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Im Namen des Staates oder Die Gefahren des Kollektivismus

Ludwig von Mises · 1978

Im Namen des Staates oder Die Gefahren des Kollektivismus

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Summary

Mises’s Im Namen des Staates oder Die Gefahr des Kollektivismus, written in Geneva in 1938/39 and published only in 1978, diagnoses the doctrines that made modern war likely. Its central problem is peace, not party blame: why economic, cultural, and national rivalries are transformed into armed conflict.

Die dringendste Aufgabe, die die Welt heute zu lösen hat, ist die Schaffung dauernden Friedens.

English translation: The most urgent task the world has to solve today is the establishment of lasting peace.

The book’s chief enemy is collectivism in its many rival forms. Fascism, National Socialism, Bolshevism, socialism, interventionism, and militant nationalism differ in rhetoric, but all enlarge the state into an agency for directing social life in the name of a collective whole. Mises therefore rejects ordinary political cartography:

Nichts ist so irreführend wie die übliche Unterscheidung von „rechts“ und „links“.

English translation: Nothing is so misleading as the customary distinction between "right" and "left."

His historical argument traces the defeat of German liberalism. German nationalism, he insists, was not simply the continuation of Prussian militarism; it first developed through Western ideas of rights, constitutional government, and self-rule.

Die Untertanen der deutschen Fürsten wurden zur deutschen Nation, indem sie sich die Ideen Westeuropas aneigneten.

English translation: The subjects of the German princes became the German nation by appropriating the ideas of Western Europe.

Yet this liberal inheritance remained fragile. Prussian military prestige, imperial bureaucracy, constitutional compromise, social policy, protectionism, and anti-liberal economics displaced the older program. National Socialism is thus not treated as a primitive relapse, but as the mass-democratic culmination of doctrines prepared by statism, militarism, and hostility to the market order.

The conceptual center is Etatismus. Mises strips the state of metaphysical aura: it is organized coercion.

Staat ist Gewaltanwendung und Bereitschaft, Gewalt anzuwenden.

English translation: The state is the application of force and the readiness to apply force.

Liberalism accepts coercion only to protect life, liberty, property, and peace. Socialism and interventionism politicize production and livelihood. If the state controls production, it controls the conditions of speech, work, movement, and publication; if it intervenes piecemeal, each control distorts prices and production, creating pressure either to repeal the intervention or to extend it. Hence Mises’s stark alternative:

Entweder Kapitalismus (Marktwirtschaft) oder Sozialismus (Kommunismus); ein Mittelding, eine dritte Organisationsform, gibt es nicht.

English translation: Either capitalism (the market economy) or socialism (communism); there is no middle way, no third form of organization.

This economic argument grounds his theory of nationalism. In a liberal order of free trade, migration, private property, and equal law, borders lose much of their destructive significance. Under interventionism, however, tariffs, school policy, labor privilege, subsidies, licenses, and administrative decisions become prizes to be captured by one national group against another. Mixed-language regions become battlegrounds not because peoples naturally hate one another, but because state power makes national control materially decisive. Modern nationalism is therefore the imperialist consequence of statist economics.

Mises applies this to Germany’s claim that conquest could solve its “space problem.” Germany’s disaster was not insufficient power but a false theory of national interest. Expansion, autarky, and militarization promised security while producing encirclement, impoverishment, and war. The same doctrinal error shaped readings of Versailles, inflation, depression, and defeat: events do not teach by themselves, because experience is interpreted through ideas. Nationalist and collectivist doctrines can turn catastrophe into further radicalization.

The critique also targets Marxist and racial “polylogism,” the denial of common human reason. Once truth is treated as bourgeois, proletarian, German, Jewish, or racial, argument yields to force. Weimar democracy lacked a liberal foundation because Marxist dictatorship and nationalist paramilitarism alike rejected the market order and the rule of law; even socialist internationalism remained attached to state protection, union privilege, social insurance, and intervention.

The closing argument denies that Bolshevism spreads chiefly as an external infection. Socialist doctrines are Western in origin, and Russia realized ideas long cultivated by European intellectuals, socialists, and syndicalists. The danger to liberal societies is internal: their own abandonment of liberal principles. Treaties, federations, boundary revisions, and punishments cannot secure peace while states are authorized to direct production, trade, migration, and national destiny. The book’s force lies in joining history, economics, and ideology: totalitarianism appears not as an accident at modernity’s margins, but as the danger inherent in granting the collective, through the state, command over social life.

Sections

This work was divided into 62 sections when it entered the library's research corpus—an apparatus for search and citation, not necessarily the author's own table of contents. Each title opens its summary.

  1. 1Front Matter and Table of Contents▾
  2. 2Note to the Reader▾
  3. 3Publisher’s Editorial Notes on Insertions, Deletions, and Language▾
  4. 4Foreword by Alfred Müller-Armack▾
  5. 5Letter from Ludwig von Mises to Alfred Müller-Armack, 14 November 1961▾
  6. 6Author’s Foreword: Peace, Nationalism, and Collectivism▾
  7. 7German Liberalism: Ancien Régime and Liberalism▾
  8. 8The Weakness of German Liberalism▾
  9. 9The Prussian Army▾
  10. 10The Prussian Constitutional Conflict▾
  11. 11Prussia’s Liberal Prestige▾
  12. 12Little-German Historiography▾
  13. 13The Lassalle Episode▾
  14. 14The Triumph of Militarism: The Prussian Army in the German Empire▾
  15. 15German Militarism▾
  16. 16Liberals and Militarism▾
  17. 17The Socialist Explanation of Militarism’s Victory and the Opening of Statism▾
  18. 18Statism: The New Spirit▾
  19. 19The State as Coercive Apparatus▾
  20. 20The Liberal Doctrine of the State▾
  21. 21Socialism and the Abolition of Democracy▾
  22. 22Interventionism as an Impossible Middle Way▾
  23. 23The Statist Myth▾
  24. 24The Reality of Statism▾
  25. 25State and People▾
  26. 26Liberalism and the Nationality Principle▾
  27. 27Liberal and Imperialist Nationalism▾
  28. 28Popular Imperialism and Total War▾
  29. 29Chauvinism▾
  30. 30Myths and Political Doctrines▾
  31. 31The Awakening of German Nationalism▾
  32. 32German Nationalism and Other Nationalisms▾
  33. 33Immanent Critique of German Nationalism▾
  34. 34The Morality of German Nationalism▾
  35. 35Nation and Individual▾
  36. 36Polylogism▾
  37. 37The Role of Violence in Nationalism▾
  38. 38German Nationalism and National Socialism▾
  39. 39The Legend of German Social Democracy▾
  40. 40Marxism and the Labor Movement▾
  41. 41Workers and the State▾
  42. 42The Legend of the Reserve Officer▾
  43. 43The Internationalism of Social Democracy▾
  44. 44The Weimar Constitution▾
  45. 45The Failure to Socialize▾
  46. 46Paramilitary Associations▾
  47. 47The Treaty of Versailles▾
  48. 48Economic Distress▾
  49. 49The National Socialist Transformation▾
  50. 50The Popular View of Democracy versus Totalitarianism▾
  51. 51Equality and Democracy▾
  52. 52Restoring Freedom of Thought▾
  53. 53The Dictatorship Complex▾
  54. 54The Rejection of Ressentiment▾
  55. 55The Future Peace I: The New War▾
  56. 56The Future Peace II: The Victorious Peace▾
  57. 57The Future Peace III: The Compromise Peace▾
  58. 58The Future Peace IV: The Lasting Peace▾
  59. 59The Future Peace V: The Road to Peace▾
  60. 60Notes▾
  61. 61Person and Subject Index▾
  62. 62Publisher Advertisements and Catalog Listings▾

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