Richard Schüller’s journal article examines Austrian commercial policy as a necessary complement to postwar financial reconstruction. It moves from the balance of payments to foreign barriers against Austrian exports, then to tariff reform and prospective trade negotiations. Its central argument is that international credit can provide temporary relief, but lasting recovery requires improved trading conditions and a stronger external balance.
Schüller begins with the decline in Austria’s merchandise trade deficit from approximately 800 million gold crowns in 1921 to 540 million in 1922. He distinguishes this deficit from the broader balance of payments: tourism, foreign-currency earnings of merchants and banks, income from assets abroad, and foreign credits offset the excess of imports. Nevertheless, an overall balance that was not negative remained insufficient after Austria’s wartime and postwar capital losses. The League of Nations loan would provide a substantial surplus for two years while imposing long-term interest and repayment obligations.
Es kommt darauf an, während dieser zwei Jahre nicht nur unser Budget zu sanieren, sondern auch unsere Zahlungsbilanz aktiv zu gestalten.
English translation: What matters is that during these two years we not only put our budget in order but also bring our balance of payments into surplus.
The loan thus creates a limited opportunity for structural improvement, not proof that recovery has been achieved. Schüller places the principal obstacle abroad: France, Italy, and Spain still subject Austrian goods to discriminatory tariff treatment. He identifies a contradiction between international financial assistance and commercial exclusion.
Es ist paradox, daß die Staaten, die sich um die wirtschaftliche Wiederaufrichtung Österreichs bemühen und dafür Kredite und Garantien zur Verfügung stellen, zur gleichen Zeit die österreichischen Waren durch eine differenzielle Behandlung von ihren Märkten ausschließen.
English translation: It is paradoxical that the states striving for Austria’s economic recovery and providing credits and guarantees for that purpose simultaneously exclude Austrian goods from their markets through discriminatory treatment.
This contradiction supplies a diplomatic argument for reform. Schüller expects negotiations to remove discriminatory treatment, particularly as Austria’s treaty-imposed obligation to grant unilateral most-favoured-nation treatment expires on 16 July 1923. Yet equal treatment alone cannot overcome tariffs raised to prohibitive levels. Reciprocal reductions are essential, and Austria has not yet concluded a single tariff agreement securing them.
The argument also turns inward. Austria lacks a definitive tariff adapted to its changed economic circumstances. Existing duties protect some goods that Austria does not produce or that need no protection, while other domestic industries receive insufficient support. Schüller’s position is therefore selective rather than uniformly free-trading: protection can be justified where increased production outweighs the burden imposed on consumption.
Man hilft da oft mit Einfuhrverboten aus, die eine plumpe und volkswirtschaftlich viel ungünstiger wirkende Methode des Schutzes darstellen.
English translation: Recourse is often had here to import prohibitions, which constitute a crude method of protection with much more adverse effects on the national economy.
His distinction concerns instruments as well as objectives. Suitable tariffs could support production and facilitate bargaining; prohibitions obstruct exchange more bluntly. Because new tariffs will take time, he endorses negotiations under existing schedules. Quota agreements can mitigate prohibitions maintained especially by Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, but remain inadequate substitutes for their abolition. Foreign-exchange restrictions create comparable obstacles. He rejects Hungary’s currency-based justification for restricting Austrian exports because the bilateral balance favours Hungary, warning that continued restrictions would further diminish already limited trade.
The conclusion combines clearly defined aims—most-favoured-nation treatment, tariff reductions, and the removal or mitigation of prohibitions—with cautious optimism about negotiations with Italy, Czechoslovakia, and France. The article’s significance lies in connecting fiscal reconstruction to the commercial conditions that could sustain it: foreign lending cannot secure recovery if creditors simultaneously impede the recipient’s exports.
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