Ernst Seidler von Feuchtenegg, Die Geldstrafe vom volkswirtschaftlichen und sozialpolitischen Gesichtspunkte (1890)

Seidler’s essay applies economic value theory to criminal fines, explaining why identical monetary penalties impose unequal suffering and developing principles for reform. Its central concern is the distinction between a punishment’s nominal amount and its subjective burden: comparable culpability calls for comparable deprivation, not necessarily equal payments.

Insbesondere ist gewiß niemandem der Gedanke fremd, daß die in den Gesetzen vorgesehenen Geldstrafen subjektiv überaus verschieden wirken.

English translation: In particular, the thought is certainly unfamiliar to no one that the monetary penalties provided for in the laws have exceedingly different effects subjectively.

Drawing on Carl Menger’s theory of subjective value, Seidler interprets punishment through the satisfactions that offenders must forgo. Individuals ordinarily secure their most important needs first; the significance of money lost therefore depends on the needs it would otherwise serve. A fine might deprive a wealthy person of a minor pleasure or an addition to savings, while costing a labourer food, warmth, or health. Variations in purchasing power across places and periods complicate monetary assessment, but differences between offenders’ circumstances are more decisive.

Die große Ungleichheit in dem Effekte der Geldstrafe beruht vielmehr fast ausschließlich auf der Verschiedenheit, welche die ökonomische Lage der einzelnen Delinquenten aufweist.

English translation: The great inequality in the effect of the monetary penalty rests rather almost exclusively upon the difference exhibited by the economic situation of the individual delinquents.

The persistence of fixed monetary assessment reflects, in part, the fine’s historical relationship to private compensation and judicial revenue. Modern punishment serves a public purpose, yet its assessment retains an external monetary standard insufficiently responsive to subjective effects. Seidler’s conclusion is reform rather than abolition. Fines are divisible, adjustable, and reversible; they preserve productive labour interrupted by imprisonment, reduce public expenditure, and transfer resources to potentially useful purposes. These economic advantages remain subordinate to punishment’s penal purpose, but explain why improving monetary assessment matters.

The constructive argument distinguishes income-based fines from confiscation of a proportion of wealth. Confiscation can damage productive capital and treats unevenly resources that differ in accessibility, concealability, or embodiment in earning capacity. Harm to dependants does not, for Seidler, uniquely disqualify property penalties: imprisonment and execution likewise remove household support. He regards such dependence as a feature of the prevailing economic and legal order rather than as direct punishment of relatives.

Income provides a preferable starting point, but a uniform percentage does not establish equal sacrifice. Necessities generally absorb a smaller share of larger incomes; consequently, Seidler advocates progressive assessment, requiring richer offenders to surrender a larger percentage as well as a larger sum. Family obligations, health, and other needs also affect capacity to bear loss. His inclusion of needs associated with social standing shows how broadly he understands the circumstances relevant to punishment. Income from property and income from labour must also be distinguished because their security and provision requirements differ. Assessment should thus concern total net income interpreted through personal needs and the character of its sources.

Daher ist es ein großer Irrtum, wenn Juristen glauben, daß dieselbe Geldsumme für jedermann dasselbe bedeutet.

English translation: It is therefore a great error when jurists believe that the same sum of money means the same thing for everyone.

This rejection of money as an invariant measure connects subjective value theory with the fiscal principle of equal sacrifice. It also clarifies why adjustment for poverty is not merely leniency. Making punishment comparable in burden differs conceptually from treating poverty as a circumstance that mitigates guilt.

Practical reform nevertheless depends on what courts can discover. Tax administration supplies methods and records, but estimates and declarations remain imperfect. Taxes on separate revenue sources may not disclose total income after debts, while poorer people may appear chiefly through indirect taxation. Courts would therefore retain substantial investigative responsibilities. Seidler does not demand exact measurement before accepting improvement: even approximate attention to income can correct the injustice of fixed sums.

The essay considers classifications, income percentages, broader sentencing ranges, and explicit directions to consider economic circumstances without settling every technical question. Its closing examination of a French law using district daily wages to assess fines reiterates the limits of external standards: labour itself has no constant value capable of guaranteeing equal subjective sacrifice. Seidler’s broader contribution is to connect penal individualization with economic analysis and public finance. Formally equal fines can privilege wealth; reducing that privilege requires assessing the actual deprivation punishment produces.