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Bestimmungsgründe des Preises

Oskar Engländer · 1921

Bestimmungsgründe des Preises

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Engländer, Bestimmungsgründe des Preises (1921)

Engländer’s treatise rebuilds price theory from monetary exchange rather than from an imagined equivalence between value and price. Its philosophical point of departure is explicitly Brentano’s psychology of preference, mediated by Marty and Kraus, but its economic purpose is critical: it preserves subjective ordering while denying that marginal utility can directly determine money prices.

Die philosophische Grundlage des Werkes bildet die Lehre Franz Brentanos, wie sie mir durch Marty und Kraus überliefert wurde.

English translation: The philosophical foundation of the work is formed by the doctrine of Franz Brentano, as it was transmitted to me through Marty and Kraus.

The decisive premise is that the buyer is not a Robinsonian chooser but an agent already situated in a money economy. Price is therefore not barter value expressed in another medium; it is a specifically monetary social relation formed through buying and selling.

Unter Preis verstehen wir dabei einen Geldpreis

English translation: By price we here understand a money price.

Engländer’s buyer ranks needs ordinally, and goods receive value from the satisfactions dependent on them. But money cannot be estimated like a consumption good, because no determinate satisfaction depends immediately on holding a given sum. This is why the theory turns from “value of money” to a residual calculation of possible expenditure.

Der Käufer hat keine Möglichkeit einer unmittelbaren Schätzung des Geldes in der Art, wie er eine unmittelbare Schätzung eines Gutes erster Ordnung nach der von diesem Gute abhängigen Bedürfnisbefriedigung vornimmt.

English translation: The buyer has no possibility of directly appraising money in the way in which he directly appraises a first-order good according to the satisfaction of needs that depends on that good.

The buyer’s maximum bid is what remains after higher-ranking needs have been provided for at their prices. Thus demand depends on disposable wealth, the rank of the need, and the prices of more important goods. This explains both the force and the limit of buyer-side theory: it can specify ceilings of willingness to pay, but not the actual market price. Engländer’s critique of marginal utility follows from this. The price of a quantity is not simply a multiple of the marginal unit’s utility, because needs are discontinuous, goods substitute for one another, and intervening claims on income constrain willingness to pay. Equal unit prices are therefore not deduced from the buyer’s consciousness; they arise through market and seller-side conditions.

Buyer competition turns these individual limits into price intervals. A final price cannot leave unsatisfied buyers who would pay more, but competition normally establishes bounds rather than a unique “equilibrium” point. Engländer consequently prefers the language of a resting price to that of equilibrium, since no equality between the value of money and the value of the good is implied. The first part therefore deliberately ends in incompleteness: subjective valuation is indispensable, but it gives only one side of price determination.

The second part rejects a simple symmetry between buyer and seller. Sellers do not usually value their wares as consumption goods; they seek monetary return. In monopoly or fixed-supply cases, buyer ceilings and bargaining strength may dominate. But the central case of modern exchange is the reproducible cost product. Here price is governed not by the buyer’s maximum willingness to pay, but by the seller’s money costs plus the normal profit obtainable in alternative uses.

Der Preis der hier in Betracht kommenden Güter ist gleich ihren Geldkosten für den Verkäufer mehr dem mit diesen Kosten vom Verkäufer sonst erzielbaren Gewinn.

English translation: The price of the goods in question here equals their money costs to the seller plus the profit otherwise obtainable by the seller with those costs.

Engländer then confronts the apparent regress of cost explanation. If costs are themselves prices, price theory cannot merely push determination backward indefinitely. Labor is the key limiting case: wages are not explained by the costs of producing labor, nor by a monetary measure of labor pain, but by labor as a given usable quantity confronting demand. More generally, the cost law rests on higher-order goods whose quantities are given, while competitive production equalizes returns across uses.

This yields Engländer’s mature simultaneous view. Subjective valuations and incomes determine which goods can be sold and in what quantities; costs and alternative profits impose relative price relations; monopoly, scarcity, land, mines, capital, and entrepreneurial activity modify the result. Cost is not a temporal chain in which earlier prices mechanically cause later ones.

Die Kostenreihe ist keine Kausalreihe, bei der das vorhergehende Glied das nachfolgende bedingt

English translation: The cost series is not a causal series in which the preceding member conditions the one that follows.

The work’s originality lies in this synthesis: ordinal subjectivism without marginal-utility price reduction, cost theory without infinite regress, and supply-demand analysis without equilibrium metaphysics. Price is not value measured in money, but a social result bounded by buyer valuations and completed by market structure, reproducibility, scarcity, and the monetary organization of production.

Sections

This work was divided into 82 sections when it entered the library's research corpus—an apparatus for search and citation, not necessarily the author's own table of contents. Each title opens its summary.

  1. 1Title Page and Publication Details▾
  2. 2Preface: Intellectual Sources and Method▾
  3. 3Contents: Individual Buyer Price Offers▾
  4. 4Contents: Competition among Buyers▾
  5. 5Contents: Competition between Buyers and Sellers and Production Factors▾
  6. 6Introduction: Object of the Inquiry and Buyer Price Offers▾
  7. 7Chapter I.A §1: Maximum Bid of an Individual Buyer for a Single Consumption Good▾
  8. 8Money Has No Direct Use Value as a Basis for Consumer Bids▾
  9. 9Maximum Bid, Available Wealth, and the Order of Need Satisfaction▾
  10. 10True and Unechte Costs in Economic Action and Consumer Purchases▾
  11. 11Determinants of the Individual Maximum Bid and Its Relation to Actual Prices▾
  12. 12Buying Multiple Units When All Units Satisfy Needs of the Same Rank▾
  13. 13Diminishing Utility Without Interruption by Other Goods▾
  14. 14Interleaved Preference Scales Across Different Goods▾
  15. 15Maximum Offers for Multiple Consumer Goods with Alternating, Jumping, and Terminating Wants▾
  16. 16Equality of Prices for Consumer Goods of the Same Kind for the Same Buyer▾
  17. 17Relations between Maximum Offers and Prices of Goods of Equal and Different Rank▾
  18. 18§ 4: Equal-Rank Goods, Equal Marginal Utility, and Maximum Bids▾
  19. 19§ 4: Different Marginal Utilities and Proportional Substitution▾
  20. 20§ 4: Variable Substitution, Discontinuous Replacement Ratios, and Price Bounds▾
  21. 21§ 5: Definition and Exceptional Causes of Prices Below the Maximum-Bid Boundary▾
  22. 22§ 5: Buyer-Side Conditions for Prices Below the Maximum-Bid Boundary▾
  23. 23Prices Below the Maximum Bid: Discontinuous and Jumping Marginal Utility▾
  24. 24Prices Below the Maximum Bid from Insufficient Residual Funds and High Unit Prices▾
  25. 25Additional Cases and Limits of Prices Below the Maximum Bid▾
  26. 26Section 6: Reply to the Equal Marginal Utility Objection▾
  27. 27Section 6: Reply to the Weighted Marginal Utility and Price-Ratio Objection▾
  28. 28Prices Below the Maximum Bid Limit: Substitution, Quality, and Marginal Utility▾
  29. 29Relations Between Price and Quantity Purchased of a Type of Good▾
  30. 30Continuation of §7: Price and Quantity Relations for an Individual Buyer▾
  31. 31§8 Opening: Repeated Purchases and Price Changes▾
  32. 32Buyer-Side Changes: Wealth, Higher-Ranked Goods, and Need Ranking▾
  33. 33Summary of Price Justification and Simplified Residual Calculation▾
  34. 34Continuation of Section 8: Replacement Calculation and Seller Price Demands▾
  35. 35Marginal Utility and Price Justification for Multiple Units▾
  36. 36Preference, Desire Intensity, and Brentano’s Theory of Choice▾
  37. 37Present and Future First-Order Goods, Time, and Price Willingness▾
  38. 38Competition Among Buyers with Equal General Price Willingness▾
  39. 39Competition Among Buyers with Equal General Willingness to Pay▾
  40. 40Equal General Willingness to Pay: Price, Quantity, and Inter-Good Price Relations▾
  41. 41Different General Willingness to Pay: Lowest Necessary Particular Price Willingness and Border Buyers▾
  42. 42Uniform Prices, Seller Competition, and Monopoly Price Discrimination▾
  43. 43Limits of Wealth-Based Price Discrimination▾
  44. 44Upper Price Limit and Unsatisfied Demand among Unequal Buyers▾
  45. 45Three Lower Price Limits and Boundary Buyer Groups▾
  46. 46Prices below the Maximum Bid for Higher-Willingness Buyers▾
  47. 47Can the Marginal Buyer Also Pay below the Maximum Bid?▾
  48. 48Fixed Prices and the Relation between Price and Quantity▾
  49. 49Effects of Changes in Buyers’ Willingness to Pay▾
  50. 50Relative Prices of Different Goods under Heterogeneous Buyer Competition▾
  51. 51Completion of Buyer-Side Analysis: Price Ratios and Marginal Utility▾
  52. 52Buyer-Side Determinants Are Insufficient for a Necessary Price▾
  53. 53Opening of Part II: Seller-Side Determinants and the Limits of Seller Valuation▾
  54. 54The Price Struggle and the Strategic Tool of Withholding▾
  55. 55Bilateral Monopoly: Indeterminate Price and Quantity▾
  56. 56Unilateral Seller Monopoly Against Unorganized Buyers▾
  57. 57Determination of Monopoly Price, Monopoly Quantity, and Relations to Other Goods▾
  58. 58Given Quantities Under Independent Buyers and Sellers▾
  59. 59Definition and Preconditions of Cost Products▾
  60. 60Competitive Formation of Cost Price Begins▾
  61. 61Price Formation for Cost-Produced Goods under Buyer and Seller Competition▾
  62. 62Determinants of the Price of Human Labor Power▾
  63. 63Labor Disutility Cannot Set Wage Bounds under Fixed Working Time▾
  64. 64Variable Working Time and the Limits of Marginal Labor-Pain Wage Theories▾
  65. 65Given Utilized Labor Quantity as the Supply-Side Determinant of Wages▾
  66. 66Overtime, Collective Restraint, and the Final Results on Labor’s Price Determinants▾
  67. 67General Determination of Prices from Labor Quantity and Buyers’ Income (§15 Opening)▾
  68. 68Labor-Cost Prices and the Stationary Economy▾
  69. 69General Formulation of the Cost Law▾
  70. 70Different Production Conditions and Differential Rent▾
  71. 71Fixed-Quantity First-Order Goods alongside Labor Products▾
  72. 72Price Bounds When Fixed-Quantity Goods Lack a Determinate Ratio▾
  73. 73Two Fixed-Quantity Higher-Order Goods▾
  74. 74Many Higher-Order Goods, Monopoly Price, and Production before Orders▾
  75. 75§15 Continued: Cost Prices, Quantity Deviations, and the Non-Causal Cost Chain▾
  76. 76§16 Opening: Definition and Prior Conditions of Prices Below the Maximum Bid▾
  77. 77§16: Income Strata, Cost Law, and the Causes of Prices Below Maximum Bid▾
  78. 78§16: Higher-Order Quantity Changes and Supply-Demand Modifications▾
  79. 79§16: Buyer-Side Determinants, Rank Changes, and Income Changes▾
  80. 80§17 Opening: Production Factors, Land Use, and Ground Rent▾
  81. 81§17: Mining Rent and Transition to Capital Interest▾
  82. 82Buyer and Seller Competition: Capital Interest, Labor, and the Income Components of Price▾

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