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The Science of Human Action

Ludwig Lachmann · 1951

The Science of Human Action

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Ludwig Lachmann, The Science of Human Action (1951)

Ludwig Lachmann’s review essay examines Ludwig von Mises’s Human Action through six connected discussions: methodology, mathematical economics, entrepreneurial knowledge, capital, trade cycles, and the political significance of economics. Admiring Mises’s intellectual courage and theoretical range, Lachmann nevertheless tests the coherence of his arguments. His central concern is how economics can explain purposeful action and market adjustment without reducing either to equilibrium relations. The essay’s distinctive contribution is to reconstruct entrepreneurship as the link between individual plans, changing knowledge, and the reorganisation of production.

Lachmann locates Mises’s methodological project in a tradition that defends both generalisation in social science and its independence from natural-scientific methods:

In reading this book we must never forget that it is the work of Max Weber that is being carried on here.

Weber opposed historians’ claims to a monopoly of explanation while treating means and ends as fundamental categories of action. Lachmann places Hayek, Schütz, and Robbins within this continuing project. Mises’s distinction between praxeology, the general science of action, and catallactics, the study of market phenomena grounded in monetary calculation, clarifies why the logic of choice extends beyond economics narrowly understood.

The difficult issue is praxeology’s claim to provide knowledge of reality through propositions valid independently of experience. Lachmann distinguishes observing action externally from understanding it internally as the execution of plans. Because action has an intelligible logical structure, reasoning can disclose something about it. Yet he avoids endorsing an unrestricted epistemological apriorism. Even if the distinction between means and ends originates in experience, it precedes the particular household and business experiences economists investigate. This distinction between layers of experience supports Mises’s methodological argument without settling the wider dispute between positivism and Neo-Kantianism.

The second section explains why an asserted affinity with logic and mathematics does not make Mises an advocate of mathematical economics. His targets are econometrics’ search for stable quantitative relationships and equilibrium theory’s displacement of the market process by a condition in which adjustment has ceased. Lachmann interprets this criticism through the contrast between functional relations and causal-genetic explanation:

In other words, all true economics is not "functional" but "causal-genetic".

Economics must make successive actions intelligible through the plans and thoughts generating them, rather than merely demonstrate the compatibility of a set of choices. Unlike physics, it possesses an understanding of the purposes behind the changes it studies. Equilibrium remains an auxiliary construction, not an adequate account of how agents move from incompatible plans towards coordination.

Lachmann then identifies a tension in this position. A theory of processes must explain how experience changes knowledge, but acquiring knowledge is not itself a logical operation. Mises’s explicit appeal to the division of labour does not resolve the problem: successful coordination already requires knowledge of others’ needs, resources, and abilities. Lachmann therefore reconstructs a stronger answer from Mises’s treatment of entrepreneurship. Profits communicate information, but their significance must be interpreted; entrepreneurs differ in their capacity to anticipate conditions and learn from events.

The essence of the matter is that the market process promotes the spreading of knowledge through the promotion of those capable of interpreting market data and of thus transforming them into market knowledge, and the elimination of those who cannot read the signs of the market.

Market adjustment thus changes not only prices but also the social distribution of economic authority. Lachmann connects entrepreneurial selection with Pareto’s circulation of elites. This is a qualified defence of Mises: the satisfactory account is implicit and scattered through the book, whereas the explicit methodological answer remains inadequate.

The discussions of capital and socialism extend this emphasis on active adjustment. Lachmann presents Mises’s capital theory as close to Hayek’s, rejecting Böhm-Bawerk’s wage-fund interpretation and backward-looking average period of production. Saving involves choosing among combinations of future goods with different maturity dates, not merely exchanging present consumption for a permanent income stream. Entrepreneurial activity also exceeds investment and output decisions: it continually regroups complementary capital assets. Socialist schemes that retain consumer markets while centralising investment overlook this transformation of the productive structure.

Capital heterogeneity likewise gives the Austrian trade-cycle theory its explanatory force. Credit expansion encourages plans whose complementary resources cannot all be supplied. The problem is malinvestment, not simply excessive investment in the aggregate. Comparing Mises with Hicks, Lachmann finds common ground in the physical limits to expansion, while stressing that Hicks’s homogeneous-capital framework obscures the uneven scarcities producing a downturn.

The core of the matter lies in this: the existence of unemployment and idle resources does not necessarily indicate “lack of effective demand”; it may indicate lack of complementary capital.

Recovery may therefore require reshuffling existing capital combinations rather than indiscriminate investment. Lachmann does not exclude underconsumption crises, and treats disagreements about secondary deflation as potentially dependent on the particular case. His argument favours explanatory plurality over a single universal model.

The final section endorses Mises’s opposition to egalitarian ideology and his account of education as transmitting established knowledge rather than producing entrepreneurial originality. Lachmann links increasing specialisation to unequal, less substitutable contributions and presents economic understanding as indispensable to industrial civilisation. The review’s lasting conceptual interest, however, lies in its qualified reconstruction of market coordination: purposeful plans become socially effective through interpretation, entrepreneurial selection, and the continual recombination of heterogeneous resources.

Sections

This work was divided into 5 sections when it entered the library's research corpus—an apparatus for search and citation, not necessarily the author's own table of contents. Each title opens its summary.

  1. 1Introduction: Reviewing Mises’s Human Action▾
  2. 2Section I: Praxeology, Catallactics, and the Foundations of Economic Knowledge▾
  3. 3Sections II–III: Mathematical Economics, Market Processes, and Entrepreneurial Knowledge▾
  4. 4Sections IV–V: Capital Structure, Socialist Calculation, and Trade-Cycle Theory▾
  5. 5Section VI: Inequality, Education, and the Social Importance of Economics▾

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