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Archive/Ernst Seidler von Feuchtenegg
Die Schwankungen des Geldwertes (der Kaufkraft des Geldes) und die juristische Lehre von dem Inhalte der Geldschulden

Ernst Seidler von Feuchtenegg · 1894

Die Schwankungen des Geldwertes (der Kaufkraft des Geldes) und die juristische Lehre von dem Inhalte der Geldschulden

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Ernst Seidler von Feuchtenegg: Die Schwankungen des Geldwertes (der Kaufkraft des Geldes) und die juristische Lehre von dem Inhalte der Geldschulden (1894)

Seidler’s German study examines whether legal fulfilment of a monetary debt preserves its economic substance. Its subject is the Summenschuld, an obligation expressed as a sum rather than a requirement to deliver particular coins. Unchanged denominations and metallic content do not ensure unchanged purchasing power: formally correct repayment can therefore redistribute wealth between creditor and debtor.

The historical analysis traces the movement from sovereign control over monetary valuation toward protection against debasement. Seidler identifies a forceful medieval challenge to princely monetary power:

Nikolaus Oresmius, der bekannte Aristoteliker († 1382)²), war der Erste, welcher den landesherrlichen Münzverschlechterungen mit Kühnheit und Energie entgegentrat.

English translation: Nicolaus Oresmius, the well-known Aristotelian († 1382)²), was the first to oppose the debasements of the coinage by territorial rulers with boldness and energy.

The subsequent emphasis on metallic content sought to preserve obligations against manipulation of coinage. Yet this response also narrowed jurisprudence’s conception of monetary instability:

Die Stabilisierung des Inhaltes der Geldschulden durch Stabilisierung der geschuldeten Metallmenge — dieses Problem war es denn auch, welches seither die Jurisprudenz rücksichtlich unserer Frage fast ausschließlich ¹) beschäftigt hat.

English translation: The stabilization of the content of monetary debts through stabilization of the quantity of metal owed — this was indeed the problem which since then has almost exclusively ¹) occupied jurisprudence with regard to our question.

For Seidler, preserving metal quantity protects one condition of continuity without securing economic equivalence. The terminology itself conceals the distinction between physical content and exchange power:

Metallwert heißt einerseits der Metallgehalt einer Münze (innerer Wert, valor intrinsecus), andererseits die Kaufkraft des in der Münze enthaltenen Metalls im Gegensatz zum Tauschwert der Münze.

English translation: Metallic value means, on the one hand, the metal content of a coin (intrinsic value, valor intrinsecus), and on the other hand the purchasing power of the metal contained in the coin, as opposed to the exchange value of the coin.

Drawing on Carl Menger, Seidler treats money as an economic good whose purchasing power depends on supply and demand. He distinguishes changes originating in goods from those originating in money itself. These are causal distinctions, not independently observable prices. Precious-metal supplies can alter purchasing power despite an unchanged monetary standard; commodity prices can also move because production and demand have changed.

The legal analysis develops the implications of money’s capacity to command other goods. Seidler understands the substance transferred in a monetary loan as economic purchasing capacity, not merely a quantity of metal. Depreciation advantages the debtor, while appreciation advantages the creditor. Such unintended transfers introduce an aleatory element into transactions whose parties ordinarily intend equivalent repayment. The argument extends to deferred purchase payments, maintenance, salaries, pensions, and other monetary obligations. Long duration particularly exposes the divergence between nominal performance and preservation of economic substance.

The practical discussion nevertheless limits this principle. Seidler rejects compensation for changes originating on the commodity side. Goods do not change price uniformly, and creditors and debtors have different consumption requirements. A general basket cannot preserve every individual’s purchasing position; individualized baskets would burden transactions without providing a general rule about whose needs should govern. Economic equivalence thus cannot readily become a universal formula for adjusting debts.

Even monetary-side disturbances are difficult to identify. Neither another commodity nor another precious metal provides an invariant measure, while exchange-rate comparisons shift rather than eliminate the difficulty. Broad price movements may suggest a monetary cause, but simultaneous commodity-market changes complicate attribution. Seidler consequently resists routine judicial recalculation of obligations under an existing monetary system.

His constructive direction is institutional: improve money rather than continually revise individual debts. Earlier protection against debasement already illustrated the movement from private-law adjustment toward public regulation:

Sie hat hiermit die frühere privatrechtliche Methode verlassen und den gewiß rationelleren Weg der verwaltungsrechtlichen Wirtschaftsgesetzgebung betreten, um Gläubiger und Schuldner vor einer Uebervorteilung zu bewahren.

English translation: It has hereby abandoned the earlier private-law method and entered upon the certainly more rational path of administrative-law economic legislation, in order to protect creditor and debtor from being taken advantage of.

Seidler extends this reasoning to purchasing-power instability. International bimetallism cannot guarantee stability against goods merely by stabilizing the gold–silver ratio. He cautiously favors an international gold standard supported by limited silver circulation, broader silver payment rights, international clearing, and developed credit institutions to mitigate gold scarcity. These measures promise greater security, not perfect invariance. The study’s central contribution is the tension it establishes between economic substance and legal administrability: metallic equivalence cannot preserve purchasing power, but this insufficiency points toward monetary institutions rather than a general rule of private-law compensation.

Sections

This work was divided into 3 sections when it entered the library's research corpus—an apparatus for search and citation, not necessarily the author's own table of contents. Each title opens its summary.

  1. 1Title and Author▾
  2. 2Sections I–II: Monetary Value, the History of Debt Doctrine, and the Legal Requirement of Equivalent Repayment▾
  3. 3Section III: The Limits of Debt Indexation and the Case for Monetary Stabilization▾

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