William Emmanuel Rappard · 1941
William Emmanuel Rappard’s contribution to the University of Pennsylvania Bicentennial Conference reconstructs the Swiss reception of American federalism between 1798 and 1848. Its subject is not simply constitutional resemblance but the transmission, resistance, and eventual adoption of an institutional solution. Through pamphlets, correspondence, newspapers, and official proceedings, Rappard shows how bicameral federalism reconciled demands that had repeatedly defeated Swiss constitutional reform: national government grounded in population and the preservation of cantonal autonomy. His opening expression of gratitude to Philadelphia develops into a less celebratory account of borrowing under pressure.
The essay proceeds chronologically through revolution, Restoration, democratic “Regeneration,” prolonged constitutional deadlock, and the settlement of 1848. French intervention in 1798 destroyed the old league of sovereign cantons and imposed a centralized Helvetic Republic. Its principles of liberty and equality survived, but its foreign origin discredited centralization and bicameral legislation alike. The resulting controversy initially opposed liberal “Unitarians,” dependent on French support, to “Federalists” seeking renewed cantonal sovereignty. Rappard carefully distinguishes these Swiss labels from their American counterparts: Swiss Federalists resisted precisely the central power that American Federalists supported.
American institutions entered this controversy as a contested example rather than an authoritative blueprint. Jean-Jacques Cart admired American republican simplicity but thought federal machinery disproportionate to Switzerland’s small territory. Other critics questioned its stability or suitability for a vulnerable European country. Moderate supporters, meanwhile, saw a middle course between centralized government and the restoration of privilege. Rappard finds their enthusiasm historically consequential but frequently ill-informed: one advocate relied on the discarded Articles of Confederation rather than the existing Constitution.
The authors are obviously advocates and not scholars.
This distinction governs Rappard’s handling of the early evidence. References to America establish its presence in Swiss political imagination, but do not necessarily demonstrate accurate institutional knowledge. He checks claims against their alleged sources and separates admiration for American prosperity from understanding of its constitutional causes. The Act of Mediation of 1803 nevertheless restored cantonal self-government while strengthening federal authority, producing what he regards as Switzerland’s first genuinely federal state.
The Restoration settlement of 1815 weakened the common authority and restored aristocratic influence under Allied pressure. America consequently changed political meaning. A model previously attacked as insufficiently centralized could now justify stronger national institutions against a loose confederation. After the cantonal democratic revolutions of 1830, constitutional reform combined three pressures: the need for effective national representation abroad, the wish to protect and extend liberal gains, and economic demands to remove internal tolls and incompatible currencies and measures. Yet even reformers hesitated to surrender their own cantons’ independence. Linguistic minorities feared German-speaking predominance, while conservative Catholic cantons feared liberal and anticlerical intervention.
Rappard follows reform along two distinct tracks: public advocacy and negotiation within the federal Diet. The cautious Rossi project of 1832–1833 failed to reconcile them. Retaining equal cantonal representation alienated liberals unwilling to let a minority of inhabitants govern the majority, without securing conservative acceptance. Against this background, Ignaz Paul Vital Troxler developed the case for representing citizens and constituent states through separate chambers. His argument appears in Rappard’s English rendering:
The federal state alone reconciles two apparently contradictory principles and satisfies alike two opposite sets of claims . . .
Troxler’s conceptual move was to make national unity and cantonal diversity complementary principles rather than mutually exclusive sovereignties. Rappard traces its dissemination through Karl Kasthofer’s popular exposition, Thomas Bornhauser’s political dialogue, and James Fazy’s journalism and constitutional proposals. He also preserves differences among reformers: Henri Druey favored centralization but resisted bicameralism, whereas Fazy valued the second chamber as an essential feature. Archival investigation into conservative officers’ reform proposals further shows that admiration for America crossed political boundaries without implying agreement about which American institutions Switzerland needed.
The decisive breakthrough followed the defeat of the Sonderbund in 1847. In the drafting committee of 1848, neither defenders of the old Diet nor supporters of population-based representation could impose their preferred arrangement. Bicameralism emerged from this impasse, despite limited enthusiasm for it.
The bicameral proposal is explained as being, not indeed welcome, but at least acceptable to both friends and foes of the existing system.
The National Council gave populous cantons their representative chamber; the Council of States preserved equality among cantons. American experience demonstrated that such an arrangement could work, but Swiss adoption depended on reciprocal concessions and the changed circumstances after civil war. Borrowing remained selective: the committee rejected a popularly elected president as incompatible with Swiss habits and dangerously suggestive of monarchy or dictatorship.
Rappard does not conceal the settlement’s coercive foundation. The Constitution took effect over dissenting cantons’ objections that the existing pact required unanimous consent. Its subsequent acceptance therefore matters more to his argument than any claim of original unanimity. Institutions initially resisted as foreign became durable guarantees of Swiss political life.
What is of universal interest, however, is the lesson it teaches, the political lesson of how general union can be combined with local freedom.
The conclusion turns constitutional history toward the contemporary world war. Switzerland’s experience suggests that federation can replace relations of rivalry and force with common legal institutions without extinguishing local freedom. Rappard’s larger claim rests on the difficulty of the transfer: a workable federal order need not begin as anyone’s preferred solution, provided it reconciles interests that no unilateral settlement can accommodate.
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