality but simply a positive-legal arrangement for difficult norm amendment, such as qualified majorities or special conventions. [Constitutional Document and the 'Eternal' Constitution]: This section examines the concept of the constitutional document as a unified instrument, tracing its origins to social contract theory. It critiques the idea of an unchangeable or 'eternal' constitution, arguing that while legal provisions may declare themselves unalterable, the reality of changing societal needs often leads to 'constitutional transformation' (Verfassungswandlung) where the interpretation of the text shifts even if the wording remains the same. [Examination of the Constitutionality of Laws]: The text discusses the power of judicial review, noting that many modern constitutions restrict judges from checking the constitutionality of laws, particularly in constitutional monarchies where the monarch's promulgation serves as a final validation. It contrasts this with republican-democratic systems where specialized constitutional courts often have the power to annul unconstitutional laws. [Thoughts on Kant: Religious Sentiment and the Moral Law]: Professor Paul Menzer explores the personal and religious motivations behind Kant's philosophy. He analyzes Kant's transition from the awe of the 'starry heavens' in his youth to the 'moral law within' in his mature work. The essay discusses Kant's pietistic upbringing, his rationalization of the divine, the tension between nature (mechanism) and freedom (teleology), and how Kant's ethics eventually lead to a purified form of religion based on autonomy rather than divine command. [The Historical Position of Kant's Aesthetics]: This section situates Kant's 'Critique of Judgment' within the history of aesthetics, contrasting it with British empiricism and German rationalism (Baumgarten). It explains how Kant used the 'transcendental method' to find a middle ground between nature and freedom through the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. The essay traces Kant's influence on Schiller's aesthetic education and the Romantic movement's view of nature as a 'hidden poem.' [On the Philosophy of Legal Sources]: Dr. Rudolf Joerges provides a philosophical analysis of the sources of law (Rechtsquellen). He distinguishes between the creation of law (Rechtsentstehung) and the recognition of law (Rechterkenntnis). He argues that the true 'source' of law is not merely custom or legislation, but the underlying system of norms and values that determine how social facts are evaluated. He references Kelsen and Stammler to define the 'source' as the ultimate ground or highest norm of a legal order. [Definitions of Law and the Concept of the Concept]: The author reviews various definitions of law from prominent legal philosophers including Kant, Stammler, and Max Ernst Mayer. Finding no consensus, the text transitions to an epistemological analysis of the 'concept of the concept', distinguishing between descriptive concepts based on experience and logical constructions. [The Descriptive Concept of Positive Law and Justice]: This section develops a descriptive concept of positive law, identifying it as a social order comprising six elements, including human plurality and enforcement mechanisms. It distinguishes law from morality and religion by focusing on the 'content of behavior' (legality) rather than the 'motive' (morality). Crucially, it introduces law as an objective 'order of justice' that transcends subjective will and time. [Sources of Law and the Idea of Justice]: The author argues that true 'sources of law' are not mere social habits or legislation, but the highest norms of justice. The 'Idea of Law' is defined as a necessary rational concept of a community of rational beings, serving as the ultimate standard for the legislator to overcome subjectivity and achieve objectivity. [Legal Ideals and the Realization of the Legal Idea]: The final section explores how the abstract 'Idea of Law' manifests as 'Legal Ideals' in the empirical world. These ideals, such as the collectivist or eudaimonistic views, bridge the gap between pure reason and social reality, serving as the guiding values that determine how social facts are evaluated in the creation of law. [Zum Philosophischen in den Rechtsentstehungsvorgängen der Gewohnheit und der Rechtsetzung]: This section explores the philosophical foundations of law-making through custom and legislation, defining them as syntheses between logical thinking and ethical valuation. The author argues that law arises from the natural law of self-preservation and self-assertion, leading to diverse legal conceptions based on varying social conditions. True justice is presented as the rational reconciliation of these differing views. The text traces the evolution of law from the 'natural process' of custom (governed by power dynamics) to the 'rational process' of cooperative legislation, viewing this progression as the realization of the idea of culture and the movement from nature to spirit. [Rezensionsabhandlung: Rechtslehre und Politik (Julius Kraft on Leonard Nelson)]: Julius Kraft reviews Leonard Nelson's 'Rechtslehre und Politik', positioning it as an exact science that moves beyond traditional legal dogmatics. The review outlines Nelson's distinction between the political ideal (the state as a guarantor of law) and the pedagogical ideal (a community of those who love the law). Key concepts discussed include the 'rule of the wise' (Platonic ideal) as a correction to Kantian popular sovereignty, the necessity of state power to secure law against ill will, and the application of the 'law of equality of dignity' to social and cultural policy. Nelson's work is praised for providing a weapon against political dogmatism and establishing the foundations for a practical sociology. [Book Reviews and Notices: Kant-Bildnisse, Dohna-Wundlacken, and Vierkandt]: A collection of reviews for contemporary academic works. It covers Karl Heinz Clasen's publication on Kant portraits, Arnold Kowalewski's edition of Kant's lectures as recorded by Count Dohna-Wundlacken, and Alfred Vierkandt's 'Gesellschaftslehre'. Vierkandt's work is noted for its use of the phenomenological method and its opposition to rationalism in favor of a 'totality' concept in sociology. [Book Reviews and Notices: Sauer, Rümelin, Kitzinger, and Others]: Final set of reviews covering Wilhelm Sauer's 'Philosophie der Zukunft', Max Rümelin's tribute to Eugen Huber, Friedrich Kitzinger's legal aphorisms, and new editions of Hegel's Logic and Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. The reviews touch upon themes of cultural metaphysics, the codification of Swiss private law, and the utility of aphoristic methods in legal science.
The front matter and table of contents for a 1924 Festschrift celebrating the 200th birthday of Immanuel Kant. It lists contributors from various German and Austrian universities and outlines essays covering topics such as legal philosophy, ethics, history, and political theory from a Kantian perspective.
Read full textHans Vaihinger explores the tension between pessimism and optimism in Kant's philosophy. He traces Kant's development from early Leibnizian optimism to a later 'moral indignation pessimism' and the doctrine of 'radical evil.' Vaihinger discusses the influence of Kant's physical constitution, his pietistic upbringing, and his melancholic temperament on his worldview. He argues that Kant eventually transcends the pessimism-optimism dichotomy through a higher 'ethical idealism' or 'activism,' a philosophy of 'nevertheless' that finds absolute value in the good will despite the suffering and irrationality of the empirical world.
Read full textC. A. Emge analyzes the concept of the infinite in the works of Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg). The essay explores how Novalis views death not as an end but as an essential part of life that leads 'home.' It details the transition from resignation—the inability to grasp the unconditioned in empirical things—to a positive relationship with the infinite through symbolism and 'romanticizing.' Emge explains Novalis's 'magical idealism,' where the artist acts as a mediator, transforming the mundane into the mysterious and the finite into a symbol of the infinite, thereby reconciling the dualism between the empirical and the ideal.
Read full textMax Salomon examines a specific quote from Gottfried Keller's 'Der grüne Heinrich' stating that 'Law is actually nothing but criticism.' The essay explores the relationship between the 'natural' and 'individual' productive life and the 'universal' and 'principled' nature of law. Salomon interprets Keller's view through a Kantian lens, arguing that law serves as the ethical 'criticism' or 'enabling' of life, transforming the raw impulses of the individual into a structured cultural order. He contrasts the 'genuine' universality of Roman law with what Keller perceived as the 'unauthentic' individualism of Germanic law.
Read full textArnold Kowalewski provides a historical and pedagogical overview of Kant's teaching career at the University of Königsberg. He describes Kant's early years as a student and private tutor, his innovative introduction of Physical Geography and Anthropology into the curriculum, and his fundamental belief that students should not learn 'philosophy' but rather 'how to philosophize.' The essay analyzes Kant's various lecture announcements (Einladungsschriften), highlighting his method of starting with empirical observations (psychology/geography) before moving to abstract metaphysics to better engage the students' natural intellectual development.
Read full textErich Jung investigates the epistemological foundations of historical science. He argues that history cannot be understood through purely mechanical causality (causae efficientes) but requires the recognition of 'goal-oriented' or 'teleological' causes (causae finales) rooted in human will and character. Jung critiques the materialist conception of history, asserting that the true 'law' of history is found in the consistent character and goal-setting of great personalities and nations. He uses examples like Frederick the Great and Bismarck to show how the 'unswerving direction' of a character provides the necessary continuity for historical understanding.
Read full textLudwig Waldecker discusses the Kantian maxim that 'True politics cannot take a step without first having paid homage to morality.' The essay situates Kant's political theory within the tradition of natural law and the transition from the absolutist 'welfare state' to the 'legal state' (Rechtsstaat). Waldecker explores how Kant rationalizes the state through the idea of the social contract and the autonomy of the will. He argues that for Kant, politics is not merely a technical problem of utility but is fundamentally grounded in the moral law, which provides the 'total norm' for social coexistence.
Read full textErwin Riezler critiques the notion of 'apriori' legal principles. He examines Kant's claim that all legal propositions are laws of reason (apriori) and contrasts this with modern phenomenological approaches, specifically that of Adolf Reinach. Riezler argues that while formal logic applies to legal thinking, specific legal concepts (like property, contract, or liability) are empirical and teleological rather than apriori. He demonstrates through examples (such as the transfer of rights or the concept of causality) that what appears to be an 'apriori' legal truth is often either a tautology or a specific policy choice of a positive legal order.
Read full textWilhelm Sauer provides a comprehensive taxonomy of contemporary German legal philosophy on the occasion of Kant's 200th birthday. He categorizes various schools of thought, including the 'General Theory of Law,' legal sociology, and more philosophical branches like Neo-Kantianism (Stammler, Kelsen), legal phenomenology, and value-theory (Lask, Radbruch). Sauer emphasizes Kant's enduring influence on the field, noting that even non-juridical Kantian concepts have shaped how legal scholars approach the conditions of knowledge and the distinction between 'is' and 'ought.'
Read full textThis section examines the 'Encyclopedic Directions' of legal theory, specifically the 'Allgemeine Rechtslehre' (General Theory of Law) and 'Allgemeine Staatslehre' (General Theory of the State). The author critiques these approaches for their reliance on positive legal data and their lack of a unified, non-contradictory philosophical foundation, arguing that they often lose themselves in logical constructions without a clear orientation toward the purpose of law.
Read full textThe author analyzes four extensions of general legal theory: Legal Historicism (Savigny, Jhering), Comparative Law (Kohler), Legal Sociology (Ehrlich, Jellinek), and Legal Policy (v. Liszt). While acknowledging their practical utility for legislation and understanding social needs, the author argues they share the same fundamental flaws as the encyclopedic direction—namely, a lack of critical philosophical grounding and a tendency to confuse causal or descriptive analysis with the normative essence of law.
Read full textThis segment transitions to 'Legal Philosophy in the strict sense,' focusing on Neo-Kantian approaches. It critiques 'Positivism' (Schuppe, Rehmke) for its inability to move beyond initial problem-settings into a true system of knowledge due to a fear of metaphysics. It then addresses 'Phenomenalism' (Husserl, Reinach), praising its analysis of meaning but arguing that a mere 'vision of essence' (Wesensschau) cannot constitute a philosophical system without incorporating values and goals.
Read full textThe author discusses 'Psychologism,' which locates the legal experience in the inner life (legal feeling, public opinion). While it identifies the correct starting point (consciousness/experience), it lacks a normative scale. This leads to 'Logism,' which emphasizes logical consistency. The author distinguishes between mere 'correctness' (error-free thinking) and 'truth' (the ultimate goal of science), warning that pure logic is a tool, not the end goal of legal philosophy.
Read full textThis section covers 'Formal Logism' (Vaihinger's Fictionalism) and 'Transcendental Logism.' It highlights the Marburg School's influence on legal theory, particularly Kelsen's 'Normative Logism.' Kelsen's demand for 'methodological purity' is praised for its scientific rigor but critiqued for being too formalistic and failing to address the teleological and cultural dimensions of law, which belong to 'practical reason' rather than pure theoretical logic.
Read full textA detailed critique of Rudolf Stammler, the founder of modern German legal philosophy. The author credits Stammler with applying Kantian principles to law but argues his 'Apriorism' remains stuck in methodology. Stammler's distinction between the 'concept of law' (formal) and the 'idea of law' (regulative) is analyzed; the author suggests this dualism, while materializing 'correct law,' ultimately lacks the unity of a complete system.
Read full textThe final section discusses 'Axiological Logism' (Southwest German School), focusing on value theory and cultural philosophy (Lask, Radbruch). The author critiques Radbruch's 'Relativism' as an 'abdication of philosophy,' where the choice between individual, collective, or objective values becomes a matter of personal confession rather than scientific knowledge. This transition marks the limit of Logism and points toward metaphysical considerations.
Read full textThis section explores legal philosophy in its broader sense as a completion of the systematic worldview. It discusses Cultural Philosophy as an expanded theory of value, critiquing thinkers like Lasson, Berolzheimer, Kohler, and Mayer for their varying degrees of systematic grounding. The author argues that the relationship between culture and law must be clarified to make legal philosophy a practical 'legal policy' rather than an abstract discipline.
Read full textThe author examines how disciplines outside of legal philosophy—specifically Ethics, Logic, and Psychology—contribute to the understanding of law. It distinguishes between the normative approach of ethics (focused on justice and the individual) and the descriptive/causal approach of psychology (focused on mental processes). It also warns against confusing these interdisciplinary applications with 'logism' or 'psychologism' within legal philosophy itself.
Read full textThis segment covers specialized sub-fields: the pedagogy of legal education, the aesthetics of legal form and artistic representation, and the philosophy of religion as a way to grasp law through the eternal. It also critiques 'Natural Philosophy of Law' and biological theories (like Lombroso's), arguing that while law can be studied causally, its essence remains normative.
Read full textThe author distinguishes between the descriptive Sociology of Law and the normative Social Philosophy of Law, which provides a higher systematic unity for legal concepts like community and justice. It concludes with the Philosophy of History and the Metaphysics of Law, the latter being described as a 'regulative idea' in the Kantian sense—an infinite task of placing law within a universal worldview.
Read full textHellmuth Wolff begins an investigation into the relationship between Adam Smith's concept of self-interest and Kant's ethics. He reviews the history of scholarship (Oncken, Hasbach, Stolzmann) and addresses the 'Adam Smith Problem'—the alleged contradiction between Smith's 'Theory of Moral Sentiments' (sympathy) and 'Wealth of Nations' (egoism). Wolff suggests that the perceived gap between Smith and Kant might be bridgeable.
Read full textWolff analyzes how the German Historical School and socialist thinkers like Marx criticized Smith's 'self-interest' as a purely materialistic or anti-social principle. He argues that this was a misinterpretation driven by the social problems of the industrial revolution. He asserts that Smith remained a moral philosopher throughout his life and that his economic theories were always grounded in his earlier ethical framework.
Read full textWolff demonstrates that for Smith, self-interest is a moral category derived from the 'self-love' inherent in human nature as created by God. He argues that Smith's 'Wealth of Nations' is effectively a 'practical ethics.' By comparing Smith to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Wolff shows that Smith views the pursuit of self-interest within the bounds of competition as a path to the common good, thus resolving the 'Adam Smith Problem.'
Read full textThis section examines Adam Smith's concept of self-interest (self-love) as a social category rather than a purely individualistic drive. It argues that Smith's 'impartial spectator' serves as a logical figure analogous to Kant's legislator, weighing self-interest within moral and social boundaries. The author posits that Smith's economic theory is an extension of his ethics, aiming for social welfare through rational division of labor and regulated competition, rather than mere wealth accumulation.
Read full textA comparative analysis of Smith's principle of self-love and Kant's categorical imperative. The author explores why Kant did not develop a full economic theory, contrasting his formal-logical approach with Smith's integrated system of ethics, politics, and economics. While Smith's principle is viewed as a subjective, national-focused drive rooted in sentiment, Kant's imperative is presented as an objective, universal social principle. The section concludes that Smith should be viewed through the lens of a 'positivistic idealism' that seeks to moralize economic life.
Read full textDr. Ludwig Spiegel analyzes the historical and legal context of the conflict between Kant and King Friedrich Wilhelm II regarding Kant's work on religion. The text examines the nature of royal authority in an absolute monarchy, Kant's formal obedience as a subject, and the controversial 'mental reservation' Kant employed in his promise to remain silent on religious matters. Spiegel argues that Kant's behavior must be understood within the personal, non-abstract legal framework of the 18th-century Prussian state.
Read full textGustav Radbruch explores the relationship between the 'legal idea' (form) and 'legal material' (substance) using transcendental logic. He critiques both pure natural law (which ignores material resistance) and historical materialism (which ignores formal autonomy). Radbruch argues that the material of law is not raw data but reality pre-formed by social concepts. He discusses how modern social law and economic democracy represent a re-approximation of legal form to social substance compared to the fictions of classical liberalism.
Read full textAdolf Dyroff provides a detailed critique of Kant's penal theory, focusing on the concept of the 'categorical imperative of penal justice' and the principle of retribution (talion). The essay explores the tension between Kant's strict demand for justice—where punishment is a moral necessity independent of utility—and his broader legal philosophy based on external freedom. Dyroff discusses Kant's views on the right of pardon, dueling, and infanticide, noting where Kant's abstract formalism struggles with psychological and social realities.
Read full textHans Kelsen presents a normative critique of the traditional theory of the three powers (legislative, executive, judicial). Starting from a Kantian definition of the state as a legal order, Kelsen argues that these are not separate 'powers' but stages in a unified process of law creation and concretization. He deconstructs the absolute distinction between law-making and law-application, showing that even administration and adjudication are forms of norm production. He concludes by critiquing the political tendency to view 'administration' as a sphere of 'free' activity outside the law.
Read full textThis segment examines the classification of war as an 'extraordinary' state function. The author argues that war is not outside the law but is a coercive legal act (Zwangsakt) defined by international or national legal orders. It clarifies that while the state is the subject of war, the objects of its coercive acts are always human beings (combatants), and critiques the prevailing view that exempts war and administration from strict legal categorization.
Read full textThe author introduces the 'Stufentheorie' (hierarchy of norms), defining state functions as a sequential process of law creation rather than a mere coordination of powers. It distinguishes between the 'constitution in a logical-legal sense' (the presupposed Grundnorm that establishes the unity of the legal order) and the 'constitution in a positive-legal sense' (the written laws governing legislation). The segment also discusses state identity, arguing that a state remains the same as long as constitutional changes follow the prescribed legal forms.
Read full textThis section describes the mechanics of the hierarchy of norms as a parallelism between physical-psychological acts (facts) and legal norms. Every higher norm defines the conditions under which a lower norm is created. The process terminates at two boundaries: the presupposed Grundnorm (pure norm without a prior factual act) and the final act of execution (pure fact that creates no further norm).
Read full textThe author compares the positivist concept of the 'Grundnorm' with the natural law tradition's 'social contract' (Urvertrag). While both seek a unified foundation for legal validity, the author critiques natural law for misinterpreting a logical hypothesis as a historical or factual contract. This segment argues that natural law's focus on individual will leads to contradictory fictions when trying to explain the objective validity of positive law, whereas the Grundnorm remains a formal, content-neutral logical requirement.
Read full textThis segment distinguishes between the 'material' constitution (norms regarding top state organs and citizen-state relations) and the 'formal' constitution (laws that are harder to amend than ordinary legislation). It traces the historical development of these concepts from natural law's desire for legal stability and individual liberty. The author also deconstructs the 'pouvoir constituant' (constituent power), arguing it is not a mystical quality but simply a positive-legal arrangement for difficult norm amendment, such as qualified majorities or special conventions.
Read full textThis section examines the concept of the constitutional document as a unified instrument, tracing its origins to social contract theory. It critiques the idea of an unchangeable or 'eternal' constitution, arguing that while legal provisions may declare themselves unalterable, the reality of changing societal needs often leads to 'constitutional transformation' (Verfassungswandlung) where the interpretation of the text shifts even if the wording remains the same.
Read full textThe text discusses the power of judicial review, noting that many modern constitutions restrict judges from checking the constitutionality of laws, particularly in constitutional monarchies where the monarch's promulgation serves as a final validation. It contrasts this with republican-democratic systems where specialized constitutional courts often have the power to annul unconstitutional laws.
Read full textProfessor Paul Menzer explores the personal and religious motivations behind Kant's philosophy. He analyzes Kant's transition from the awe of the 'starry heavens' in his youth to the 'moral law within' in his mature work. The essay discusses Kant's pietistic upbringing, his rationalization of the divine, the tension between nature (mechanism) and freedom (teleology), and how Kant's ethics eventually lead to a purified form of religion based on autonomy rather than divine command.
Read full textThis section situates Kant's 'Critique of Judgment' within the history of aesthetics, contrasting it with British empiricism and German rationalism (Baumgarten). It explains how Kant used the 'transcendental method' to find a middle ground between nature and freedom through the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. The essay traces Kant's influence on Schiller's aesthetic education and the Romantic movement's view of nature as a 'hidden poem.'
Read full textDr. Rudolf Joerges provides a philosophical analysis of the sources of law (Rechtsquellen). He distinguishes between the creation of law (Rechtsentstehung) and the recognition of law (Rechterkenntnis). He argues that the true 'source' of law is not merely custom or legislation, but the underlying system of norms and values that determine how social facts are evaluated. He references Kelsen and Stammler to define the 'source' as the ultimate ground or highest norm of a legal order.
Read full textThe author reviews various definitions of law from prominent legal philosophers including Kant, Stammler, and Max Ernst Mayer. Finding no consensus, the text transitions to an epistemological analysis of the 'concept of the concept', distinguishing between descriptive concepts based on experience and logical constructions.
Read full textThis section develops a descriptive concept of positive law, identifying it as a social order comprising six elements, including human plurality and enforcement mechanisms. It distinguishes law from morality and religion by focusing on the 'content of behavior' (legality) rather than the 'motive' (morality). Crucially, it introduces law as an objective 'order of justice' that transcends subjective will and time.
Read full textThe author argues that true 'sources of law' are not mere social habits or legislation, but the highest norms of justice. The 'Idea of Law' is defined as a necessary rational concept of a community of rational beings, serving as the ultimate standard for the legislator to overcome subjectivity and achieve objectivity.
Read full textThe final section explores how the abstract 'Idea of Law' manifests as 'Legal Ideals' in the empirical world. These ideals, such as the collectivist or eudaimonistic views, bridge the gap between pure reason and social reality, serving as the guiding values that determine how social facts are evaluated in the creation of law.
Read full textThis section explores the philosophical foundations of law-making through custom and legislation, defining them as syntheses between logical thinking and ethical valuation. The author argues that law arises from the natural law of self-preservation and self-assertion, leading to diverse legal conceptions based on varying social conditions. True justice is presented as the rational reconciliation of these differing views. The text traces the evolution of law from the 'natural process' of custom (governed by power dynamics) to the 'rational process' of cooperative legislation, viewing this progression as the realization of the idea of culture and the movement from nature to spirit.
Read full textJulius Kraft reviews Leonard Nelson's 'Rechtslehre und Politik', positioning it as an exact science that moves beyond traditional legal dogmatics. The review outlines Nelson's distinction between the political ideal (the state as a guarantor of law) and the pedagogical ideal (a community of those who love the law). Key concepts discussed include the 'rule of the wise' (Platonic ideal) as a correction to Kantian popular sovereignty, the necessity of state power to secure law against ill will, and the application of the 'law of equality of dignity' to social and cultural policy. Nelson's work is praised for providing a weapon against political dogmatism and establishing the foundations for a practical sociology.
Read full textA collection of reviews for contemporary academic works. It covers Karl Heinz Clasen's publication on Kant portraits, Arnold Kowalewski's edition of Kant's lectures as recorded by Count Dohna-Wundlacken, and Alfred Vierkandt's 'Gesellschaftslehre'. Vierkandt's work is noted for its use of the phenomenological method and its opposition to rationalism in favor of a 'totality' concept in sociology.
Read full textFinal set of reviews covering Wilhelm Sauer's 'Philosophie der Zukunft', Max Rümelin's tribute to Eugen Huber, Friedrich Kitzinger's legal aphorisms, and new editions of Hegel's Logic and Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. The reviews touch upon themes of cultural metaphysics, the codification of Swiss private law, and the utility of aphoristic methods in legal science.
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