Hans Bayer, Krise in der EWG? (1963)

Hans Bayer’s journal article examines whether the breakdown of negotiations over British accession threatens the European Economic Community’s future. Its answer distinguishes economic performance from political confidence: integration continues to produce tangible results, while the interruption exposes unresolved conflicts and weakens trust. Moving from the Community’s international role through its internal tensions to the economic forces favouring further integration, Bayer argues that neither collapse nor continued progress is inevitable. Economic interdependence creates opportunities and pressures for cooperation, but their realization depends on political judgment and commitment.

The opening challenges an immediate diagnosis of crisis with evidence of economic consolidation. Internal tariff reductions have proceeded faster than planned; the reduction scheduled for July 1963 would leave duties at 40 percent of their original levels. Industrial production increased by approximately 6 percent in 1962, and trade among member countries intensified. Yet Bayer rejects the inference that the successful Community of Six can therefore remain self-sufficient. He introduces E. Sträub’s account of European regionalism as a means of accumulating power, then counters its exclusive orientation with his own conception of the Community’s purpose:

Sie soll im Rahmen der Weltwirtschaft nicht trennend, sondern verbindend wirken.

English translation: Within the framework of the world economy, it should act not to divide but to connect.

The section headed “Nicht Block, sondern Kristallisationspunkt” makes openness the criterion of successful integration. Bayer draws on Angelopoulos’s warning that discrimination against outsiders could deepen Western divisions, and on Niehans’s contention that Europe cannot indefinitely endure another partition. These interventions support an expansive conception of integration: the EEC should provide a centre around which wider cooperation develops, rather than consolidate a protected enclave. The argument joins economic growth to international interdependence without treating the Community’s existing boundaries as its final form.

British exclusion consequently matters beyond the accession question itself. It complicates the equal Atlantic partnership that Hallstein favours over either Europe’s emergence as a third power or its incorporation into an Atlantic community. The Kennedy Round offers a partial alternative: tariff negotiations could mitigate problems left by interrupted enlargement and help shape both the Community and its relationship with the United States. Bayer nevertheless stresses commercial interests and institutional obstacles. Without Britain, complete tariff elimination for the proposed “80-vH-Kategorie” loses its basis. American proposals for linear reductions also conflict with the EEC’s preference for prior tariff harmonization: halving a high tariff and halving a low one are not equivalent interventions. France further links its negotiating commitments to settlement of outstanding agricultural questions.

The internal crisis is thus a weakening of political momentum rather than proof that economic integration has ceased. Earlier dynamism had pushed disagreements into the background; its interruption makes them more visible and sometimes encourages exaggeration. Bayer identifies the central danger succinctly:

Die gefährlichste Auswirkung im Inneren der EWG ist das schwindende Vertrauen.

English translation: The most dangerous effect within the EEC is dwindling trust.

Trust matters because firms might begin organizing around a lasting commercial division between the EEC and EFTA. Agricultural disagreements give this danger concrete institutional substance. Common market arrangements for milk products, beef, and rice remain unfinished, while convergence of grain prices has been postponed. The rice dispute sets producing countries, Italy and France, against consuming members. Italian demands for restrictions on imported long-grain rice and higher round-grain prices show how a common policy can become an arena for conflicting national interests rather than an agreed framework.

Bayer then moves beneath sectoral bargaining to competing conceptions of economic order. Planning versus market coordination concerns the foundations of economic policy, not merely administrative technique. French programming derives authority partly from its status as a national institution and shared belief. The Commission’s proposal for a revisable, multiyear overview contrasts with Erhard’s objection that detailed quantitative planning must either perpetually chase changing circumstances or constrain economic life. Bayer does not adjudicate these doctrines; he establishes their importance as a source of tension among the Six.

The final section identifies countervailing “forces of integration.” Industrial concentration pushes large firms beyond national markets, while export associations, joint factories, coordinated production, and shared distribution networks extend cooperation. Such connections also cross the EEC–EFTA boundary. British investment applications and Unilever’s expectation of an eventual unified Western European economic area illustrate business activity anticipating political enlargement. American direct investment similarly establishes transatlantic links independently of tariff negotiations. Economic integration therefore operates through corporate organization as well as governmental agreements.

Interdependence also diminishes the effectiveness of isolated national policies. Bayer’s example of German discount-rate increases attracting foreign credit shows how an instrument intended to restrain domestic expansion can be undermined by international capital movements. Monetary cooperation, exchange-rate arrangements, and tax harmonization become practical requirements. He expects these pressures to soften the doctrinal opposition between planning and market economics, but refuses to convert structural pressures into a guarantee:

Wir dürfen uns freilich nicht auf diese Tendenzen verlassen; denn sie zwingen nicht zu einer bestimmten Entwicklung, sondern erleichtern den Weg zur Zusammenarbeit in der EWG und darüber hinaus mit anderen Staaten.

English translation: We must not, however, rely on these tendencies; for they do not compel any particular development, but make the path to cooperation within the EEC and beyond it with other states easier.

This qualification governs the conclusion. Bayer fears that satisfaction with present prosperity weakens the willingness to build a common future. His appeal for European cooperation rests ultimately on securing Europe’s economic and cultural existence. The article’s relevance lies in its distinction between integration’s economic incentives and its political realization: commercial success cannot eliminate conflicts of sovereignty, policy, and trust, while political setbacks need not extinguish the material foundations of cooperation.