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Wirtschaftspolitik in der Schweiz in kritischer Sicht

Alfred Amonn · 1959

Wirtschaftspolitik in der Schweiz in kritischer Sicht

98 sections
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About this work

Amonn (1959), Wirtschaftspolitik in der Schweiz in kritischer Sicht

Amonn’s 1959 text reads as a critical inventory of Swiss economic policy after wartime emergency measures and amid postwar corporatist arrangements. Its central concern is not simply whether state intervention is large or small, but whether particular instruments remain compatible with an ordered market economy: money must retain value, competition must remain meaningful, labour protection must answer social standards, and sectoral policy—especially agriculture—must not become a chain of expedients.

Solche Inflationen sind in Kriegszeiten unvermeidlich und müssen bei länger dauernden Kriegen immer eine dauernd preissteigernde und geldentwertende Wirkung haben.

English translation: Such inflations are unavoidable in times of war and, in longer-lasting wars, must always have a lasting price-raising and currency-depreciating effect.

This passage situates Amonn’s analysis of inflation historically rather than moralistically. Wartime inflation may be unavoidable, but its consequences persist through prices, expectations, and the diminished reliability of money. The critical question is therefore how Switzerland moves from exceptional wartime policy back toward stable peacetime rules. Monetary stability is treated not merely as a technical objective but as a condition for calculation, contracts, and disciplined public policy.

Bereits vor Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkriegs hatte es sich herausgestellt, dass diese Gesetze nicht ausreichten, um die agrarpolitischen Ziele, die man sich setzte, zu erreichen, und dass eine neue, umfassendere Konzeption hiezu notwendig war.

English translation: Even before the outbreak of the Second World War it had become apparent that these laws did not suffice to attain the agricultural-policy goals that had been set, and that a new, more comprehensive conception was necessary for this purpose.

The agricultural discussion shows Amonn’s sensitivity to policy accumulation. When earlier laws prove inadequate, the demand for a broader conception may be understandable; yet it also risks turning temporary or limited measures into a permanent administrative structure. His criticism is not simply anti-agrarian. Rather, he asks how politically defined goals reshape prices, incentives, and the relation between organized interests and public authority.

The treatment of labour policy is similarly non-reductive. Amonn does not collapse social regulation into economic irrationality, since the case for limiting excessive hours is explicitly acknowledged.

Auch gegen eine Arbeitszeit von 10 oder 11 Stunden sprechen gewichtige kulturelle und soziale Gründe.

English translation: Weighty cultural and social reasons also speak against a working time of 10 or 11 hours.

At the same time, labour arrangements are examined for their effects on competition. Collective agreements are not only instruments of social peace or distribution; they can also alter the competitive conditions under which firms operate.

Das ist «das wettbewerbspolitische Element in den Gesamtarbeitsverträgen».

English translation: This is «the competition-policy element in collective labour agreements».

This phrase captures the text’s characteristic balance. Standardized labour conditions may prevent competition through social undercutting, but they may also harden into restrictive arrangements. Amonn’s “critical view” lies in tracing such double effects instead of classifying coordination either as pure progress or pure interference.

Das letzte Kapitel des Berichts ist einer Untersuchung der «Möglichkeiten zur Verfolgung wettbewerbspolitischer Ziele im Rahmen der Allgemeinen Wirtschaftspolitik» gewidmet.

English translation: The final chapter of the report is devoted to an examination of the «possibilities for pursuing competition-policy objectives within the framework of general economic policy».

The concluding orientation brings the strands together: competition policy cannot be isolated from monetary, agricultural, labour, and stabilization policy. Amonn’s contribution is to judge Swiss economic policy as an interconnected order of compromises. The decisive issue is whether historically understandable interventions still serve liberty, stability, and productive competition once the exceptional conditions that justified them have passed.

Sections

This work was divided into 98 sections when it entered the library's research corpus—an apparatus for search and citation, not necessarily the author's own table of contents. Each title opens its summary.

  1. 1Publication Front Matter and Contents▾
  2. 2The Swiss Economic Order▾
  3. 3Price and Wage Policy, Inflation, and Dearness▾
  4. 4Price Control?▾
  5. 5Wages and Working Time▾
  6. 6Market Traffic Policy and Competition as a Condition of the Market Economy▾
  7. 7The Cartel Problem and the Transition to the Swiss Perspective▾
  8. 8The Swiss Cartel Problem and the Price Formation Commission Report▾
  9. 9Goals of Vertical Restraints: Market Enclosure and Boycott▾
  10. 10Vertical Integration as Incomplete Market Order▾
  11. 11Labor Agreements as Vertical Restraints▾
  12. 12Individual Vertical Contracts, Resale Price Maintenance, and Exclusivity▾
  13. 13Historical Motives for Cartel Formation▾
  14. 14Sector-Specific Motives for Cartelization▾
  15. 15Conditions for the Effectiveness of Cartel Measures▾
  16. 16Market Forms and Cartelization Possibilities▾
  17. 17Market Forms and Cartelization▾
  18. 18Internal Preconditions for Cartel Effectiveness▾
  19. 19External and Adjacent-Market Limits on Cartel Power▾
  20. 20Reported Disadvantages of Cartels for Members, Outsiders, Customers, and Consumers▾
  21. 21Public-Interest Critique of Cartel Effects on Production and Distribution▾
  22. 22Transition to Legal Competition Regulation▾
  23. 23Modified Abuse Control Instead of a General Cartel Ban▾
  24. 24Competition as an Instrument of Welfare and Market Order▾
  25. 25Failure of Abstract Criteria for Balancing Competition and Contract Freedom▾
  26. 26The Order of Possible Competition and the Minimum Existence of Competitive Freedom▾
  27. 27Transition to Cartel Restraints Under Possible Competition▾
  28. 28Permissible Cartel Coordination Versus Coercive Market Closure▾
  29. 29Cartel Measures Compatible and Incompatible with Possible Competition▾
  30. 30Oligopolies, Individual Monopolies, and the Limits of Market Power▾
  31. 31Policy Instruments for Securing Possible Competition▾
  32. 32General Economic Policy as an Instrument of Competition Policy▾
  33. 33Conclusion of Swiss Cartel Policy Discussion and Transition to Business Cycle Policy▾
  34. 34Business Cycle Policy: Aims, Instruments, and Credit Policy▾
  35. 35Keynes and Keynesianism▾
  36. 36Creeping Inflation, Dearness, and Currency Depreciation▾
  37. 37Business Cycle and Credit Policy in Switzerland▾
  38. 38Inflationism and Restrictionism▾
  39. 39Saving and Capital Formation▾
  40. 40Investments and Economic Progress▾
  41. 41Saving, Capital Scarcity, and Countercyclical Interest Policy▾
  42. 42Agricultural Policy: Legal Foundations and Historical Background▾
  43. 43Goals of Swiss Agricultural Policy and Structural Change▾
  44. 44Means of Agricultural Policy: Subsidies, Protection, Rationalization, and Guarantees▾
  45. 45Price Fixing and Cost-Covering Prices▾
  46. 46The Test Case of Milk▾
  47. 47Promoting Milk Consumption▾
  48. 48A Proposal to Change the Regime▾
  49. 49Total Compulsory Economy or Reintegration into the Market Economy▾
  50. 50The Path to the Goal▾
  51. 51Land Value and Land Price▾
  52. 52Coordinating Agricultural Policy with General Economic Policy▾
  53. 53Summary and Proposed Reorientation of Agricultural Policy▾
  54. 54Housing Policy: The Situation and Rent Control▾
  55. 55Main Argument Against the Rent Freeze▾
  56. 56Social Argument for Low Old Rents Rejected▾
  57. 57Housing Shortage Justifies Eviction Protection, Not Rent Freezes▾
  58. 58Reason for Resistance to Normalizing the Rental Market▾
  59. 59Wartime Justification and Postwar Obsolescence of Tenant Protection▾
  60. 60The 1947 Memorial on Restoring Housing Market Equilibrium▾
  61. 61Walter Raissig on Rent Control, Tenant Protection, and Collectivism▾
  62. 62Reply to Paul Steinmann on Living Costs and Wages▾
  63. 63Rebuttal of Steinmann on Landlord Rights and Housing as Capital▾
  64. 64Underoccupied Housing, Social Housing, and Targeted Assistance▾
  65. 65Market Prices, Social Justice, and the Collectivist Implication of Rent Policy▾
  66. 66Housing Policy: Failure to Seek Independent Expertise▾
  67. 67Objective Scientific Assessments of Rent Control▾
  68. 68Need for Nonpartisan Systematic Analysis▾
  69. 69Legal and Constitutional Critique of Tenant Protection▾
  70. 70Economic-Policy Critique of Wartime Housing Controls▾
  71. 71Social-Policy Case for Normalizing the Housing Market▾
  72. 72Political Resistance and Federal Government Inaction▾
  73. 73An Initiative for the “Protection of Tenants and Consumers”▾
  74. 74A Reasonable Unbiased Voice from Trade Union Circles▾
  75. 75Right and Wrong in the Rent Question: What Landlords Are Owed and What May Be Demanded of Tenants▾
  76. 76The Social Stratification of Homeowners▾
  77. 77Social Stratification of Homeowners Continued▾
  78. 78Housing Shortage and Rent Control▾
  79. 79Rent Restriction, Housing Decay, and Demolition▾
  80. 80Effects of Raising Old Rents and the Misleading Cost-of-Living Index▾
  81. 81Rent Levels and Vacancy Stock▾
  82. 82Summary of Facts and Conclusions on Rent Control▾
  83. 83Constructive Housing Policy: Goals and Means▾
  84. 84Goals of Rational Housing Policy▾
  85. 85Instruments of Housing Policy and Rent Supplements▾
  86. 86Subsidized Housing and the Failure of Cooperative Construction▾
  87. 87A Program and No Program for Housing Normalization▾
  88. 88Newer Trends: Rent Subsidies and Income-Based Rents▾
  89. 89The Road to the Goal: Ending Rent Control and Tenant Protection▾
  90. 90The Alternative: Otto Bauer’s Path to Socialism▾
  91. 91Financial Policy Chapter Opening▾
  92. 92The Principle of Budget Balance and Countercyclical Fiscal Policy▾
  93. 93Public Debt, Debt Redemption, and Cycle-Based Surpluses▾
  94. 94Taxes in Reserve▾
  95. 95Revenue and Expenditure in Public and Private Finance▾
  96. 96Swiss Fiscal Policy and the Abandonment of Countercyclical Principles▾
  97. 97Epilogue: Demagogy, Interest Politics, and Democratic Responsibility▾
  98. 98Epilogue: Structural Preservation and the Crisis of Swiss Economic Policy▾

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