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Die Staatssubventionen für Privatbahnen

Gustav Adolf Groß · 1882

Die Staatssubventionen für Privatbahnen

32 sections
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About this work

Gustav Gross, Die Staatssubventionen für Privatbahnen (1882)

Gross frames railway subsidies as a practical problem that persists wherever private railways coexist with the state-railway ideal. Railways are not ordinary businesses: they alter markets, military mobility, administration, settlement, and political cohesion. For that reason the state cannot treat concession as a simple private license. Even when built by companies, railways exercise a public function under public conditions.

zu einer sozialen Macht sind die Eisenbahnen geworden

English translation: the railways have become a social power

Gross begins from a clear preference for public ownership. State railways secure control over a strategic network and allow profitable lines to support routes whose value is social, political, or developmental rather than immediately commercial. This is his normative horizon:

Im Principe wird man sich daher unbedingt und rückhaltslos für das Staatsbahnsystem, vielleicht vervollständigt durch Provinzial-, Kreis-, ja sogar Communalbahnen, kurz für ein ausschliesslich gemeinwirtschaftliches Bahnsystem aussprechen müssen.

English translation: In principle, therefore, one must unconditionally and unreservedly declare oneself in favor of the state railway system, perhaps supplemented by provincial, district, and even communal railways—in short, in favor of an exclusively public-economic railway system.

Yet the book is not a simple plea for nationalization. Gross’s subject is the historically given mixed system, in which fiscal limits and inherited concessions make private capital temporarily necessary. Concession therefore appears as delegated monopoly, not as an unconditional private right. Its public character justifies time limits, tariff supervision, Heimfall, expropriation powers, construction control, accounting inspection, and state intervention wherever public money supports private returns.

The first chapter turns on the distinction between direct and indirect profitability. Direct profitability is the net revenue available to remunerate capital; indirect profitability is the broader public advantage of a line.

mit indirecter Rentabilität das Maß des sonstigen volkswirthschaftlichen und auch politischen Nutzens einer Bahnlinie

English translation: with indirect profitability [as] the measure of the other economic and even political benefit of a railway line

This distinction lets Gross defend subsidies without defending speculation. A railway may be indispensable for production, national integration, or military security and still fail to attract capital on private terms, especially in its early years. If the state does not build such a line itself, subsidy becomes the means by which public utility is translated into a financeable enterprise. But the test is restrictive. Gross rejects support for merely competing routes, inflated promotions, and local conveniences without wider importance. Secondary and branch lines may deserve aid only where the distribution of benefit justifies shared burdens among state, locality, and connected main railway.

The second chapter compares forms of subsidy: land grants, state-built sections, fixed capital grants, annuities, loans, and public subscription to railway shares or bonds. Gross judges each by whether it corresponds to the real deficit of the line and whether it protects the treasury against inflated construction costs, founder gains, and disguised private enrichment. Land grants suit settler economies more than Europe; fixed grants are simple but rigid; loans may help during crises; state participation in securities is dangerous unless accompanied by strict public control.

The analytical center is the revenue guarantee, which Gross favors over simplifiedr subsidies when its legal character is properly defined. It is not a guarantee for shareholders or creditors. The company receives conditional advances to raise net earnings to the guaranteed level, while later surpluses must repay the state.

Der Garantievertrag stellt sich daher als das bedingte Versprechen zur Gewährung eines Darlehens gegen ebenfalls bedingte Rückzahlung dar.

English translation: The guarantee contract thus presents itself as the conditional promise of granting a loan against likewise conditional repayment.

This definition makes guarantee policy an accounting problem. Guarantees must apply to net rather than gross receipts, rest on verified capital rather than arbitrary lump sums, and be joined to examination of construction costs, financing expenses, intercalary interest, and operating accounts. Gross criticizes Austrian practice where rounded guarantee bases enabled contractors, founders, and financiers to enlarge capital accounts at public expense. French practice appears more disciplined when old and new networks are separated, surpluses offset advances, and the guarantee belongs to a broader administrative plan.

Sections

This work was divided into 32 sections when it entered the library's research corpus—an apparatus for search and citation, not necessarily the author's own table of contents. Each title opens its summary.

  1. 1Title Page and Preface▾
  2. 2Table of Contents▾
  3. 3Economic, Social, and Political Significance of Railways▾
  4. 4Railway Law and the State-versus-Private Railway Debate▾
  5. 5Concessions, Reversion Rights, and Planned Railway Networks▾
  6. 6Capital Formation, Expropriation, and Construction Oversight▾
  7. 7Operation, Tariffs, State Revenues, and Public Uses of Private Railways▾
  8. 8General Justification for Railway Subsidies▾
  9. 9Objectives and Credit Effects of Railway Subsidies▾
  10. 10Conditions for Granting Subsidies and Public-Interest Criteria▾
  11. 11Subsidy Policy by Type of Railway Line▾
  12. 12State Practice, Market Timing, and Rescue of Distressed Railways▾
  13. 13Second Chapter Heading▾
  14. 14Methods of Subsidy: Conceptual Classification▾
  15. 15Land-Grant Subsidies and the American Pacific Railroads▾
  16. 16French State Construction and Fixed Cash Subsidies▾
  17. 17Fixed Subsidies: Critique and Prussian, Austrian, and Gotthard Cases▾
  18. 18Subsidies Requiring Repayment and the Theory of State Loans▾
  19. 19Austrian Railway Loans and Construction Advances▾
  20. 20Loan Subsidies in Prussia, France, and the United States▾
  21. 21Revenue Guarantee: Legal Form and Parties▾
  22. 22Economic Evaluation of Revenue Guarantees and Gross versus Net Guarantees▾
  23. 23Setting Guaranteed Net Yield and Austrian Fixed-Guarantee Problems▾
  24. 24Austrian Lump-Sum Guarantees: Early Cases, Kaiser Franz Josef-Bahn, and Kaschau-Oderberger Bahn▾
  25. 25Further Austrian, Hungarian, and Hessian Examples of Lump-Sum Railway Guarantees▾
  26. 26Correctly Fixing the Guarantee Sum: Actual Capital, Construction Costs, Contractors, and State Revision▾
  27. 27Investment Capital, Financing Costs, Nominal Interest, and Amortization in Railway Guarantees▾
  28. 28Austrian Applications of Actual-Capital Guarantees and Their Fiscal Results▾
  29. 29Prussian, German, and French Systems of Railway Guarantees▾
  30. 30Operating Accounts, Timing, Duration, and Repayment of State Railway Guarantees▾
  31. 31Negative Subsidy and the Theory of Railway Taxation▾
  32. 32Tax Exemptions as Negative Railway Subsidies in Austria, Prussia, and France▾

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