Emil Lederer · 1920
This official commission speaking turn addresses the institutional problem of setting coal prices during the transition to a socialized economy. Lederer announces two remarks, but the supplied passage develops the question of price-setting authority: why the Reich government should exercise it provisionally, and why the Reich Economic Council would be an unsuitable substitute. His central distinction is between institutions needed for a limited initial socialization and those appropriate to an economy whose principal sectors have been socialized.
Erstens: die Festsetzung der Kohlenpreise durch die Reichsregierung ist nicht eine für immer gedachte Bestimmung, sondern nur für so lange, als die Sozialisierung eben lediglich ganz wenige Zweige, zunächst nur den Kohlenbergbau, begreift.
English translation: First: the setting of coal prices by the Reich government is not a provision intended to last forever, but only for as long as socialization encompasses just a very few sectors, initially only coal mining.
Governmental authority thus fills an institutional gap rather than defining the permanent organization of socialization. Once the economy’s supporting sectors have been socialized, Lederer envisages an overarching organ above that economic structure, to which coal-price decisions would more appropriately pass. The immediate question is which existing body can act in its absence.
Da stimme ich überein, daß ich den Reichswirtschaftsrat für ungeeignet halte, weil ich nicht sehe, wie er Beschlüsse finden soll.
English translation: On that point I agree that I consider the Reich Economic Council unsuitable, because I do not see how it is to arrive at decisions.
The objection concerns the basis of decision-making, not simply administrative efficiency. Lederer rejects resolution through majority domination and questions whether the council’s distribution of votes meaningfully measures economic interests. His contrast between theatrical representatives and municipalities exposes the distance between successfully obtaining representation and possessing a substantial stake in coal policy. The council has not rationalized different economic influences into a defensible common weighting.
He then strengthens the argument by considering even an ideally constituted council. Representation calibrated to an interest’s general economic importance would still fail to capture its specific dependence on coal. Different industries have different requirements; construction supplies his example of a heavy coal user. General economic representation therefore cannot automatically justify authority over this particular price.
Nun ist die Kohlenpreisfrage eine solche, aber die Sonderinteressen der Verbraucher sind doch sehr verschieden, und da ist jede Industrie ganz anders.
English translation: Now the question of coal prices is such a question, but consumers’ particular interests are nevertheless very different, and each industry is quite different in this respect.
The final objection is structural: the council rests on the existing distribution and separation of interests, precisely what the proposed plan seeks to transform. Lederer’s contribution makes socialization a problem of institutional design as well as ownership. Its significance lies in distinguishing provisional state authority from a future coordinating organ, while refusing to equate representation of existing interests with a sound basis for governing a transformed economy.
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