Alfred Amonn, Sozialisierung (1919)

Alfred Amonn’s economic-policy article examines the meaning and feasibility of socialization after the German revolution. It moves from conceptual clarification to institutional alternatives and the constraints of postwar reconstruction. Revolutionary power, in his account, does not itself establish either a workable organization of socialist production or the economic conditions for introducing it.

Die Revolution hat in Deutschland plötzlich ein Thema in den Mittelpunkt der wirtschaftspolitischen Diskussion gerückt, von dem man vorher in weiten Kreisen nicht geglaubt hätte, daß es überhaupt je einmal ernstlich zur Diskussion stehen würde.

English translation: The revolution has in Germany suddenly placed at the center of economic-policy discussion a theme of which wide circles would previously not have believed that it would ever seriously come up for discussion at all.

Amonn distinguishes the desirability of socialization, which depends on political will, from predictions about its general consequences, which remain matters of judgment. He concentrates instead on the question he considers susceptible to scientific examination: how far, and through which institutions, socialization is presently possible. That inquiry first requires a definition.

Weder der Ausdruck „Vergesellschaftung der Produktionsmittel“, wie noch weniger der Ausdruck „Sozialisierung“ hat einen bestimmten, klaren, eindeutigen positiven Inhalt.

English translation: Neither the expression "socialization of the means of production" (Vergesellschaftung) nor, still less, the expression "socialization" (Sozialisierung) has a definite, clear, unambiguous positive content.

These slogans specify the displacement of private control more readily than its replacement. Giving them positive content requires identifying the organs through which society would direct economic activity. The breadth of the projected transfer makes this institutional question decisive:

Die „Gesellschaft“ soll künftiglich verfügen, was mit den Produktionsmitteln zu geschehen hat, was produziert wird, wie produziert wird, wieviel produziert wird und wie das Produkt verteilt wird.

English translation: "Society" is henceforth to decide what is to happen with the means of production, what is produced, how it is produced, how much is produced, and how the product is distributed.

Amonn first considers nationalization. He argues that state bureaucracy has demonstrated competence chiefly in relatively simple, stable enterprises with secure supplies and markets. He then examines state participation through share ownership, the capitalization of reserves, or a wealth levy paid in ownership claims. Such “Durchstaatlichung” would extend public influence over management and profits while retaining private entrepreneurial initiative.

Neither arrangement fully expresses what he understands as socialization in its positive socialist sense. This would establish an administration independent of both the state and private capital, with substantial representation for workers and salaried employees. Yet the constitution of that governing body remains unresolved. The problem is therefore not merely who owns productive assets, but who makes decisions and under what authority. The allocation of earnings presents a parallel difficulty: employee participation and possible state claims must leave room for investment and reserves.

Compensation and continuity of production form the next practical test. Although Amonn regards confiscation as consistent with socialist logic, he argues that announcing uncompensated expropriation would destroy owners’ incentive to maintain enterprises during the transition. Russia supplies his warning example. Compensation would consequently need to be assured, while its form and financing—capital payment, annuity, borrowing, taxation, or claims on future enterprise income—would still require settlement. He also separates the active entrepreneur from the passive shareholder: abolishing private capital’s authority does not eliminate the need for entrepreneurial abilities, which a new administration must preserve.

The argument then turns to Germany’s immediate economic predicament. War damage and dependence on foreign credit make reconstruction a prerequisite for general socialization. Amonn maintains that attracting foreign capital requires postponement, while existing foreign investments cannot simply be socialized without risking external intervention. Dependence on foreign markets imposes further limits. Domestic political authority thus operates within international economic relationships it cannot unilaterally abolish.

He reads the caution of Ebert, Eisner, and the official socialization commission in this light. The commission’s protection of export industries, foreign trade, and banking, together with its identification of monopolized raw materials and large landed properties as possible candidates, points toward selective reform rather than immediate general transformation.

Finally, Amonn relates these limits to Marx and Engels’s account of capitalist concentration. Much production remains too fragmented to satisfy the anticipated conditions for socialist reorganization; consolidation therefore becomes a preparatory task. His conclusion is conditional: immediate general socialization lacks both settled administrative mechanisms and adequate economic prerequisites. The article shifts the debate from revolutionary authorization to the concrete organization of authority, incentives, investment, and international dependence.