[Diskussionsbeitrag zum Kohlenbergbau, Bd. I, S. 305–306, Nr. 18]

Emil Lederer: Discussion contribution on coal mining (1920)

This official commission speaking turn examines two problems of coal-price regulation: the allocation of profitability within integrated enterprises and the effectiveness of premiums intended to encourage economical production. Lederer proceeds tentatively, asking for clarification rather than presenting a finished scheme.

His first question concerns enterprises combining coal mining with further processing. If higher production costs automatically yield higher profits under the pricing arrangement, might the resulting gain permit lower profitability in the processing branch and higher profitability in the coal operation?

Das wäre dann nur eine rechnungsmäßige Verschiebung.

English translation: That would then be merely an accounting shift.

The question distinguishes a redistribution of recorded profitability between branches from a substantive economic change. Lederer then requests a worked practical example showing whether a premium could be large enough—while respecting consumers’ interests—to outweigh the incentive to increase production costs.

Der Anreiz der Prämie muß größer sein, als der Anreiz, die Selbstkosten zu steigern.

English translation: The incentive provided by the premium must be greater than the incentive to increase production costs.

This comparison is the intervention’s central criterion: a premium is effective only if it overcomes the contrary incentive embedded in cost-based pricing. Lederer closes by locating these concerns within wartime economic conditions. Under normal conditions, he argues, economically appropriate price formation does not require such safeguards. The contribution thus links accounting scrutiny to incentive design while questioning the continuing necessity of wartime regulatory precautions.