Emil Lederer: Discussion Contribution on Coal Mining (1920)

This attributed speaking turn in official commission proceedings concerns the institutional design of socialized coal mining. Lederer responds to a proposal granting the government authority to approve coal prices and organizing the industry through four representative groups, or Kurien. His argument moves from political responsibility for pricing to the collective ownership principle underlying representation, then to the choice between neutral arbitration and negotiated compromise. Its central claim is that socialization requires both governmental influence and an organization representing the wider economy; neither fiscal pressures nor conflicts of interest can simply be eliminated by changing the institutional wording.

Lederer begins by questioning the discussion’s emphasis:

Ich habe die Empfindung, daß auf die Preisfrage zu starkes Gewicht gelegt wird.

English translation: I have the impression that too much weight is being placed on the question of prices.

He acknowledges that the Reich government might raise coal prices to avoid unpopular tax legislation. But this would be a political decision for which it must answer to parliament. Socialization cannot deny influence to the government as the central leadership of the national economy. Given the fiscal situation, granting that influence also entails a risk of overextension; the Reichstag supplies the political counterweight. Lederer further observes that the existing coal tax already permits financial surpluses to be extracted from coal. His point is not that price policy is harmless, but that its fiscal uses arise from the political situation and cannot be abolished through alternative formulations of the scheme.

The constructive center of the intervention is his explanation of whom the socialized industry should serve:

Der Grundgedanke ist der, einen Körper zu schaffen, in dem sämtliche volkswirtschaftlichen Kräfte zur Vertretung gelangen, weil der Kohlenbergbau nicht den im Betrieb Beschäftigten, sondern der Allgemeinheit gehören soll.

English translation: The basic idea is to create a body in which all the forces of the national economy are represented, because coal mining is to belong not to those employed in the enterprise, but to the community as a whole.

This distinguishes public ownership from ownership by the workforce. The four representative groups are trustees of the whole community, for whose benefit the companies and their means of production have been expropriated. Representation therefore expresses a conception of collective entitlement, not merely a division of administrative offices. Those directly engaged in production must participate, but cannot exhaust the interests that socialization is supposed to recognize.

Within this framework, Lederer is willing to adjust the distribution of seats. He supports Neustedt’s suggestion to reduce representation of final consumers and increase that of consuming industries, mentioning distributions of fifteen and ten, or even twenty and five. Such adjustments remain compatible with the proposal’s governing principle. A different issue arises with a scheme, associated with Neustedt or Cohen, assigning approximately forty percent to producers, twenty percent to consuming industries, twenty percent to the last-mentioned group, and twenty percent to a neutral stratum. That last group would become a permanent arbitrator, deciding between opposing interests.

Lederer doubts whether the required combination of neutrality, expertise, and commitment to the general interest can reliably be found:

Ich traue mich nicht, einen Vorschlag in dieser Richtung zu machen, weil ich nicht weiß, aber bezweifle, ob es eine solche neutrale, sachkundige und die Allgemeininteressen wahrnehmende Persönlichkeitsgruppe oder solche Persönlichkeiten geben würde.

English translation: I do not venture to make a proposal in this direction because I do not know, but doubt, whether there would be such a group of individuals, or such individuals, who are neutral, knowledgeable, and safeguard the general interests.

He specifically questions the suitability of representatives from technical higher-education institutions. Their decisions, he fears, might reflect the force with which arguments are presented rather than their actual weight. Technical standing does not by itself establish the capacity to arbitrate social interests.

His preferred solution is consequently to bring the opposing parties together and require them to reach a compromise. Each should possess enough power to prevent being overridden, or at least be placed in a position that makes cooperation necessary. Though willing to accommodate alternatives, Lederer favors an institutional balance of interested parties over an assumed impartial authority. The intervention’s significance lies in this distinction: collective ownership supplies the public purpose, parliamentary accountability checks governmental power, and organized bargaining provides a practical means of reconciling the interests within the socialized industry.