Alexander Mahr, „Wirtschaftliches und ethisches Verhalten“

The file is a single theoretical essay by Alexander Mahr. Its scope is conceptual and methodological: it asks whether “economic” conduct is inherently at odds with ethical obligation. Mahr begins from the suspicion that proper economic behavior means profit-seeking unconstrained by morality.

Nur zu oft begegnet man der Auffassung, daß ein Verhalten, welches den Grundsätzen „richtiger“ Wirtschaftsführung entspricht, nur schwer oder überhaupt nicht mit den Forderungen der Ethik in Einklang zu bringen ist.

English translation: All too often one encounters the view that conduct which conforms to the principles of "correct" economic management can hardly, or not at all, be reconciled with the demands of ethics.

The main thesis is that this conflict is produced by a false definition of economy. Older theory often treated homo oeconomicus not merely as an ideal type but as a model, and current usage still sometimes equates economic rationality with exclusive orientation to gain. Mahr replaces this with the broader concept derived from subjective value theory: economy is not a material realm of money or goods, but the ordering of scarce means toward ends.

Es handelt sich eben nur um das Disponieren über die knappen Mittel zwecks maximaler Zielerreichung.

English translation: What is involved is simply the disposition of scarce means with a view to maximal attainment of ends.

This formal definition is the essay’s central conceptual move. It separates rational use of means from the moral content of ends. Economic action appears in consumption, in managing income and goods, and in entrepreneurial decisions about labor, land, machines, and inputs; occupational labor itself is usually only a means. Because ends may be egoistic or altruistic, ethical, religious, cultural, or political aims become economic whenever they require scarce resources and have to be weighed against other claims.

Mahr then distinguishes several relations between ethics and calculation. Some duties are calculated in degree but not in principle: one may be unconditionally resolved to support impoverished parents or donate to charitable, religious, cultural, or political causes, yet still must decide how much can be given alongside family needs and other obligations. Other duties stand outside calculation altogether, as when a fixed medical cost must be paid to relieve a mother’s grave illness. Ethical obligations can need material means without becoming merely optional preferences.

Man kann somit sagen, daß es ethische Zielsetzungen gibt, die trotz der Notwendigkeit des Aufwandes materieller Mittel zu ihrer Realisierung über dem wirtschaftlichen Kalkül stehen.

English translation: One can thus say that there are ethical goals which, despite the necessity of expending material means for their realization, stand above the economic calculus.

The middle of the essay applies this argument to market behavior. Incomplete competition and personal motives in pricing are not “uneconomic” residues. If a buyer favors a friend, a seller toward whom he feels sympathy, or members of a shared group, the exchange may satisfy two needs at once: the need for the good and an altruistic or personal aim. Economic theory must therefore recognize non-egoistic motives as economically intelligible.

Von einem „unwirtschaftlichen“ Verhalten kann hier keine Rede sein, denn altruistische Ziele sind ebenso legitime Motive für wirtschaftliches Handeln wie egoistische.

English translation: There can be no talk here of "uneconomic" conduct, for altruistic aims are just as legitimate motives for economic action as egoistic ones.

The same logic extends to production and income-seeking. Bad economic conduct consists in irrational use of means for given aims—clinging to obsolete methods out of laziness, prejudice, or inertia—not in declining to maximize profit at every opportunity. State monopolies may combine profitability with social policy; private entrepreneurs may pay above-market wages or grant voluntary benefits. Such conduct can still be Wirtschaftlichkeit when several ends are rationally pursued together.

The closing methodological section asks whether economists should merely record ethical motives or advocate ethical postulates. Mahr rejects a flat ban on value judgments: economists may judge systems morally, especially where culture and social order are at stake. But such judgment belongs to ethics, not to economic theory proper. Economics must explain causal relations, conditions, and likely consequences; moral conviction cannot replace demonstration.

Kurz gesagt, es dürfen hier nicht Werturteile an die Stelle der wissenschaftlichen Beweisführung gesetzt werden.

English translation: In short, value judgments must not here be substituted for scientific demonstration.

His final position is a qualified value-freedom. Derivation and proof must remain free of value judgments, yet the selection of problems, emphases, and ideals of justice, freedom, security, or equality is shaped by ultimate commitments.

In gewisser Hinsicht ist freilich alle wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Forschung wertgebunden.

English translation: In a certain respect, of course, all economic research is value-bound.

The essay remains relevant because it avoids two simplifications: it neither identifies rational economics with selfish profit-maximization nor dissolves economics into moral preaching. By redefining Wirtschaften as the rational disposition of scarce means, Mahr makes ethical ends visible within economic theory while preserving the economist’s distinct responsibility to analyze causal conditions and feasible consequences.