Das Problem der Logik

[Front Matter and Preface]: The introductory pages include the title, dedication, and a preface by Karel Engliš. He introduces his work 'Das Problem der Logik' as a precursor to a larger study on the order of thought, noting its practical application in economic and legal sciences. [Table of Contents]: A detailed table of contents outlining the seventeen chapters of the book, covering topics from the structure of concepts to the crisis of logic and the three primary thought orders: ontology, teleology, and normology. [I. Introduction: The Current State of Logic]: Engliš critiques the contemporary state of logic, arguing that the boundaries between logic, psychology, and empirical sciences are blurred. He distinguishes between truth and correctness, rejects the reduction of logic to mathematics, and proposes a 'logic of logic' that discovers the inherent order of thought rather than inventing it. [II. How Must Logic View Thinking? Double Order in Thought]: This section defines logic as the study of the 'correctness' of thought, which implies a normative structure. Engliš distinguishes between thinking as a causal psychological process (ontology) and thinking as a willed, goal-oriented activity (teleology). He argues that logic treats thinking as an ordering of mental contents directed toward an epistemic goal. [III. The Ordered Thought Contents: Concepts]: Engliš analyzes concepts as the 'building blocks' of thought. He distinguishes concepts (which are symbolic, communicable, and non-visual) from perceptions and mental images (which are individual and visual). Concepts are described as purposeful constructs used to describe reality efficiently. [IV. The Structure of Concepts: Elementary Forms of Thought]: The author analyzes the structure of concepts by comparing 'hardness', 'utility', and 'correctness'. He identifies three elementary thought forms: 'Being' (ontological), 'Willing' (teleological), and 'Ought' (normological). These forms are not derived from abstraction but are contributions of the thinking subject. [V. The Elementary Thought Forms as Logical Orders: A) Ontology]: Engliš describes the ontological thought order, which views reality as simply existing and causally determined. He explains the relationship between cause and effect as a logical norm within this system and distinguishes between logical judgments (about the norms themselves) and empirical judgments (about reality). [V. The Elementary Thought Forms as Logical Orders: B) Teleology]: This section details the teleological thought order, centered on the relationship between means and ends. Concepts like utility, harm, and cost are defined relative to a willed purpose. Engliš introduces the principle of economy and distinguishes between subjective and objective purposes. [V. The Elementary Thought Forms as Logical Orders: C) Normology]: Engliš defines the normological thought order, which views reality through the lens of 'ought'. He discusses the hierarchy of norms leading to a 'basic norm' (Urnorm) and contrasts the normological subject (duty-bound) with the teleological subject (willing). He argues against the possibility of autonomous norms. [V. The Elementary Thought Forms as Logical Orders: D) Relationship Between the Three Orders]: The final section of this chunk synthesizes the three thought orders (Ontology, Teleology, Normology) using law as a model. It explains how a complete understanding of a subject like law requires all three perspectives—historical/causal, political/teleological, and legal/normological—without mixing them. It concludes with a comparative summary table. [III. Normologie und das Verhältnis der Denkordnungen]: Englis defines Normology as the third order of thought, concerned with what 'ought' to be. He explains the hierarchical relationship between the three orders: Normology ascends to an ultimate 'Urnorm', which is then explained teleologically as an act of will (postulate), which in turn is explained ontologically as an existent process of causation. [VI. Jede Denkordnung hat ihre Begriffskategorien]: This section analyzes the five categories of thought—Subject, Object, Process, Property, and Relation—across the three thinking orders. Englis argues that the 'Subject' is a mental construct serving as a point of attribution (Zurechnungspunkt), and that objects change their conceptual nature (e.g., becoming 'goods' in teleology) depending on the applied order of thought. He distinguishes between logical relations (content-based) and empirical relations (reality-based). [VII. Die Mengen- und Raumdenkordnung]: Englis discusses mathematics and geometry as distinct orders of thought based on axioms. He argues that axioms are not 'truths' but postulates or norms that serve as instruments for empirical science. Using the shift from Euclidean to non-Euclidean geometry as an example, he demonstrates that mathematical judgments are 'correct' (richtig) relative to their system's norms, rather than 'true' (wahr) in an empirical sense. [VIII. Die Ordnung des gesamten Denkens]: Englis synthesizes the various orders into a total system of thought. He posits that outside of mathematics, the analysis of purposively formed concepts (Zweckbegriffe) provides the norms for logical thinking. The three primary orders (Ontology, Teleology, Normology) integrate to provide a complete understanding of reality, while mathematics serves as a specialized logic for quantity and space. [IX. Das Urteilen]: Englis critiques traditional logic for conflating 'judgments' (Urteile) with 'sentences' or 'statements' (Aussagen). He argues that the principle of the excluded middle only applies to judgments when structured as a response to a specific question (logical predicate). He also distinguishes between a norm and a judgment about a norm. [X. Die Denkordnung und die Wirklichkeit]: This section explores the relationship between the mental instrument (order of thought) and the object (reality). Englis distinguishes between logical judgments (positive agreement with the order of thought, valued as 'correct') and empirical judgments (negative agreement with the order of thought, valued as 'true'). He argues that truth is never absolute but is a comparison between different perceptions/judgments. [XI. Zwischen den logischen und den empirischen Urteilen]: Englis identifies a 'chasm' between logical and empirical judgments. Logical judgments possess absolute certainty because they concern relations between self-created concepts. Empirical judgments have only relative certainty. He expands on the 'Why-question', identifying four types of answers: one for logical validity and three for empirical reality (cause, purpose, or normological ground), referencing Schopenhauer's 'Fourfold Root'. [XII. Höherer Grad des Urteilens: Das Schließen]: Englis examines the logic of inference (Schließen). He argues that the 'inference' itself is a logical judgment regardless of whether the premises are empirical. He distinguishes between induction (using empirical premises from the experience system) and deduction (using premises from the order of thought). He critiques the Aristotelian syllogism for not exhausting all possible forms of inference. [XIII. Das Kriterium der Wahrheit]: Englis argues that logic cannot provide a universal criterion for truth, as truth belongs to the domain of empirical sciences. Logic only provides the 'concept' of truth and the criterion for 'correctness' (agreement with logical norms). Truth is established through the integration of new judgments into a non-contradictory system of experience (Erfahrungssystem). [XIV. Die Wertung ist ein Erkennen]: Englis posits that valuation is a form of cognition (Erkennen) occurring through judgments. He distinguishes between ontological, teleological, and normological values. He introduces the distinction between 'theoretical' judgments (describing a valuation) and 'practical' judgments (performing a valuation), which serves as the basis for distinguishing between theoretical and practical sciences. [XV. Das Denksubjekt wertet das empirische Urteil]: This section analyzes the subjective side of judgment, including certainty, doubt, belief, and hope. Englis critiques Johnson's identification of belief with certainty, arguing that 'belief' (Glauben) specifically refers to accepting a judgment as true based on authority rather than proof. He also notes how emotional states like fear or hope color the valuation of empirical possibilities. [XVI. Die Krise der Logik]: Englis reviews the history and current 'crisis' of logic. He critiques Kant's 'a priori' concepts as being merely purposive constructs, and attacks the 'Logistics' (symbolic logic) of Russell and others for trying to force all thought into mathematical formulas. He uses Menger's paradoxes to show that symbolic logic fails because it treats sentences as judgments without considering their teleological or normological context. [XVII. Schluss]: In the conclusion, Englis summarizes his teleological and normological theory of logic. He argues that the impetus for reforming logic came from the social sciences (economics and law), which could not be understood through ontological (causal) thinking alone. He reiterates that logic is the science of the 'instrument of thought' and must distinguish between conceptual systems and empirical experience.