Ludwig M. Lachmann · 1982
Lachmann’s essay is an intellectual history of Austrian economics after its mid-century eclipse and a methodological argument for how such a tradition can be revived. Its premise is that Austrian economics did not simply fall out of fashion; it lost the conceptual continuity that had once made its problems intelligible. Exile, Keynesian dominance, and Hayek’s movement away from technical economics left scattered insights without the shared framework needed to use them. Revival therefore requires more than republication or homage. It requires recovering the questions, distinctions, and analytical tools through which the older arguments had force.
Where the storage of ideas failed we must at least make an attempt at their salvage.
The first recovery concerns Hans Mayer’s critique of functional price theory. Lachmann presents Mayer as identifying a central weakness of equilibrium systems: they display relations among already-formed prices but do not explain the market processes by which prices come into being. In this respect Mayer represents a specifically Austrian concern with time, sequence, and disequilibrium. Price theory must not begin and end with an internally consistent array of equilibrium magnitudes; it must ask how agents, facing uncertainty and imperfect knowledge, form, revise, and test prices in actual markets.
By price formation Mayer means the formation of market prices, not equilibrium prices.
Lachmann treats Mayer’s causal-genetic approach as incomplete but still indispensable. Its value lies less in a finished doctrine than in reopening an agenda. It anticipates later attention to administered prices, flexible prices, Keynesian and post-Keynesian price formation, and the institutional diversity of markets. For Lachmann, the missing Austrian contribution is a theory of market paths: how prices move, how plans collide, how expectations are disappointed or confirmed, and how order may emerge without presupposing equilibrium.
The second major salvage is Hayek’s epistemic turn. Lachmann reads “Economics and Knowledge” and Hayek’s later essays on competition as shifting Austrian economics toward the problem of knowledge: how dispersed agents acquire, transmit, revise, and sometimes discard what they think they know. Equilibrium language remains in Hayek’s early formulation, but Lachmann emphasizes the deeper point that economists cannot treat knowledge as a given datum while claiming to explain markets. Market coordination is itself a knowledge problem.
How can knowledge be both, dispersed and diffusable?
Lachmann’s answer is to distinguish kinds of knowledge. Some can be communicated through prices, routines, and competition; some remains tacit, local, practical, and bound to circumstances. Market actors possess not certainty but fallible orientations: they learn by acting, misread situations, imitate, innovate, and unlearn what has become obsolete. This makes technical progress and entrepreneurship subjectivist phenomena rather than exogenous facts. Producers do not merely choose from a given menu of techniques; they discover possibilities through practice, and those discoveries are tested by consumers and rivals.
The final recovery concerns the capital controversy between Knight and the Austrians. Lachmann argues that the dispute was not only about technical measurement but about perspective. Knight’s conception of capital as a self-maintaining value fund belongs to a classical and macroeconomic view. Hayek’s conception, which Lachmann develops, treats capital as heterogeneous resources whose meaning depends on individual plans and expectations. Social capital cannot be assumed to maintain itself automatically, because society has no single planning mind and no unified scale of valuation.
The theory of capital has to be reconstructed from the basis of individual decision-making.
This reconstruction makes aggregation suspect. A firm may evaluate its capital within a coherent plan, but the economy as a whole consists of divergent plans and changing expectations. Capital goods have physical properties, yet their economic character is plan-relative: the same object may be useful, useless, or obsolete depending on the structure of expectations in which it is placed. Lachmann therefore rejects both simplified physicalism and the homogeneous fund view.
The essay’s larger thesis is methodological. Austrian economics remains valuable because it insists on process where equilibrium theory abstracts from process, on knowledge where models assume data, and on heterogeneous plans where aggregates impose false unity. Its revival depends not on preserving a closed doctrine but on salvaging neglected problems: price formation, learning, entrepreneurship, disequilibrium, and capital structure.
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