Indonesia: The Generals

Friedrich August von Hayek’s “Indonesia: The Generals” is a published letter to the editor of the Sunday Times, dated November 5, 1967, and republished in the supplied 2022 version. Written after his return from Djakarta, it responds to Henry Brandon’s reporting on Indonesia’s new rulers. Hayek calls Brandon’s article “sensible” but offers two qualifications: the generals’ social origins complicate their identification as military men, and corruption must be understood alongside the government’s administrative and political constraints.

The first qualification challenges the explanatory value of the rulers’ military designation:

First, the ‘generals’ who now govern Indonesia are mostly not what we would regard as military men.

Hayek argues that many came from other professions, rose through the struggle for independence, and remained in the army to oppose communism. His conceptual move is to distinguish military rank from professional background and political purpose. The designation “generals,” on this account, obscures the varied trajectories that brought these men to power. This is a sympathetic reframing of the leadership, rather than an examination of its conduct or institutions.

The second qualification moves from the rulers’ identity to the constraints on reform. Hayek asserts that the generals are acutely aware of corruption. He then identifies an inherited administrative problem: under Sukarno, the civil service expanded far beyond the country’s needs, leaving the government unable to provide adequate salaries. This juxtaposition supplies an economic context for corruption, although the letter does not demonstrate the connection or explain particular abuses.

Reducing the bureaucracy, however, presents a political danger:

On the other hand it would be politically fatal to dismiss a large number as they would create an intellectual proletariat which would acutely endanger the political stability.

The phrase “intellectual proletariat” makes displaced educated employees a potential source of instability. Hayek thus presents a tension between administrative retrenchment and maintaining political order. The letter’s significance lies in this compact account of constrained reform. The accompanying editorial note supplies broader context about Suharto’s regime, including corruption and repression; these retrospective observations should be distinguished from Hayek’s own narrowly focused defence of the generals’ position.