Richard Schüller, Review of Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, by Francis Deák (1943)

Richard Schüller’s book review assesses Deák’s documentary account of Hungary’s position at the Paris Peace Conference through two connected failures: the Allies’ inability to control the postwar settlement and Hungarian leaders’ inability to pursue realistic diplomatic objectives. Schüller values the book’s extensive published and unpublished evidence, while questioning its author’s impartiality. His review moves from the consequences of Allied commitments and military weakness to Hungarian negotiating errors, ending with unsuccessful efforts to secure French support through economic concessions.

The opening identifies the book’s contemporary relevance in the “unfortunate consequences” of wartime commitments to governments in exile. Schüller then concentrates on a practical problem: Allied authority in Hungary lacked the military means to enforce its decisions. Bolsheviks seized power; Marshal Foch used the Rumanian army to remove them; and that army subsequently occupied and looted Hungary despite Allied warnings.

The helpless representatives of the Allied governments kept the wires hot with reports of defiance by the Rumanians, Czechs and Yugoslavs; but their mission was a complete failure.

The contrast between continuous reporting and ineffective intervention gives this episode its force. Diplomatic communication could document defiance without stopping it. After the Rumanian withdrawal, the same absence of Allied troops allowed Admiral Horthy, whose 8,000 soldiers constituted the only military force in Budapest, to take control. Schüller presents the establishment of a reactionary government as an outcome the Supreme Council distrusted but lacked the means to prevent. The decisive distinction is between the powers’ expressed intentions and their capacity to shape events.

Schüller’s assessment of Deák’s historical judgment is more qualified. He doubts that the author has overcome his attachment to Hungary, yet credits that attachment with making the account vivid:

In this attempt he has naturally had little success, but his apparent affection for the Magyars adds warmth and vividness to his story.

This reservation does not lead Schüller to dismiss the evidence. On the contrary, he maintains that Deák’s presentation enables readers to recognize serious Hungarian mistakes. The first was refusing to recognize the Austro-Hungarian armistice of November 3, 1918, thereby incurring harsher terms on November 13. At Trianon, the delegates’ intelligence and personal charm likewise failed to compensate for their misunderstanding of Hungary’s position.

And in addition to minor gaffes, they were guilty of a fundamental strategic mistake in making a frontal attack on the peace treaty, instead of confining their case to those border areas where the Magyars had an undoubted majority.

Here Schüller distinguishes comprehensive opposition to the settlement from a narrower claim grounded in Magyar majorities. His criticism concerns the choice of negotiating strategy, not merely diplomatic manners. The review closes with Hungarian attempts to gain French governmental favor by offering railway and banking interests to French industrial and financial circles. Although France promised assistance in negotiations with Hungary’s neighbors, the hoped-for bloc with Rumania and Poland did not materialize; instead, the Little Entente emerged against Hungary. Schüller thus finds the book valuable both as an account of unenforceable Allied policy and as evidence of Hungary’s repeated misjudgment of its available leverage.