Victor Mataja · 1892
Published in the Revue d’économie politique in 1892, Victor Mataja’s article compares Italian and French legislative proposals for resolving disputes between employers and workers. It begins from a shared aspiration toward industrial peace:
Bien des efforts sont faits actuellement en vue de trouver des moyens qui soient de nature à faciliter l'entente entre patrons et ouvriers, en cas de différends survenus entre eux.
English translation: Many efforts are being made at present with a view to finding means of a kind to facilitate agreement between employers and workers in the event of disputes arising between them.
Mataja’s inquiry concerns the institutional and social conditions under which such efforts can succeed. The existence of a conciliatory procedure does not itself guarantee legitimate representation, willingness to compromise, or compliance with an agreement.
The opening establishes the distinction governing the comparison:
Ces différends peuvent aussi bien se rapporter aux conflits auxquels donnent lieu l'interprétation des contrats de travail existants, qu'aux conditions de contrats de louage dans l'avenir.
English translation: These disputes may relate as much to the conflicts to which the interpretation of existing contracts of employment gives rise as to the terms of contracts of hire in the future.
Disputes over existing contracts call for legal interpretation and adjudication; disagreements over future wages or working hours concern the negotiation of new terms. These functions have different institutional precedents:
L'exemple typique des institutions du premier genre nous est fourni par la France par ses conseils de prud'hommes ; celui des institutions du second nous a été présenté par l'Angleterre$^{1}$.
English translation: The typical example of institutions of the first kind is furnished us by France with its conseils de prud'hommes; that of institutions of the second has been presented to us by England.
Against this comparative background, the article’s two sections examine contrasting strategies: Italy would combine functions within industrial tribunals, while France would establish a voluntary procedure for collective conciliation and arbitration.
The Italian proposal, introduced by Chimirri, would create collegi di probi viri with equal employer and worker representation. They would conciliate individual disputes and adjudicate unresolved cases, but offer only conciliation in disagreements over future employment conditions. Mataja does not regard the combination of legal and economic responsibilities as inherently defective. Contractual interpretation can overlap with equitable adjustment, and conciliation already forms part of industrial courts’ activity. Employing existing institutional forms also avoids multiplying elections, offices, and expenses.
His objection is instead that collective conciliation risks becoming an accessory to judicial work. Giving a tribunal additional responsibilities does not create the collective organization needed to discharge them. Effective compromise requires workers’ associations capable of coordinating workplaces, commanding employers’ respect, and securing observance of agreements. Bargaining power matters because parties generally compromise when they recognize the strength of their opponents.
Mataja also examines electoral qualifications, jurisdiction, appeals, and fees. He particularly welcomes the Italian Chamber’s addition of women’s eligibility for office to their proposed voting rights, contrasting this inclusion with German exclusion. His argument connects industrial participation to institutional equality: a society that exposes women to factory labour cannot consistently invoke propriety to deny them participation in bodies governing industrial affairs.
The French section examines Roche’s proposal for voluntary conciliation and arbitration in collective disputes. A justice of the peace would notify the opposing party, facilitate meetings between equally represented delegations, and invite arbitration if conciliation failed. Public posting of refusals, agreements, awards, and unsuccessful proceedings would mobilize public opinion rather than coercive enforcement.
Mataja recognizes publicity’s potential but questions who may initiate proceedings, receive notifications, or commit workers who have not elected the delegates. Moral pressure requires credible representatives and developed employer and worker organizations; it cannot substitute for them. Distrust of state intervention further complicates the justice of the peace’s role. An official competent to perform formalities may lack the industrial knowledge and authority required in major conflicts. Nor do existing prud’hommes supply an uncomplicated solution: Mataja criticizes binding mandates and supervisory committees that restrict worker representatives’ independent judgment.
The conclusion compares both proposals with Belgium’s earlier councils of industry and labour, whose achievements Mataja cautiously declines to endorse. France offers modest procedural encouragement supported by publicity; Italy primarily establishes industrial courts with scope for later development into collective conciliation. The article’s central distinction is therefore between creating conciliatory machinery and establishing the organized constituencies, representative legitimacy, and reciprocal leverage that enable it to work.
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