Felix Kaufmann on Valuation and Theory Construction (1941)

Felix Kaufmann’s journal book review assesses two contributions to the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science: John Dewey’s Theory of Valuation and J. H. Woodger’s The Technique of Theory Construction. Following an earlier review of the Encyclopedia’s first six booklets, Kaufmann notes that political conditions have delayed completion of its foundational volumes. He treats the two new monographs as important contributions, examining first the relation between values and practical inquiry, then the role of symbolic logic in comparing scientific theories. His judgments combine strong approval with reservations about the exclusion of philosophical alternatives and exaggerated expectations of formal methods.

Kaufmann commends Dewey’s clear exposition of pragmatic valuation, presenting its central results through a quotation from the monograph:

His chief results are: “(i) that the problem of valuation in general as well as in particular cases concerns things that sustain to one another the relation of means-ends; (ii) ends are determinable only on the ground of the means that are involved in bringing them about; and (iii) desires and interests must themselves be evaluated as means in their interaction with external or environing conditions” (p. 53).

On this account, ends cannot be assessed independently of the means required to realize them, and desires do not provide an unquestionable starting point for evaluation. They too must be appraised through their interaction with environmental conditions. Kaufmann praises the organization of Dewey’s argument and its criticism of both aprioristic and empiricistic doctrines. Although unwilling to endorse every argument without modification, he considers the monograph an exceptionally strong basis for further discussion.

His substantive reservation emerges from Dewey’s concluding discussion of valuation and social theory. Kaufmann highlights its diagnosis of the separation between affection and cognition as a source of social maladjustment, and its call for cultural conditions integrating emotions with ideas and desires with appraisals. He finds this practical ideal close to the moral aspirations of rationalistic philosophers since Plato. Their belief in transcendent, pre-established values need not exhaust the significance of their ethical thought:

But it is possible to reinterpret these doctrines by replacing the concept of pre-established values by that of ideals of, or regulative principles for, human conduct.

Kaufmann places Kant’s moral philosophy along this interpretive line. His objection is therefore qualified: he asks whether Dewey’s rejection of aprioristic value philosophies—and his criticism of Aristotelian logic—might have been less uncompromising had he considered this alternative reading. The conceptual move is to distinguish a doctrine’s metaphysical grounding from its possible function as a guide to conduct.

The review then turns to Woodger’s effort to facilitate scientific unification by expressing alternative theories in a common logical language. Woodger axiomatizes a biological discipline to demonstrate how the postulational method can disclose relations between theories. Kaufmann identifies the symbolism broadly with Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica, while noting Carnap’s influence on the distinction between theory and metatheory, itself a generalization of Hilbert’s distinction between mathematics and metamathematics.

Kaufmann acknowledges that the notation may initially intimidate readers unfamiliar with symbolic logic. Nevertheless, he judges its acquisition worthwhile for those engaged in methodological work. This recommendation does not imply that symbolism will revolutionize scientific thinking. He praises Woodger precisely for maintaining a proportionate view of its contribution:

The universal notation which he advocates is not intended to replace the major part of the activity of scientists, but it should serve the purpose "that the purely mechanical part of their theoretical work can be done by machines and the theoretical workers are set free to devote their energies to the important task of devising new hypotheses" (p. 80).

Formalization thus supports scientific creativity rather than substituting for it. Kaufmann anticipates particular difficulties in the social sciences, where many existing terms have vague meanings, but does not regard these obstacles as insurmountable. The review’s relevance lies in this discriminating endorsement of methodological clarification: pragmatic valuation offers a powerful framework without necessarily invalidating every rationalist insight, while logical notation aids comparison and mechanical reasoning without displacing the invention of hypotheses.