Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk on James Bonar’s Philosophy and Political Economy (1894)

Böhm-Bawerk’s review of James Bonar’s Philosophy and Political Economy in Some of Their Historical Relations endorses a history of the reciprocal influence of philosophy and economics. Its opening moves from the conspicuous overlap between philosophers and economists—Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, the Mills, and Jevons—to the intellectual grounds of that connection. General conceptions of humanity shape economic inquiry, while economic life supplies philosophy with material and problems of its own.

Thatsächlich hat eine wechselseitige Befruchtung beider Gebiete im grössten Maasstabe stattgefunden, wobei vielleicht anfangs und durch sehr lange Zeit die Philosophie vorwiegend in der aktiven Rolle der Geberin, neuestens aber auch, und in steigendem Maasse, als empfangend erscheint.

English translation: In fact a reciprocal fructification of both fields has taken place on the largest scale, whereby perhaps at the beginning, and for a very long time, philosophy appears predominantly in the active role of the giver, but most recently also, and in increasing measure, as the receiver.

The qualification matters: reciprocal influence does not imply an unchanging balance. Böhm-Bawerk suggests that philosophy long occupied the position of intellectual donor, but increasingly receives impulses from economics. This historical shift establishes the significance of Bonar’s undertaking for readers in both disciplines.

The review next presents Bonar’s qualifications. Alongside a claim about the British and Scottish concentration of philosopher-economists, Böhm-Bawerk emphasizes Bonar’s philosophical learning and established economic scholarship. His work on Malthus demonstrates an interest in thinkers as representatives of worldviews; his accounts of Austrian value and capital theories reveal an attraction to their psychological foundations. His earlier discussion of the term “law” in economics likewise exemplifies inquiry extending beyond narrow disciplinary boundaries. These examples make Bonar’s intellectual career itself evidence of the relationship his book investigates.

Es führt uns durch die ganze Geschichte der Philosophie von Plato bis Darwin, überall die Verknüpfungsfäden aufweisend, die zur ökonomischen Wissenschaft und ihrer Entwicklung hinüberleiten.

English translation: It leads us through the whole history of philosophy from Plato to Darwin, everywhere pointing out the connecting threads that lead over to economic science and its development.

Böhm-Bawerk’s principal critical judgment concerns how Bonar manages this breadth. A compressed intellectual history risks becoming a monotonous chronicle or burying its larger patterns beneath particulars. He credits Bonar with avoiding both through clear organization, discrimination between central and secondary matters, and an introduction and concluding chapter that restore a panoramic perspective. The praise thus rests on historical synthesis, not merely the accumulation of learning.

The review adopts the same principle of selectivity in its own presentation:

Ich will nicht als Referent in einen Fehler verfallen, den der Autor so glücklich vermieden hat, und unterlasse daher absichtlich eine referierende Inhaltsangabe, die in so knappem Raum nur höchst oberflächlich und trocken ausfallen könnte.

English translation: I do not wish, as reviewer, to fall into a fault which the author has so happily avoided, and therefore I deliberately refrain from a summarizing account of the contents, which in so narrow a space could turn out only most superficial and dry.

Instead of a compressed paraphrase, Böhm-Bawerk supplies Bonar’s five-book architecture. Ancient philosophy leads into modern discussions of natural right and natural laws, followed by utilitarian economics, idealist economics, and finally materialist economics and evolutionary theory. The sequence places Smith, Malthus, and the Mills within a wider philosophical history while bringing Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Engels, and Lassalle into the account of economic thought. Böhm-Bawerk does not adjudicate these individual interpretations; his unreserved recommendation turns on Bonar’s capacity to make their connections intelligible. The review’s broader relevance lies in its presentation of economics as both shaped by philosophical commitments and increasingly consequential for philosophy itself.