Felix Somary’s discussion intervention, originally published in proceedings in 1918 and preserved here as the complete contribution on pages 85–87, examines a one-time wealth levy through its effects on postwar production. Responding to Diehl, Zwiedineck, and Pierstorff, Somary moves from the timing of price adjustment to foreign trade, competition between established and new firms, and central-bank policy. His central argument is that the levy should be judged not simply as a burden on existing wealth, but as a possible means of restoring conditions for investment and international payment.
Somary begins by challenging the preference for gradual economic adjustment. He accepts that falling prices can threaten industrial investment, but asks whether a sudden fall would actually be more damaging than a prolonged decline. The immediate aftermath of peace offers, in his account, unusually favorable conditions for a rapid adjustment:
Zu keiner andern Zeit als zu der Zeit nach Friedensschluß hat ein Preissturz relativ so geringe Wirkung. Wir haben ja wenig Vorräte, keine großen Warenkredite, und Zusammenbrüche, die sonst bei Preissturz am meisten zu befürchten sind, würden darum nach Friedensschluß in großem Umfang nicht zu erwarten sein.
English translation: At no other time does a collapse in prices have relatively so little effect as in the period after peace is concluded. We have few inventories and no large amounts of trade credit, and bankruptcies, which are otherwise most to be feared when prices collapse, would therefore not be expected on a large scale after peace is concluded.
The argument is conditional on this depleted postwar economy, not a general endorsement of abrupt price falls. Small inventories and limited trade credit reduce the exposure that would ordinarily make such a collapse dangerous. Conversely, years of anticipated price declines would discourage investment, while continually falling wages would prolong social conflict. Somary thus reverses the apparent opposition between a disruptive immediate adjustment and a reassuring gradual transition: gradualism itself can paralyze industry and labor.
His second move connects productivity with external balance. Agreeing with Zwiedineck, he expects the levy to improve the balance of payments. At prevailing prices, a favorable trade balance—especially with countries important for currency relations—would be difficult to achieve. Export recovery requires a reduction in production costs:
Die Steigerung der Exportfähigkeit läßt sich unter den so vielfach erhöhten Schwierigkeiten des Auslandabsatzes nur bei relativ niedrigeren Produktionskosten erreichen, die bei den gegenwärtigen Phantasiepreisen nicht erzielbar sind.
English translation: Given the greatly increased difficulties of selling abroad, export capacity can be increased only through relatively lower production costs, which cannot be achieved at the present fantastical prices.
Exporting capital offers no immediate substitute. Somary considers substantial foreign investment unlikely in the first postwar years, apart from investments in allied countries. Later investment abroad would itself require a preceding period of favorable payments balances to generate the necessary capital. His reasoning makes restored competitiveness a prerequisite for renewed international financial expansion.
Turning to implementation, Somary maintains that financing can be organized without state participation in enterprises or state intervention in goods production, though he does not develop that organization here. He then grants Pierstorff’s objection that taxing existing enterprises alone could confer a protective advantage on new firms. Yet this advantage must be weighed against the incumbents’ accumulated war profits, better position in difficult credit conditions, and expected preferential access to raw materials during the transition. The levy is therefore unlikely to overcome the barriers facing new enterprises or produce a strong wave of business formation.
The intervention culminates in monetary policy. Somary expects the levy’s strongest effect to concern international credit: relieving the central bank’s burdens could restore its ability to conduct discount policy once international money markets reopen. The Reichsbank would again be affected by developments in London and the American Federal Reserve system, even with only limited international payments. Its capacity to respond matters directly for production:
Aber wenn die einmalige Vermögensabgabe auch nur bewirkt, daß die Zentralnotenbank überhaupt Diskontpolitik treiben kann, und daß volle internationale Zahlungsfähigkeit möglichst bald nach Friedensschluß erreicht wird, wird sie die Entwicklung der Produktion in entscheidender Weise beeinflussen.
English translation: But even if the one-time wealth levy merely enables the central bank to conduct discount policy at all, and ensures that full international payment capacity is achieved as soon as possible after peace is concluded, it will decisively influence the development of production.
Somary’s contribution links fiscal reconstruction to productive recovery through prices, trade, and monetary capacity. Its distinctive claim is that taxing wealth may support investment indirectly by shortening uncertainty and restoring the financial conditions under which production can resume.
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