Emil Lederer: Discussion contribution on the potash industry (1921)

This recorded commission speaking turn, published on pages 323–324, supplements Lederer’s earlier remarks on the feasibility and implementation of full socialization in the potash industry. Its argument moves from the organization of production to the conditions of foreign competition. Lederer treats socialization as a conditional response to demonstrable failures of private organization, while distinguishing the loss of price-setting power from the danger of being unable to sell output.

The first issue is the closure of works and the future organization of private enterprise. Agreeing with Wissell, Lederer finds that Prentzel’s explanation has not resolved the discrepancy between “80 Werken” and “10%”; the contribution does not supply enough context to reconstruct those figures independently. His substantive question is whether entrenched corporate structures obstruct economically desirable transfers of production quotas and the absorption of works:

Wenn tatsächlich die Festfahrung in den privatwirtschaftlichen Körpern sehr groß, die Übertragung der Quoten aus einem Konzern in den andern, die sonst zweckmäßig wäre, die Aufsaugung der Werke, die volkswirtschaftlich notwendig ist, nicht möglich wäre, wenn wir also zur Überzeugung kommen sollten, daß das Optimum durch die Privatwirtschaft nicht erzielt würde, dann würde das ein sehr starkes Argument für die Vollsozialisierung sein.

English translation: If entrenchment within privately organized economic entities were indeed very great, if the transfer of quotas from one corporate group to another, which would otherwise be expedient, and the absorption of works, which is necessary for the economy as a whole, were impossible, if we therefore came to the conclusion that private enterprise would not achieve the optimum, then that would be a very strong argument for full socialization.

The conditional construction is decisive: Lederer identifies a test for socialization rather than announcing that its necessity has already been established. The relevant standard is the economy-wide optimum, not the preservation of existing firms or corporate boundaries.

He then accepts Vogelstein’s claim that circumstances have changed completely since 1910, but shifts the emphasis:

Gewiß gebe ich Herrn Dr. Vogelstein darin vollkommen recht, daß die Situation gegenüber 1910 vollständig verschieden ist, aber verschieden vielleicht weniger nach der Richtung des Auslandsabsatzes, als weil die Möglichkeit der Preisdiktatur nicht mehr gegeben ist, wie sie in früherer Zeit gegeben war.

English translation: Certainly I agree entirely with Dr. Vogelstein that the situation is completely different from that of 1910, but perhaps different less with respect to foreign sales than because the possibility of dictating prices no longer exists as it did in earlier times.

Lederer is comparatively less pessimistic about foreign sales. Establishing Alsatian production and sales organization would entail high costs, partially offsetting the danger of price undercutting. He qualifies this reasoning by noting that factories are not required where raw salts are used, and leaves competitive promotional methods as a separate concern.

The closing exchange preserves the limits of his judgment. Lederer invokes the chairman’s figures to suggest that unsold output is not the principal danger; Vogelstein interjects that this is itself a question of price. Lederer’s reply acknowledges the difficulty of reaching a definitive position. The contribution’s significance lies in these distinctions: institutional rigidity may justify socialization, while stronger competition need not imply the disappearance of export demand.