Hans Bayer’s journal article examines how enterprise planning generates an internal dynamic within an “organized market economy.” Published in Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft, it moves through four stages: the common characteristics of institutionalized large enterprises, the forces promoting their development, their contribution to economic stabilization, and the complementary functions of personally directed small and medium-sized enterprises. Its methodological premise is that abstract market models must be brought closer to social reality. Contemporary competition is organized not only through legislation but through enterprises’ own decisions; economic coordination therefore cannot be understood exclusively as either market automatism or centralized direction.
The decisive distinction concerns leadership rather than size or legal form. In institutionalized enterprises, managers operate within durable administrative structures, prior decisions, and collective responsibilities. Personally directed enterprises leave greater scope for individual initiative; even a family-owned joint-stock company may belong to this category. Drawing on his earlier research into large firms, Bayer identifies growth, security, and profitability as their principal objectives. Long-term planning can reconcile these goals, while research and diversification make maintaining market share an active undertaking rather than a defensive position.
Der Profit steht hierbei nicht als Ziel im Vordergrund, sondern als Sicherheitsspanne.
English translation: Profit does not stand in the foreground here as an objective, but as a margin of safety.
This reinterpretation of profit supplies a bridge between enterprise behavior and macroeconomic development. Profit remains essential, but increasingly as protection against uncertainty and a condition of continued growth. Bayer suggests that this orientation connects the firm’s survival more closely to sustained general prosperity. Forecasting and operations research support the connection by narrowing planning errors and enabling continuing adjustment, without eliminating uncertainty or replacing entrepreneurial judgment.
The second section explains concentration through economic and technical pressures rather than attributing it solely to power-seeking or misguided policy. Research facilities, automation, advertising, finance, and scientific management favor large organizations. Concentration and “objectification”—the displacement of subjective impulses by systematic procedures—reinforce one another. Smaller enterprises also need access to shared research, market analysis, and comparative performance studies. Their continued independence may thus require institutional support without requiring their own transformation into bureaucratic corporations.
The article’s central section tests whether organizational advantages stabilize the economy as well as the enterprise. Bayer first revisits the assumptions of competitive theory. Forecasting improves market knowledge; diversification permits production to shift between establishments even when specialized physical capital cannot move. Long-term commitments can also make immediate reactions to every price or demand movement unnecessary. Institutionalization weakens the assumption of equally powerful competitors while bringing enterprise conduct closer to the model’s assumption of rational decision-making.
These effects are not uniformly beneficial. Maintaining employment and turnover through diversification can preserve the income stream, but transferring risk to subcontractors merely relocates instability. Advertising may defend one firm’s sales at another’s expense. Nor does concentrated power necessarily call forth an effective counterpower. Bayer therefore refuses to equate enterprise security automatically with economic stability.
Diese Überlegung bedeutet keineswegs, daß etwa Wettbewerb in einer organisierten Marktwirtschaft überflüssig geworden wäre; im Gegenteil, er ist notwendig, um zu verhindern, daß Institutionalisierung der Unternehmung zu ihrer Erstarrung oder Vermachtung führt.
English translation: This consideration by no means implies that competition has become superfluous in an organized market economy; on the contrary, it is necessary to prevent the institutionalization of the enterprise from leading to its ossification or domination by power.
Bayer next distinguishes seasonal fluctuations, business cycles, and structural changes. Financially secure firms can maintain investment during downturns, supporting government full-employment policy rather than leaving stabilization entirely to the state. Long-range planning can anticipate changing demand and integrate technical innovations gradually, avoiding some overcapacity pressures associated with unrestricted competition. Yet some structural crises, exemplified by coal, exceed what individual enterprises can manage. His argument concerns conditional possibilities, not an assured harmony of interests or an assumption of entrepreneurial altruism.
The final section gives smaller enterprises a specific economic function. Large-scale standardized production leaves gaps for special orders, components, and services that large firms cannot supply economically. Independent suppliers serving multiple customers can fill these gaps while retaining flexibility and personal initiative. Complementarity increasingly supplements direct rivalry, although recessions may induce large firms to reclaim outsourced work.
Die Forderung nach Solidarität kann nicht als Tendenz bezeichnet werden.
English translation: The demand for solidarity cannot be described as a tendency.
This distinction limits the article’s account of endogenous development. Complementarity emerges from production structures; cooperation requires deliberate choice. Shared purchasing, research, and experience can preserve smaller firms’ independence, but Bayer regards these arrangements as insufficiently developed and vulnerable to indiscriminate cartel legislation. Some individual freedom must be relinquished to secure lasting, ordered freedom.
In der organisierten Marktwirtschaft entstehen neue Gesetzmäßigkeiten einer Dynamik, die — wenn auch in ganz anderer Weise als im Modell der freien Konkurrenz — zu einem dynamischen Gleichgewicht führen können.
English translation: In the organized market economy, new regularities of a dynamic emerge which—even if in an entirely different way than in the model of free competition—can lead to a dynamic equilibrium.
The article’s relevance lies in locating potential stabilization within enterprise organization while distinguishing spontaneous tendencies from conscious institutional choices. Its conclusion remains qualified: concentration threatens cultural life, public opinion, and politics as well as competition. Bayer leaves the means of containing that power unresolved, insisting that economic and intellectual forces must act together. Organized growth offers possibilities for equilibrium, not a self-enforcing guarantee of freedom.
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