Emil Lederer, Weltanschluß oder Selbstblockade? Wirtschafts- und Machtzerstörung durch Autarkie (1932)

Emil Lederer’s newspaper article attacks economic autarky as a policy that would destroy both Germany’s productive capacity and its international power. Its central reversal is contained in the title: what advocates present as national independence is actually self-blockade. Lederer develops this argument through a demographic account of industrialization, an analysis of the reciprocity between imports and exports, contemporary trade figures, and a concluding warning about unemployment and diplomatic marginalization. The article combines economic explanation with political intervention, ending by presenting 31 July as a moment of decision over Germany’s future.

Lederer begins with the social ideal behind autarky: a disciplined farming and working population living simply and securely on its own soil, freed from the supposed excesses of large-scale capitalist enterprise. His objection is not merely that this ideal is provincial. It assumes that Germany can return to an economic structure whose demographic foundations no longer exist. He reports that the population has grown by 60 percent since 1871, while the territory of the Reich has contracted by approximately 15 percent. Agriculture supports roughly as many people as it did fifty years earlier; the additional population therefore requires a different productive basis. Moreover, the improved tools and working methods that have increased agricultural and craft output are themselves products of industrialization. The traditional economy cannot be separated from the modern development its defenders reject.

The decisive historical connection is between industrial employment and participation in international exchange:

Die Industrie aber konnte sich nur aufbauen, weil die deutsche Volkswirtschaft an die Weltwirtschaft angegliedert wurde.

English translation: Industry, however, could develop only because the German national economy was integrated into the world economy.

World-market integration supplied raw materials unavailable domestically and enabled their payment through exports of manufactured goods. Imported food sustained the additional population and improved nutrition; inexpensive, high-quality imported fodder helped make farming profitable. Lederer thus refuses the opposition between an internationally dependent industrial sector and a supposedly self-sufficient agricultural sector. Both belong to an interconnected economy. Specialization, adaptability, and the mutual dependence of its parts also furnished the material foundation of Germany’s power. His qualified praise of Bismarck distinguishes this economic foundation from its diplomatic use: integration offered favorable conditions for international influence, provided policy recognized its limits.

Lederer next turns nationalist rhetoric against itself. He rejects the claim that British commercial jealousy chiefly explains the alignment against Germany in 1914, assigning greater importance to territorial questions. Nevertheless, he follows that claim through its own logic. If Britain sought to destroy German exports, it also sought to deprive Germany of the imports those exports financed. Autarkists now voluntarily pursue the condition they attribute to an enemy’s hostile design. Allowing “necessary” imports does not resolve the contradiction: interested parties will continually enlarge that category, while the ability to pay depends on maintaining foreign sales.

The mechanism of self-blockade is reciprocal rather than simply domestic:

Mit jeder neuen Hemmung der Einfuhr entziehen wir unseren Exporten den Boden.

English translation: With every new restriction on imports, we undermine the basis of our exports.

Restrictions provoke countermeasures from Germany’s principal markets. Nor are imports and exports equally dispensable: foreign customers can relatively easily forgo German goods, whereas Germany must retain certain imports, potentially obtaining them only by selling its own products at ruinously low prices. A falling import bill therefore cannot by itself demonstrate progress toward security. It can accompany a faster destruction of the export capacity needed to sustain essential supplies.

The trade figures make this warning concrete. Imports and exports were both approximately 13.5 billion marks in 1929; in 1931, imports had fallen to about 6.7 billion and exports to 9.6 billion. The first five months of 1932 showed a further contraction. Lederer emphasizes that exports were now declining faster than imports and projects that the annual export surplus might fall to no more than one billion marks, against nearly three billion in 1931. This is a forecast, not a reported full-year result. His concern is the shrinking volume of productive activity behind the balance:

Betrachten wir die Volkswirtschaft als Ganzes, so bedeutet diese Veränderung der Handelsbewegungen eine Verringerung des Arbeitsvolumens in der Volkswirtschaft.

English translation: If we consider the national economy as a whole, this change in trade flows means a reduction in the volume of work in the national economy.

The loss of foreign tourism further worsens the result. More fundamentally, reduced employment diminishes purchasing power until consumers cannot buy domestic agricultural products at remunerative prices. Protection therefore damages even the rural economy it promises to restore.

So hat uns das Streben nach Autarkie in einen falschen Zirkel hineingerissen, in dem Not und Elend sich nicht verringern können, bevor wir nicht eine Wendung in unserer Handelspolitik vollziehen.

English translation: Thus the pursuit of autarky has dragged us into a vicious circle in which hardship and misery cannot diminish until we change our trade policy.

The conclusion extends this destructive circle to foreign policy. A country withdrawing from international commerce loses political weight, particularly while others seek renewed economic connections through preferential arrangements. Lederer’s distinctive move is to treat international exchange as a foundation of national capacity, not its opposite. Autarky promises sovereignty but undermines employment, agricultural incomes, and diplomatic influence together. The article’s enduring analytical force lies in that connection: economic withdrawal cannot be judged by imports alone, and independence purchased by dismantling productive interdependence may amount to a destruction of power.