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Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, Volume II

Joseph Alois Schumpeter · 1939

Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, Volume II

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Summary of J. A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, Vol. II

Volume II functions as the empirical and statistical continuation of Schumpeter’s theory of capitalist evolution. Its task is not to replace theory with measurement, but to test and discipline the theory through series on prices, output, employment, commodity markets, expenditure, wages, deposits, loans, and interest. Schumpeter’s method is deliberately anti-barometric: economic aggregates do not speak for themselves, and business-cycle statistics become intelligible only when read through the historical process of innovation, credit creation, adjustment, and disturbance. The volume therefore treats data as traces of an evolutionary mechanism rather than as independent indicators from which cycles can simply be inferred.

The organizing thesis remains that capitalist fluctuations arise from development itself: innovations enter in clusters, are financed by credit, disturb existing equilibria, and produce prosperity, recession, and secondary liquidation. The statistical chapters are meant to show how such movements appear in different series, while also warning that no single index can reveal the cycle’s “true” shape. The three-cycle schema gives the evidence its structure, but Schumpeter repeatedly insists that it must be used historically, not mechanically. Prices, employment, loans, and wages are not parallel barometers; each reflects the timing, institutional setting, and superposition of shorter and longer waves.

The monetary and financial analysis sharpens this argument by refusing to make interest the master cause of cycles. Interest permeates capitalism because credit and valuation permeate capitalist calculation, but Schumpeter distinguishes ubiquity from explanatory primacy:

a central position does not imply a key position

This is one of the volume’s core conceptual moves. Interest is everywhere in the capitalist process, yet it is not the originating force behind development. Entrepreneurial demand for purchasing power, created by the prospect of profit from innovation, is more fundamental than any autonomous movement of rates. Monetary conditions can intensify, retard, or transmit cyclical movements, especially in secondary phases, but they cannot by themselves produce genuine revival where entrepreneurial opportunities are absent.

Schumpeter therefore reverses the usual causal order. Instead of deriving cycles from cheap or dear money, he treats the rate of interest as an outcome of capitalist development that may later acquire derivative causal force:

interest is fundamentally consequential, and is causal only in a secondary sense.

This formulation is crucial for his policy implications. Easy credit may soften or amplify secondary waves, but it is not a substitute for innovation. Depression cannot be cured merely by lowering rates if the primary process of entrepreneurial recombination has not resumed. Conversely, a boom cannot be explained simply by abundant money; credit becomes dynamic when attached to new combinations.

Schumpeter also rejects conventional attempts to ground interest in durable-goods yields, quasi-rents, or an abstract stock of “capital.” Discounting future returns already presupposes a monetary rate; it cannot explain that rate from outside. This leads him to blur the rigid distinction between money markets and capital markets. All credit instruments are claims to future balances, and negotiability “mobilizes” commitments that might otherwise appear long-term and fixed. Hence he denies that there is a single natural object called the long-term rate:

there exists no such thing as the long-term rate

The point is not merely semantic. Different rates embody different risks, maturities, institutional forms, and expectations; treating them as one aggregate obscures the financial anatomy of the cycle. Schumpeter’s analysis of deposits, loans, and interest thus complements the statistical chapters: both oppose over-simple aggregates and insist on historically situated interpretation.

The relevance of the volume lies in this combination of theory, history, and statistical criticism. Schumpeter offers neither pure narrative history nor modern macroeconomic measurement, but an evolutionary reading of capitalism in which quantitative series are meaningful only when connected to entrepreneurial change and financial structure. Vol. II shows how the visible movements of prices, employment, credit, and rates are surface forms of a deeper process: capitalist development creates disequilibrium, prosperity, liquidation, and renewed adaptation. Its lasting contribution is methodological as much as doctrinal: business cycles must be studied as historically specific, financially mediated, innovation-driven processes, not as movements of detached aggregates.

Sections

This work was divided into 154 sections when it entered the library's research corpus—an apparatus for search and citation, not necessarily the author's own table of contents. Each title opens its summary.

  1. 1Title Page and Copyright for Business Cycles Volume II▾
  2. 2Contents: Chapter VIII—The Price Level▾
  3. 3Contents: Chapter IX—Physical Quantities and Employment▾
  4. 4Contents: Chapter X—Prices and Quantities of Individual Commodities▾
  5. 5Contents: Chapter XI—Expenditure, Wages, Customers’ Balances▾
  6. 6Contents: Chapter XII—The Rate of Interest▾
  7. 7Contents: Chapter XIII—The Central Market and the Stock Exchange▾
  8. 8Contents: Chapter XIV—1919–1929▾
  9. 9Contents: Chapter XV—The World Crisis and After; Appendix and Index▾
  10. 10Theory of the Price Level: Differential Measurement and Proper Scope▾
  11. 11Practical Price Indices and the Cyclical Behavior of Price-Level Series▾
  12. 12Group Prices, Price Dispersion, and Cyclical Covariation▾
  13. 13Physical Quantities, Output Measurement, Trends, and Cyclical Production▾
  14. 14Employment of Labor and Forms of Unemployment▾
  15. 15Chapter X, Section A: Prices and Quantities of Individual Commodities▾
  16. 16Chapter X, Section B: Special Cases—Technological Lags, Coffee, and Animal Cycles▾
  17. 17Chapter X, Section C: The Cycle in Shipbuilding▾
  18. 18Chapter X, Section D: Entrepreneurial Price Policies▾
  19. 19Chapter XI, Section A: Some Propositions about Money▾
  20. 20Chapter XI, Section B: System Expenditure Outside Clearings▾
  21. 21Chapter XI, Section C: National Income and Wages▾
  22. 22Chapter XI, Section D: Deposits and Loans▾
  23. 23Chapter XII: The Rate of Interest — Interest Theory and Market Rates, Sections A–B▾
  24. 24Chapter XII: The Rate of Interest — Time Shape of Interest Rate▾
  25. 25Chapter XIII, Section A: Banks and the Pulse of Industry▾
  26. 26Chapter XIII, Section B: The Central Market in an Isolated Domain▾
  27. 27Chapter XIII, Section C: The Cyclical Aspects of International Relations▾
  28. 28Chapter XIII, Section D: Stock Exchange Series▾
  29. 29Chapter XIV, Section A: Postwar Events and Postwar Problems▾
  30. 30Chapter XIV, Section B: Social Patterns, Neomercantilism, and Fascist Planning▾
  31. 31Chapter XIV, Section B.1: Labor Power, the New Middle Class, and Anti-Saving Attitudes▾
  32. 32Chapter XIV, Section B.2: External Factors, War Effects, Moral Disorganization, and Fiscal Pressure▾
  33. 33Chapter XIV, Section B.3–B.4: International Financial Arrangements and Other War Effects▾
  34. 34Postwar Protectionism and the American Creditor Position▾
  35. 35United States Postwar Capitalist Climate and the Effects of Heavy Taxation▾
  36. 36Weimar Germany: Fiscal Expansion, Foreign Credits, and Fragile Prosperity▾
  37. 37England after World War I: Gold, Fiscal Burdens, and Structural Decline▾
  38. 38Agrarian Depression and United States Agriculture in the Kondratieff Downgrade▾
  39. 39English and German Agriculture after the War▾
  40. 40Building Booms and United States Construction in the 1920s▾
  41. 41German and English Housing Construction, Subsidies, and Building Societies▾
  42. 42The Industrial Revolution of the Twenties and English Industry▾
  43. 43German Rationalization, Public Enterprise, Cartels, and the 1927 Prosperity▾
  44. 44United States Industrial Change: New Firms, Electricity, and Power Finance▾
  45. 45Automobiles, Petroleum, Rubber, Chemistry, and Rayon in the United States▾
  46. 46Steel, Aluminum, Copper, Census Evidence, and Labor-Saving Rationalization▾
  47. 47United States Business-Cycle Chronology from 1919 to the 1929 Crash▾
  48. 48Transition to Systematic Time Series Analysis▾
  49. 49Kondratieff Downgrade Expectations and Statistical Limits▾
  50. 50Industrial Output, Output Composition, Durable Goods, and Excess Capacity▾
  51. 51Rationalization, Productivity, and Technological Unemployment▾
  52. 52Price Levels, Postwar Deflation, and Kondratieff Price Tendencies▾
  53. 53Interest Rates, Credit Conditions, and International Money Markets▾
  54. 54American System Expenditure, Debits, National Income, and Payrolls▾
  55. 55Corporate Accumulation, Undistributed Profits, and Oversaving Claims▾
  56. 56Consumers’ Expenditure, Household Saving, Dissaving, and Consumer Credit▾
  57. 57German and British National Income, Consumption, Wages, and Saving▾
  58. 58Corporate Profit Ratios, Earnings Rates, and the Competing-Down Process▾
  59. 59Opening of Wage-Rate Analysis▾
  60. 60Wage Rates, Payrolls, and Unemployment in the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, 1919–1929▾
  61. 61Banking, Deposits, Loans, Investments, and Monetary Cycles, 1919–1929▾
  62. 62IV–V.a. Temporary Investment, Stock Markets, Capital Issues, and Monetary Preconditions in the 1920s▾
  63. 63V.b–c. Mechanics and Appraisal of Federal Reserve Credit Policy▾
  64. 64V.d. Bank of England Policy, Gold Parity, and Bank Rate▾
  65. 65Chapter XV: The World Crisis and the Cyclical Schema▾
  66. 661930: The United States▾
  67. 671930: Germany▾
  68. 681930: England▾
  69. 691931–1932 and Physical Production: Depression Troughs and Early Recovery Signals▾
  70. 70German Incidents, Accidents, and Policy in the 1931–1932 Crisis▾
  71. 71United States Incidents, Debt-Deflation, Policy Measures, and the 1933 Banking Panic▾
  72. 72American and German Indicators of the 1932 Juglar Trough▾
  73. 73Deflation, Price Dispersion, and Relative Price Adjustment▾
  74. 74Deposits, Corporate Losses, Dividends, and Wage Rates Before Recovery▾
  75. 75The United Kingdom’s Suspension of Gold and Stabilizing Discipline▾
  76. 76British Cheap Money, Bank Investments, and Deposit Expansion▾
  77. 77English Monetary Management, Sterling Depreciation, and Neomercantilist Trade Reorientation▾
  78. 78English Industrial Reorientation, Housing Boom, and Rearmament Expenditure▾
  79. 79English Time-Series Evidence: Production, Unemployment, Prices, Wages, and Income▾
  80. 80Germany’s State-Directed Economy: Full Employment, Autarky, and Creative Adaptation▾
  81. 81German Pump Priming, Armaments, and State-Directed Juglar Prosperity▾
  82. 82German Prices, Wages, Reichsbank Policy, and Banking under State Finance▾
  83. 83Recovery Policy in the United States, 1933–1935: Framework and Preliminary Financial Measures▾
  84. 84The Agricultural Adjustment Act and Its Contribution to Recovery▾
  85. 85The NRA, Industrial Self-Government, Cartelization, and Labor Policy▾
  86. 86Natural and Sound Recovery: Stock-Taking Before Monetary Policy▾
  87. 87Dollar Devaluation, Inflation Politics, Easy Money, and Foreign Trade Effects▾
  88. 88Federal income generation and the statistical picture of recovery, 1933–1935▾
  89. 89The Disappointing Juglar and the 1935–1938 upswing and slump▾
  90. 90Extreme Monetary Ease, Credit Expansion, and Price Behavior in the 1935–1938 Juglar▾
  91. 91Industrial Processes Carrying the Current Juglar: Electricity, Automobiles, Steel, Chemicals, and Aviation▾
  92. 92Trade, Monetary Policy, Gold Sterilization, and the Cessation of Government Income Generation▾
  93. 93The Theory of Vanishing Investment Opportunity: Qualified Acceptance of the Long-Run Possibility▾
  94. 94Why Vanishing Investment Opportunity Does Not Explain the American Situation of 1938▾
  95. 95Anticapitalist Social Atmosphere and Fiscal, Labor, and Industrial Policies as Inhibitors of Investment▾
  96. 96Combined Policy Effects, Administrative Atmosphere, and Deadlock in American Capitalism▾
  97. 97Appendix: Charts I–II, Sine-Curve Components and Their Derivative▾
  98. 98Chart III: Railroad Freight, Moving Averages, Superseasonal Normal, and Inflation Factor▾
  99. 99Chart IV: Rate of Percentage Change of Wholesale Prices▾
  100. 100Chart V: British Prewar Pulse▾
  101. 101Chart VI: United States Prewar Pulse▾
  102. 102Chart VII: German Prewar Pulse▾
  103. 103Chart VIII: Nine-Year Moving Averages of Prices▾
  104. 104Chart IX: United States Wholesale Prices, 1790–1920, Arithmetic Scale▾
  105. 105Chart X: Percentage Deviations of Prices from 9-Year Moving Average▾
  106. 106Chart XI: United States Prices, 1840–1913, Annual Log Scale▾
  107. 107Chart XII: Pig Iron Consumption in the United Kingdom, United States, and Germany▾
  108. 108Chart XIII: Rate of Percentage Change of Pig Iron Consumption▾
  109. 109Chart XIV: United States Economic Series, Log Scale▾
  110. 110Chart XV: Industrial Production in the United States, Germany, and Great Britain▾
  111. 111Charts XVI–XVII: Industrial Production Change and Production–Consumption Indices▾
  112. 112Chart XVIII: United States Production Series▾
  113. 113Chart XIX: German Prewar Pulse in Percentage Change Rates▾
  114. 114Chart XX: Interest Rates and British Unemployment▾
  115. 115Chart XXI: United States Individual Prices Relative to the General Price Level▾
  116. 116Chart XXII: British Shipping, Shipbuilding, Freight Rates, and Steamer Prices▾
  117. 117Chart XXIII: United States Deposits, Clearings, Output, Payrolls, and Ratios▾
  118. 118Charts XXIV–XXV: Philadelphia Clearings and United States Annual Banking and Production Series▾
  119. 119Chart XXVI. United States Annual Log Scale▾
  120. 120Chart XXVII. United Kingdom Log Scale▾
  121. 121Chart XXVIII. United Kingdom Annual Log Scale▾
  122. 122Chart XXIX. United States Log Scale▾
  123. 123Chart XXX. Germany Log Scale▾
  124. 124Chart XXXI. United Kingdom Arithmetic Scale▾
  125. 125Chart XXXII. Germany Annual Log Scale▾
  126. 126Chart XXXIII. United States Log Scale▾
  127. 127Chart XXXIV. United States Log Scale▾
  128. 128Chart XXXV. Bank of England Figures, Etc. 1844–1914 Log Scale▾
  129. 129Chart XXXVI. United States Log Scale▾
  130. 130Chart XXXVII: Great Britain (Log Scale)▾
  131. 131Chart XXXVIII: Germany (Log Scale)▾
  132. 132Chart XXXIX: United States Postwar Pulse (Log Scale)▾
  133. 133Chart XL: German Postwar Pulse (Log Scale)▾
  134. 134Chart XLI: British Postwar Pulse (Log Scale)▾
  135. 135Chart XLII: Industrial Production, Annual (Log Scale)▾
  136. 136Chart XLIII: United States Production Series, 1919–1934▾
  137. 137Chart XLIV: United States Customers' Loan Rates▾
  138. 138Chart XLV: United States Profit Ratios▾
  139. 139Chart XLVI: United States, 1919-1934 Monthly Log Scale▾
  140. 140Chart XLVII: United States Log Scale▾
  141. 141Chart XLVIII: Germany Log Scale▾
  142. 142Chart XLIX: Great Britain Log Scale▾
  143. 143Chart L: United States, 1919–1934 Monthly Log Scale▾
  144. 144Chart LI: London Clearing Banks Log Scale▾
  145. 145Chart LII: United States Log Scale▾
  146. 146Appendix Chart LIII: Issues for New Capital, New York Stock Exchange▾
  147. 147Appendix Chart LIV: United States Log Scale Series▾
  148. 148Appendix Chart LV: Germany Log Scale Series▾
  149. 149Appendix Chart LVI: Great Britain Log Scale Series▾
  150. 150Appendix Chart LVII: Issues for New Capital, Great Britain▾
  151. 151Appendix Chart LVIII: Federal Reserve Bank Operations▾
  152. 152Appendix Chart LIX: United States Reserve Factors and Central Market Rates▾
  153. 153Appendix Chart LX: Bank of England Figures▾
  154. 154Index▾

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