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How Can Europe Survive?

Hans F. Sennholz · 1955

How Can Europe Survive?

75 sections
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About this work

Hans F. Sennholz’s How Can Europe Survive? is a single-author Austrian political-economic pamphlet about the ideological foundations of postwar Europe’s crisis. It asks why Europe remains economically fragile despite reconstruction, foreign aid, and new international institutions, and it answers that the problem is not insufficient administration but the administrative mentality itself. For Sennholz, planning, welfare-state expansion, protectionism, exchange control, and cartelized integration are not separate errors. They are symptoms of one anti-market doctrine.

Policies of government planning and welfare and the disintegration of the world economy into heterogeneous national units are two aspects of the same phenomenon.

This claim supplies the pamphlet’s organizing logic. Europe’s closed national economies are not merely wartime residues; they are the external form of domestic interventionism. Once governments manage prices, currencies, industries, and welfare claims at home, they also restrict trade and payments abroad. The European problem is therefore not solved by moving authority from national ministries to supranational agencies if those agencies preserve the same philosophy of control.

Sennholz’s argument is sharply Austrian in its account of market failure. He denies that capitalism requires planning to overcome its own defects. When markets work badly, he attributes the disorder to previous obstruction of exchange, not to exchange itself. Controls distort calculation, prices, production, and payments; the resulting difficulties then become excuses for additional controls.

There is only one reason for an unsatisfactory operation of the market economy: it is government intervention.

From this premise, the pamphlet judges postwar institutions by a single standard: do they restore voluntary international exchange, or do they regularize restriction? Sennholz is skeptical of monetary stabilization schemes when they accommodate exchange controls, and he treats managed integration as no substitute for free markets. Thus the International Monetary Fund and the Coal and Steel Community are criticized less as failed technical devices than as embodiments of the wrong principle.

The Fund sanctions and brings about exchange restrictions.

His treatment of the Coal and Steel Community follows the same pattern. What many contemporaries viewed as a seed of peace and unity appears to Sennholz as public cartelization of basic industry. If coal and steel are allocated through political authority rather than competitive exchange, “integration” becomes another name for monopoly and planning.

The Community is a monopoly of coal and steel supply.

The pamphlet’s positive alternative is not nationalist withdrawal but cosmopolitan liberalism. Europe, in Sennholz’s view, cannot prosper as an autarkic bloc because its dense population and industrial structure depend on the widest possible division of labor. Nor can it achieve durable peace through bureaucratic unification while retaining economic nationalism. The central obstacle is intellectual and moral: Europe must abandon the doctrines that made restriction seem necessary.

Only the system of individual liberty and the unhampered world economy can provide the enormous advantages of the international division of labor and provide the milieu for nations to live in peace.

The work’s lasting interest lies in its critique of European integration from a free-market rather than nationalist standpoint. Sennholz does not oppose cooperation among Europeans; he opposes cooperation organized through planning, monetary manipulation, and monopoly privilege. How Can Europe Survive? thus argues that Europe’s fate depends less on institutional architecture than on the economic philosophy animating it. A continent may appear to unify while deepening the habits of control that divide it; genuine survival requires liberty, sound money, private property, and open world commerce.

Sections

This work was divided into 75 sections when it entered the library's research corpus—an apparatus for search and citation, not necessarily the author's own table of contents. Each title opens its summary.

  1. 1Front Matter: Title Page, Contents, and Acknowledgment▾
  2. 2Introduction▾
  3. 3Part One: On Peace and Present-day Ideologies▾
  4. 4Part Two: Doctrines and Plans of Unification▾
  5. 5Chapter I: Clarence K. Streit and the Federal Union of Democracies▾
  6. 6Clarence K. Streit’s Federal Union of Democracies: Proposal and Critique▾
  7. 7R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, and the Opening Critique of European Autarky▾
  8. 8Critique of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe: Tariffs, Autarky, Pressure Groups, and Socialism▾
  9. 9The Socialist Movement for a United States of Europe and Critique of Socialist Unification▾
  10. 10American Aid, Socialist Europe, and Anti-American Imperialism Claims▾
  11. 11Wall Street and American Capitalism▾
  12. 12Leninist Imperialism and the History of Capital Movements▾
  13. 13Intergovernmental Aid and Private Lending▾
  14. 14Socialism, Communism, and Democracy▾
  15. 15The European Federalist Union: Origins, Objectives, and Ideological Roots▾
  16. 16Critique of Federalist Functional Organization and Industrial Federalism▾
  17. 17Solidarism, Saint-Simonian Planning, and Socialist Federalism▾
  18. 18The United Europe Movement and Churchill’s Call for Unity▾
  19. 19Critique of the Commonwealth Model and Trade Preferences▾
  20. 20Protectionism, Commonwealth Dissolution, and Rejection of the Commonwealth Model▾
  21. 21Coordination of European Unity Movements and Hague Political Resolutions▾
  22. 22Westminster Economic Conference and Economic Union Resolutions▾
  23. 23Appraisal of the European Movement’s Economic Program▾
  24. 24Steps Toward Union: Overview of European Institutions▾
  25. 25Aristide Briand and the French Initiative for European Union▾
  26. 26Criticism of Briand: Humanity, Collectivism, and the Failure of Conciliation▾
  27. 27The Benelux Economic Union: Origins, Organization, and Early Progress▾
  28. 28Contemporary Explanations of Benelux Stumbling Blocks▾
  29. 29Benelux, Interventionism, Exchange Control, and the Balance-of-Payments Fallacy▾
  30. 30The Economic Commission for Europe: Tasks and Committee Activity▾
  31. 31ECE, Government, and Economic Planning: Opening Appraisal▾
  32. 32Economic Commission for Europe and Government Economy▾
  33. 33United Nations Economic Cooperation and Economic Nationalism▾
  34. 34Organization for European Economic Cooperation: Origins, Convention, and Structure▾
  35. 35OEEC Aid and Counterpart Funds▾
  36. 36OEEC Annual Program, Quota Removal, and Trade Liberalization Appraisal▾
  37. 37Needed Reforms and the Missed Opportunity of U.S. Foreign Aid▾
  38. 38Marshall Aid as a Windfall for Socialism▾
  39. 39The Dollar Mystery and Monetary Policy▾
  40. 40Council of Europe: Background, Aims, Structure, and Work▾
  41. 41Council of Europe Critique: Welfare Ideology and Economic Nationalism▾
  42. 42European Monetary Cooperation, Bretton Woods, and the IMF▾
  43. 43International Monetary Fund: Provisions and Critique of Bretton Woods▾
  44. 44European Payments Union: Origins, Mechanism, and Beginning of Critique▾
  45. 45European Payments Union as a Supplement to National Controls▾
  46. 46Monetary Depreciation as a Threat to the Payments Union▾
  47. 47EPU Credit Expansion by Member Central Banks▾
  48. 48EPU Contrasted with the Gold Standard▾
  49. 49EPU as an Advocate of Inflationary Policy▾
  50. 50EPU Support for Exchange and Trade Restrictions▾
  51. 51EPU Reversal of Credit Principles▾
  52. 52American Financing and the Individualist Critique of the EPU▾
  53. 53The European Coal and Steel Community: Schuman’s Rationale and Treaty Objectives▾
  54. 54ECSC Common Market and Institutional Structure▾
  55. 55ECSC Economic and Social Regulatory Powers▾
  56. 56International Position, Political Ambitions, and Early ECSC Operations▾
  57. 57Criticism of the ECSC as Socialization of Basic Industries▾
  58. 58Political Control and the Claim That ECSC Makes War Unthinkable▾
  59. 59ECSC as a Source of Conflicts and Supranational Monopoly▾
  60. 60Social Justice, Price Controls, and the Denial of Economics▾
  61. 61A Common Market Without Convertible Currencies and the Planning Alternative▾
  62. 62Turnover Taxes as Instruments Against the Common Market▾
  63. 63National Controls, Supranational Controls, and the Limits of European Integration▾
  64. 64The Brussels Treaty and the Western Union: Origins and Organization▾
  65. 65Brussels Treaty and the Western Union: Institutions, EDC, WEU, and Economic Nationalism▾
  66. 66The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Treaty Provisions, Structure, and Ideological Defense▾
  67. 67NATO, Military Morale, and Europe’s Defense Spending▾
  68. 68An Alliance of Freemen: The Liberation of Man▾
  69. 69Monetary Reconstruction▾
  70. 70A Free-Trade Area▾
  71. 71On Ideological and Military Defense▾
  72. 72The Gradual and Independent Realization of Freedom and Union by the European Nations▾
  73. 73Conclusion▾
  74. 74Conclusion: Unite or Perish▾
  75. 75Index▾

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