Alfred Amonn, Zu Oppenheimers Neubegründung der objektiven Wertlehre II (1926)

Amonn’s article continues his debate with Franz Oppenheimer over the foundations of objective value theory. Its central concern is the difference between defining economic equilibrium and explaining the forces that produce it. Amonn accepts statics as a methodological fiction, but denies that its definition alone establishes income-maximizing behavior, the equalization of incomes, or the relative valuation of different kinds of labor.

The opening separates equilibrium from its determining conditions. Neither the pursuit of maximum income nor the pursuit of the best exchange terms follows necessarily from the concept of statics:

Ein solcher Gleichgewichtszustand ist meiner Ansicht nach unter mehreren verschiedenen Bedingungen — alternativ — möglich.

English translation: Such a state of equilibrium is in my view possible under several different conditions — alternatively.

This distinction shifts the burden of argument from conceptual consistency to empirical explanation. The existence of opposing forces does not by itself establish the particular equilibrium toward which they move. Their character and effectiveness must be investigated:

Denn wir haben es mit einem System empirischer Kräfte zu tun und nur aus der Untersuchung der empirischen Wirksamkeit dieser Kräfte können wir erkennen, welcher Art das Gleichgewicht ist, auf das hin sie tendieren.

English translation: For we are dealing with a system of empirical forces, and only from the investigation of the empirical efficacy of these forces can we recognize of what kind the equilibrium is toward which they tend.

Amonn consequently distinguishes legitimate abstraction from the elevation of a partially effective motive into a universally dominant force. Income maximization plainly influences conduct, but that does not prove that it governs every producer’s choice of occupation and effort. Seeking the best return for a given performance differs from choosing that performance exclusively to maximize income. A producer can seek the best price for what is offered without choosing the most lucrative occupation or quantity of work. Amonn considers this narrower assumption more generally applicable, while leaving its complete universality unresolved.

Occupational choice gives the objection concrete form. Someone capable of demanding, well-paid work may knowingly prefer easier, less remunerative employment. Such a choice need not demonstrate deficient information, courage, or ability: the additional income may simply fail to compensate, in that person’s estimation, for the additional effort. Inferring inferior qualification from lower earnings therefore confuses capacity with its exercise.

This distinction also undermines an analytical derivation of equal incomes for equally qualified producers. If actual earnings and occupational choice are already incorporated into the definition of qualification, the purported explanation merely retrieves what the definition presupposed. Invoking the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, Amonn insists that economic deduction requires empirically grounded premises to explain its object. Replacing one equilibrium formula with another does not supply the missing causal account:

Aber mehr ist uns auch nicht gesagt, wenn wir an Stelle der Formel von der „Ausgleichstendenz der Preise“ die von der „Ausgleichstendenz der Einkommen“ setzen.

English translation: But no more is told us either if we put in place of the formula of the "tendency toward equalization of prices" that of the "tendency toward equalization of incomes."

The later discussion differentiates the seriousness of these objections. Amonn allows that income maximization may be widespread enough to support approximate results. More troublesome are the undefined standards of “average qualification” and “normal income.” The case of differently qualified producers working in the same marginal mine requires an independent criterion for identifying the normal producer; calling the marginal producer average leaves the position of below-average producers unexplained.

The deepest difficulty concerns heterogeneous skilled labor that ordinary labor cannot replace. Oppenheimer treats its relative valuations, established through social norms and occupational competition, as fixed data for statics. Amonn argues that a general value theory must explain precisely these valuations. Once labor values are assumed, calculating product values becomes an addition problem. The theory’s possible achievement is consequently narrower than its general claim: it may explain exchange ratios among products of normally qualified labor, provided that qualification can itself be defined, but it leaves other labor values unexplained despite the interdependence of prices.

The concluding rye-and-wheat example extends the criticism to demand. If a change in demand alters supplied quantities and these adjustments restore the initial price ratio, demand remains causally effective even though the final ratio is unchanged. Its contribution cannot be excluded merely by assigning adjustment to dynamics, since static equilibrium is the outcome of those adjustments. Throughout, Amonn’s argument requires objective value theory to distinguish an equilibrium description from an explanation of how its constituent values arise.