
Gottfried Haberler · 1946
Gottfried Haberler’s Prosperity and Depression is a critical synthesis of business-cycle theory written for the League of Nations, not a defense of a single school. It asks why disturbances in market economies become cumulative waves of prosperity and depression, and it treats monetary forces, investment structure, saving, expectations, agriculture, Keynesian analysis, and international transmission as interdependent parts of one process.
The purpose is rather to gather together various hypotheses of explanation, to test their logical consistency and their compatibility with one another and with accepted economic principles.
The book’s governing principle is anti-monocausal. A shock may begin an upswing or a downturn, but initiation is not explanation: Haberler wants to know how credit, prices, costs, profits, debts, inventories, and confidence magnify change and then reverse direction. Hence he rejects theories that reduce crises to money alone, technology alone, saving alone, or psychology alone.
explanations which run in terms of one single cause have been more and more discredited and should be regarded with suspicion.
Part I classifies and tests the major theories. Hawtrey’s monetary account shows how bank credit, merchants’ inventories, discount policy, and velocity can generate expansion and contraction, though Haberler doubts that every crisis is merely monetary. He gives more sustained attention to over-investment theories because they explain how booms can distort the structure of production, especially by expanding capital-goods industries beyond what saving, final demand, or complementary resources can sustain. His distinction between vertical maladjustment among stages of production and horizontal maladjustment among industries lets him compare Wicksellian and Hayekian ideas of forced saving with Spiethoff’s, Cassel’s, and Schumpeter’s emphasis on innovations and new markets. The acceleration principle is crucial because it shows how small changes in consumption can cause amplified movements in investment.
The acceleration principle and the over-investment theory as discussed in the preceding pages are in reality not alternative but complementary explanations.
Haberler is more skeptical of under-consumption theories. Simplified versions imagine a chronic excess of production over consumption; refined versions claim that saving may outrun investment. He translates these claims into problems of definition, time period, expectations, and the demand for capital. Keynes is treated similarly: liquidity preference and the multiplier illuminate hoarding, interest, and income propagation, but they do not displace older questions about credit conditions, relative prices, profits, and the capital structure.
Part II develops Haberler’s own general account. A cycle is not any fluctuation caused by war, weather, or accident, but a recurrent cumulative movement in money demand, credit, production, prices, costs, and investment. Expansion often begins where idle labor and capacity make output responsive: credit creation or dishoarding raises incomes, sales, profits, investment, and optimism. As full employment approaches, however, costs rise, bottlenecks appear, credit becomes less elastic, and earlier investment commitments reveal disproportions. Contraction then spreads through falling demand, debt liquidation, hoarding, bank caution, pessimism, and collapsing investment.
Deflation in the sense of a gradual decrease in the total demand for goods in terms of money plays an essential rôle in the contraction process.
The turning points are asymmetrical. Restrictive credit can usually stop an expansion, but cheap money may fail in depression when expected yields are low, capacity is unused, banks are cautious, and firms see no profitable outlet. Recovery requires altered real and psychological conditions: lower costs, replacement needs, depleted inventories, accumulated balances, new opportunities, public demand, or restored confidence. Haberler extends this framework internationally, showing that gold-standard rules, exchange rates, tariffs, capital movements, transport costs, banking systems, and exchange controls determine how disturbances travel. Protection may shield one country briefly, but generalized protection deepens world contraction. Part III reassesses multiplier-accelerator models, econometrics, Hayek’s Ricardo effect, price rigidity, and public spending. Haberler values formal models and deficit spending in some depressions, yet insists that shifting expectations, credit constraints, capacity limits, and institutions prevent mechanical policy rules. The book’s lasting contribution is disciplined eclecticism: prosperity and depression are phases of one unstable adjustment mechanism, not mysteries explained by a single cause.
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