Friedrich Engel-Janosi, “The Roman Question in the First Years of Benedict XV” (1954)

Friedrich Engel-Janosi’s historical article reconstructs Vatican approaches to reconciliation with the Kingdom of Italy from the late pontificate of Pius X through the summer of 1916. Drawing principally on Austrian diplomatic documents, it argues that Benedict XV actively explored accommodation with Italy while seeking guarantees of the Holy See’s independence. The Roman Question emerges less as an unchanging demand for restored territory than as a problem of sovereignty, international standing, and institutional freedom. The evidence also exposes Austria-Hungary’s ambivalence: a monarchy ostensibly committed to papal independence feared that reconciliation would diminish its influence and strengthen Italy.

The opening establishes the political inheritance of Benedict’s pontificate. Engel-Janosi rejects the assumption that Pius X lacked political interests, distinguishing his reduced antagonism toward the Italian kingdom from Leo XIII’s later policy. Pius’s friendliness toward Austria-Hungary accompanied distrust of Serbia; Austrian reports contradict accounts of his condemning the monarchy’s action in 1914. Yet improved Vatican–Italian relations troubled Vienna. Having complained about the unresolved conflict since 1870, Austrian diplomats now feared the “Italianisation” of the Curia. Their proposals for internationalizing its personnel and the College of Cardinals linked ecclesiastical universality to national diplomatic interests. In the 1914 conclave, Austria avoided a formal veto but worked against candidates associated with Italian nationalism.

Engel-Janosi then traces conciliatory possibilities already discussed under Pius X. Catholic political participation and public debate about temporal power created openings without committing the Vatican to a particular settlement. Merry del Val contemplated an agreement between the pope and the powers, with Italy entrusted to uphold it. This recognized Italy’s special position while retaining an international framework. Benedict inherited these possibilities, but war made their exploration urgent. His diplomatic training, Italian political contacts, and initially favorable relations with Austria supported efforts to preserve Italian neutrality. Italy’s entry into the war nevertheless exposed the vulnerability of the Holy See: the departure of Central Powers diplomats from Rome restricted its international relations.

The apprehensions of former years, that a participation of Italy in an international conflagration would greatly increase the difficulties of the Holy See, had now materialized.

War thus sharpened the distinction between the pope’s international responsibilities and his practical dependence on conditions within Italy. Benedict’s pursuit of neutrality served humanitarian and spiritual purposes, but also the protection of his own institution. Austrian observers increasingly believed that he sought a permanent settlement through direct accommodation with the Italian government.

The information received revealed that the plans of Benedict XV did not aim at winning back any territory, or at vindicating any material advantages, but rather at increasing and insuring his independence, his rights as sovereign, and as supreme teacher of the Church.

This distinction between territorial restoration and effective sovereignty is the article’s central conceptual move. German demands for restored temporal power did not necessarily express Vatican objectives. Reports of Benedict’s intentions, together with Gasparri’s moderate public statements, suggested that Italian consent rather than foreign military intervention offered the preferred route. Engel-Janosi nevertheless preserves an important evidentiary qualification: Gasparri categorically denied negotiations in November 1915, and the Austrian chargé d’affaires, Count Pálffy, could not determine the denial’s precise scope. Diplomatic expectations therefore cannot simply be treated as proof of an agreed negotiating process.

The Austrian response reveals why reconciliation was not an uncomplicated Catholic diplomatic objective. Pálffy anticipated that a bilateral settlement would deprive Austria of credit for achieving peace between Vatican and Quirinal, accelerate the papacy’s Italian orientation, and strengthen Italy through Catholic political mobilization. His conclusion makes the divergence between confessional solidarity and state interest explicit:

"Thus such an understanding," he stated, "would not be agreeable to us from a political angle."

Vienna rejected his proposed interference, but retained hopes of influencing the outcome at a postwar congress. The guarantee question remained unsettled: a bilateral agreement might still require international protection, while external guarantees could themselves expose papal independence to intervention. Prince Schönburg consequently suggested Italian recognition of the pope’s existing sovereignty over Vatican territory rather than substantial territorial enlargement. Engel-Janosi presents this as the ambassador’s personal proposal, not an adopted Vatican program.

The final sections explain why apparent openings produced no settlement within the period studied. The Vatican learned in December 1915 of the Treaty of London provision committing Britain and France to support Italy in excluding the Holy See from peace diplomacy—earlier than the treaty’s publication following the Russian Revolution. This revelation damaged prospects for accommodation. Catholic discussion meanwhile generated competing schemes rather than agreement, and attempts to organize neutral-country opinion yielded no demonstrable breakthrough.

The Curia had changed its attitude and had now taken the initiative itself.

That judgment captures the article’s conclusion without implying that Benedict possessed a finalized solution. Ending with the cautiously reported tradition that reconciliation remained his dying wish, Engel-Janosi identifies the early pontificate as an important stage in rethinking the Roman Question. Its significance lies in showing how papal sovereignty could be separated from territorial recovery—and how Austrian diplomatic evidence illuminates that transition while remaining shaped by Austria’s own anxieties and incomplete knowledge.