Hermann von Schullern zu Schrattenhofen, Zur Gesetzgebung über das Trucksystem (1893)

Schullern’s article examines an Italian proposal to prohibit truck—the payment of wages through goods and employer-linked arrangements—accompanied by Francesco S. Nitti’s explanatory report. Moving from contractual theory to scrutiny of the fifteen-article draft, he argues that protection must prevent employers from converting workers’ dependence into commercial profit and control over consumption.

Es ist nicht etwa unsere Meinung, dass eine Einschränkung der Freiheit des Arbeitsvertrages oder gar die Aufhebung dieser Freiheit nothwendig sei; es ist für uns einfach selbstverständlich, dass der vollständig freie auch der ideale Arbeitsvertrag wäre.

English translation: It is by no means our opinion that a restriction of the freedom of the labour contract, or even the abolition of this freedom, is necessary; for us it is simply self-evident that the completely free labour contract would also be the ideal one.

Contractual freedom is the objective of reform, not an obstacle to it. Legal permission to contract does not ensure meaningful independence in bargaining.

Bei den heutigen Verhältnissen aber garantiert die formelljuristische Freiheit durchaus noch nicht auch das Vorhandensein materieller Freiheit und diese letztere ist als das erstrebenswerte Ziel zu erklären.

English translation: Under present-day conditions, however, formal-juridical freedom by no means already guarantees the presence of material freedom as well, and this latter is to be declared the goal worth striving for.

This distinction between formal and material freedom supplies the article’s normative foundation. Unequal bargaining positions can leave workers merely submitting to employers’ conditions; limiting employers’ discretion may consequently increase workers’ effective freedom. Truck reduces real wages, binds workers through credit, and damages their physical and intellectual condition. Its abolition serves both individual independence and public welfare.

The Italian draft translates these principles into monetary payment, limits on deductions, regular paydays, and enforcement provisions. Wages must be paid in legal currency; contrary agreements are void, and unlawful payments do not discharge the employer’s obligation. Permitted deductions for advances or necessary working materials are capped at two-fifths of wages. Lower-paid workers receive weekly or fortnightly payment, while pieceworkers receive weekly advances. Other provisions protect workers’ disposal of wages, prohibit payment in specified commercial premises, and allow injured parties and recognized mutual-aid societies to pursue compensation in criminal proceedings.

Schullern’s principal objections concern Article XIV’s exclusion of agricultural workers and Article XV’s allowance for customary provision of food and lodging. He accepts that payment partly in kind can benefit workers in agriculture and small crafts, where household-like relations with employers persist. Neither these relations nor local custom, however, warrants exemption from protection against exploitation. The decisive question is whether employers supply necessities or profit from dependence.

His proposed safeguard is payment in kind at the employer’s own cost. Prevailing local prices are insufficient because employers may buy cheaply, manipulate prices, or establish self-serving practices as apparent custom. Article XV could thus reintroduce into industrial employment the system the law seeks to exclude. Schullern would replace the two exceptions with narrower permission for customary provision at cost, allowing extensions where workers’ interests require them, as on remote railway or road projects. An arrangement’s economic function matters more than its monetary or nonmonetary form.

Enforceability likewise shapes his criticism of the guarantee that workers may freely dispose of their wages. If workers possess other income, proving that compulsory purchases were financed specifically from wages may be impossible. General assurances therefore require explicit prohibitions against coercive purchasing arrangements and employers’ provision of goods on credit against wages.

Schullern also considers possible abuse by workers. Declaring an unlawful payment void leaves unclear what becomes of goods already received. Austria’s imperfect but more explicit rule allows surviving goods or enrichment to pass to sickness funds or local poor relief. His concern is to preserve the worker’s claim to lawful payment without creating opportunities for speculative gain. Protection rests on public welfare, not unconditional preference for either contracting party.

Wo aber eine solche Gesetzgebung fehlt, müssen auch die ersten zaudernden Schritte mit Genugthuung begrüsst werden, die zur allmählichen Herausbildung einer solchen führen können.

English translation: Where such legislation is lacking, however, even the first hesitant steps that can lead to the gradual formation of such legislation must be greeted with satisfaction.

This reformist orientation governs his final assessment: the draft’s strengths substantially outweigh its defects. Regular payment, substantial penalties, public prosecution, and collective standing promise meaningful progress. A closing note endorses a related five-article proposal restricting wage seizure and assignment and granting wage claims preferential security. Throughout, Schullern judges legislation by its effects on bargaining power, enforcement, and circumvention rather than by formal declarations of contractual liberty alone.