Brief vom 7. Februar 1918

This file is a short political letter of 7 February 1918: Schumpeter writes deferentially to a noble addressee, in the context of the “Briefe Schumpeters an Graf Otto Harrach,” to transmit an accompanying memorandum. Its scope is therefore not the memorandum itself but a cover letter that states its purpose, sketches its argument, and reveals Schumpeter’s alarm over Austria-Hungary’s political and military direction near the end of the First World War.

Wieder erlaube ich mir Euer Erlaucht ein Memorandum zu überreichen und daran die Bitte zu knüpfen, mir jene Förderung und Anregung zuwenden zu wollen, die in jeder Kritik aus der Feder Euer Erlaucht liegt.

English translation: Once again I take the liberty of submitting a memorandum to Your Illustrious Excellency and of linking to it the request that you kindly grant me that encouragement and stimulation which lies in every criticism from Your Illustrious Excellency's pen.

The letter’s central thesis is that the Habsburg monarchy faces mortal danger unless it can defuse national conflict, overcome parliamentary dysfunction, and assert an Austrian political will independent of Prussian-German domination. Schumpeter begins from the nationalities problem, not as an abstract liberal question but as a practical condition of imperial survival. He sees radicalization across all camps and judges their political language as destructive.

Alle nationalen Gruppen haben sich in der letzten Zeit zu radikalisiert und alle haben eine so unqualifizierbare Sprache adoptiert, daß man ihnen nur mit Mühe frühere Sympathien bewahren kann.

English translation: All national groups have radicalized themselves too much of late, and all have adopted such unqualifiable language that one can only with difficulty preserve one's earlier sympathies for them.

Yet the conceptual move is not withdrawal from compromise. Precisely because nationalist politics has become repellent, a viable constitutional or administrative “Modus” must still be found. Schumpeter’s concern is conservative in aim but pragmatic in method: the monarchy must satisfy national groups “im Wesen” while eliminating points of friction.

Und dennoch ist es nötig einen Modus zu finden, der sie im Wesen befriedigt und die wichtigsten Reibungsflächen eliminiert, sonst wird die Monarchie daran zugrunde gehen.

English translation: And yet it is necessary to find a modus that satisfies them in essence and eliminates the most important points of friction; otherwise the Monarchy will perish thereby.

The foreign-policy dimension sharpens the urgency. Schumpeter reacts with dismay to news of a military convention with Germany, reading it as a possible surrender of Austrian autonomy to Prussia.

Ich vermag die Nachricht nicht auf ihre Richtigkeit zu prüfen, aber ich gestehe: nie hätte ich es für möglich gehalten, daß Oesterreich vor Preußen kapitulieren könnte!

English translation: I am unable to verify the accuracy of the report, but I confess: I would never have thought it possible that Austria could capitulate before Prussia!

The letter then outlines the missing memorandum’s structure: first foreign policy, then the causes of parliamentary “misère,” and finally the possibility of a strong conservative government. This architecture shows Schumpeter linking external dependence, internal parliamentary breakdown, and governmental weakness as parts of one crisis.

Aber eben deshalb scheint mir eine starke Regierung, die weiß was sie will, in Oesterreich nötig.

English translation: But precisely for that reason a strong government which knows what it wants seems to me necessary in Austria.

The relevance of the document lies in its compressed view of late-imperial politics: Schumpeter appears not as a detached economist but as a political analyst diagnosing the monarchy’s collapse-risk. His remedy is neither nationalist surrender nor parliamentary drift, but purposeful statecraft capable of reconciling national demands without abandoning Austria’s independence.