John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern · 1961
This German translation of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior presents von Neumann and Morgenstern’s foundational attempt to recast economics as a mathematical theory of strategic interaction.
Dieses Buch enthält eine Darstellung sowie verschiedene Anwendungen einer mathematischen Theorie der Spiele.
English translation: This book contains an exposition, together with various applications, of a mathematical theory of games.
The book’s premise is methodological as much as technical: economics cannot become exact merely by borrowing mathematical language. It must first clarify what its basic objects are—utility, choice, strategy, payoff, coalition, and stability.
Man kann nicht exakte Methoden verwenden, solange keine Klarheit in den Begriffen und Fragen besteht, auf die sie angewendet werden sollen.
English translation: One cannot employ exact methods so long as there is no clarity concerning the concepts and questions to which they are to be applied.
Against models of isolated maximization, the authors define economic action as interdependent choice. Each participant tries to optimize an outcome, but that outcome depends on variables controlled by others. This is why games, not single-agent calculation, become the central formal model.
So versucht jeder Teilnehmer eine Funktion (das oben erwähnte "Resultat") zu maximalisieren, ohne jedoch alle Variablen dieser Funktion zu kontrollieren.
English translation: Thus each participant seeks to maximize a function (the "outcome" mentioned above), without, however, controlling all the variables of this function.
The early chapters build the formal machinery: extensive and normal forms, payoff functions, utility under risk, and strategies understood as complete plans of conduct. In two-person zero-sum games, the decisive result is the minimax theorem. Rational play may require mixed strategies, where probability is not a sign of uncertainty alone but part of optimal strategic design.
Die Strategie des Spielers besteht weder in der Wahl von "Kopf" noch von "Wappen", sondern in der Wahl von "Kopf" mit der Wahrscheinlichkeit 1/2 und der Wahl von "Wappen" mit der Wahrscheinlichkeit 1/2.
English translation: The player's strategy consists neither in the choice of "heads" nor of "tails," but in the choice of "heads" with probability 1/2 and "tails" with probability 1/2.
The later sections extend the theory to n-person games, where coalitions become central. Here the “solution” is no longer necessarily a single outcome, but a stable set of possible imputations: a standard of behavior that resists internal domination while excluding inferior alternatives. This shift lets the authors treat social order, bargaining, and market organization as formal phenomena rather than informal background conditions.
In vielen der weiteren Untersuchungen werden wir sehen, daß diese Vielfalt der Lösungen tatsächlich ein sehr allgemeines Phänomen darstellt.
English translation: In many of the further investigations we shall see that this multiplicity of solutions is in fact a very general phenomenon.
The book’s importance lies in this combination of rigor and scope. It founds modern game theory by showing how economic behavior can be modeled through strategic dependence, randomized play, coalition formation, and stable social standards. Its market discussions connect the abstract theory back to economic life, including competition, monopoly, bargaining blocs, and transfers. Economics is thereby reconstructed as the mathematics of interdependent choice.
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