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Commentary on Keynes: II

Emil Lederer · 1936

Commentary on Keynes: II

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Emil Lederer, Commentary on Keynes: II (1936)

Emil Lederer’s journal discussion article examines Keynes’s General Theory through two questions: whether its central concepts adequately explain economic behavior, and whether its analysis accounts for the severity of the Great Depression. His assessment combines admiration for Keynes’s account of persistent unemployment with criticism of its psychological foundations, historical scope, and political expectations. The article moves from consumption and investment to the interdependence of productive sectors, then to structural disruption and a comparison with Marx. Throughout, Lederer distinguishes accepting Keynes’s conclusions from accepting the mechanisms offered to explain them.

Lederer first reconstructs Keynes’s argument: as income increases, consumption absorbs a smaller proportion of it, making employment increasingly dependent on investment. Declining marginal efficiency of capital eventually requires interest rates below those savers will accept; liquidity preference can therefore obstruct full employment. Lederer questions the presumed regularity of the consumption relationship. Employing additional workers at unchanged wages need not reduce their propensity to consume. Higher wages may encourage new standards of living, while optimism during recovery may weaken saving. Rising profits and repayment of debts can increase the unconsumed share of national income, but these effects require analysis of income distribution and the recovery process, not merely a general psychological disposition.

His treatment of liquidity preference similarly challenges the explanatory independence of Keynes’s terminology:

But in both cases it is not the liquidity that is preferred but the investment that is refused.

The distinction redirects attention from attachment to cash toward the assessment of prospective investments. Apart from transaction needs, Lederer identifies familiar risks: a future rise in interest rates can reduce an investment’s capital value, and disappointing business returns can cause losses. Even refusal of an apparently riskless investment at a low yield may reflect suspicion of hidden risks or an attempt to obtain better terms. Liquidity preference thus gives a distinct psychological name to behavior Lederer believes can be explained through risk and expected return.

This criticism does not amount to rejection of Keynes’s account of stagnation. Lederer accepts that deteriorating investment opportunities can produce prolonged involuntary unemployment:

If the "fields of investment" yield returns which are not only scanty but uncertain, the process will stagnate and lead to the consequences Keynes analyzes.

He locates the decisive mechanism in declining marginal efficiency rather than in either a sharply falling propensity to consume or an independent preference for liquidity. His alternative explanation emphasizes the connection between consumers’ and producers’ goods. Additional consumer-goods output includes value corresponding to replacement requirements, while some additional income is destined for investment rather than consumption. If investment or replacement is postponed, part of the output lacks corresponding demand, producing unsold goods or falling prices and losses. Production normally therefore requires investment to expand alongside it. Lederer explicitly qualifies this claim: dishoarding or additional exports can support increased consumer-goods production from unused capacity without additional investment.

The historical objection is that such interdependence does not establish the inevitability of catastrophic depression under gradual growth. If marginal efficiency declines slowly, savers may adapt to lower returns, particularly when they trust the security of their investments. Sudden dislocations create a different situation:

If, as in the last depression, unemployment rises beyond 20 per cent, if at the same time production of consumers' goods falls off, if practically every industry works far below its capacity, even an interest rate of zero will hardly lead to investments.

Lederer agrees that wage reductions cannot resolve this deadlock. But he attributes its severity to shocks interacting with the business cycle: disrupted export markets, drastic cost reductions, and technical changes that unsettle existing production. He also identifies fewer inventions generating new industries, increasingly effective labor- and capital-saving devices, closed national economies, and a lack of new markets for established industrial countries. Folding these developments into a gradual decline of marginal efficiency obscures their specific effects. When dislocation drives expected returns below zero, interest-rate policy loses its efficacy. Renewed employment requires an initiating demand, potentially supplied by important inventions, new markets, or public works.

The comparison with Marx develops the distinction between subjective motives and systemic relations. Lederer finds parallels in the treatment of labor, declining returns, and the proportions required between producers’ and consumers’ goods. Their explanations nevertheless differ: Marx connects declining returns to accumulation relative to labor and treats sectoral relations through wages and unconsumed surplus; Keynes employs marginal efficiency and subjective motivations. The deeper contrast concerns the social response to economic pressure. Marx treats economic development as a process that forms classes capable of collective action. Keynes’s reform expectations, Lederer argues, retain an individualistic psychology that underestimates this transformation.

A rational analysis as such is not a force.

This closing proposition connects the theoretical critique to political power. Low returns may provoke collective resistance from capitalists rather than accommodation to state-determined interest rates, more equal incomes, or publicly guided investment. Entrepreneurs stand to lose power as well as revenue, and theoretical persuasion does not neutralize those interests. Lederer’s article is consequently both an appreciative reconstruction of Keynes’s employment analysis and a challenge to its generality: explaining demand and investment is insufficient without explaining historically specific disruption and the organized social reactions that constrain reform.

Sections

This work was divided into 3 sections when it entered the library's research corpus—an apparatus for search and citation, not necessarily the author's own table of contents. Each title opens its summary.

  1. 1Propensity to Consume, Liquidity Preference, and Declining Investment Returns▾
  2. 2Production Interdependence, Depression Shocks, and the Limits of Interest Rate Policy▾
  3. 3Keynes and Marx: Economic Structure, Class Reaction, and the Limits of Persuasion▾

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