Wilhelm Vleugels, Zur Verteidigung der Wertlehre (1931)

Wilhelm Vleugels’s Zur Verteidigung der Wertlehre (Kritik der der Ablehnung der Wertlehre zugrunde liegenden Gedankengänge) defends subjective value as an indispensable instrument of economic explanation. The German essay, supplied in a reproduced edition of the 1931 work, distinguishes describing equilibrium from explaining price formation. Its central contention is that several apparent opponents of value theory retain its conceptual substance while rejecting its vocabulary.

Wendet man sich aber der Erklärung des Mechanismus der Preisbildung in seiner Bewegung zu, so wird der Wertbegriff sofort zu einem ganz unentbehrlichen Werkzeug.

English translation: But if one turns to the explanation of the mechanism of price formation in its movement, the concept of value at once becomes a wholly indispensable tool.

This claim defines the defense’s scope. Vleugels accepts that economists can describe the functional interdependence of equilibrium prices without explicitly invoking value. He accordingly appreciates Wieser’s treatment of imputation as an account of that interdependence. Yet explaining the movement through which prices emerge requires attention to agents’ valuations. The relevant concept is subjective or use value; exchange value supplies no independent foundation, since its explanation follows from that of prices.

“ Die Theorie kann sich ja unmöglich mit einer bloßen Beschreibung des Gleichgewichtszustandes begnügen.

English translation: " Theory cannot, after all, content itself with a mere description of the state of equilibrium.

Equilibrium analysis and the explanation of price formation thus perform complementary tasks. Neither can replace the other merely because a researcher prefers its methods. Vleugels does not demand that every economic proposition employ the language of value, but argues that a complete theory must account for the valuations underlying economic action.

The critiques of Gottl and Cassel expose conceptual continuities beneath claims of theoretical rupture. Gottl’s “economic dimension” reproduces conditional valuations based on anticipated prices. Such expectations are not equilibrium prices, nor do they guarantee correspondence between requirements and provision; they represent one influence on price continuity. Gottl’s treatment of desire likewise preserves the substance of utility theory. His emphasis on interconnected needs does not invalidate marginal utility, because utility maximization already concerns the economic arrangement as a whole.

Cassel’s scarcity principle supplies another supposed alternative that depends on the relation it claims to supersede. Scarcity matters economically only in relation to demand, just as utility acquires economic significance in relation to scarcity. Vleugels also rejects the allegation that subjective value theory requires measurement of feelings. It assumes differences in the strength of wants without undertaking psychological measurement; numerical examples symbolize those differences. In exchange, valuations become expressible through quantities of goods an individual would surrender. Money facilitates this expression but is not its logical prerequisite. Böhm-Bawerk’s monetary examples thus already connect individual valuation with price formation.

Dietzel’s balances of costs and utilities similarly retain subjective valuation. Liefmann’s attack rests on attributing to Austrian theory a conception of scarcity as an objective physical property. For Vleugels, scarcity relative to desire is already fundamental to marginal-utility reasoning. These polemics support a historical judgment: ostensible opponents often belong among the theory’s adherents once their terminology is translated into its conceptual terms.

The discussion of socialist objections distinguishes economic explanation from historical and sociological inquiry. Tugan-Baranowsky accepts marginal utility for product prices but contests its application to distribution because property and power shape incomes. Vleugels replies that economics takes concrete ownership arrangements as data; explaining their historical formation is a different task. Functional income categories must also be distinguished from social classes, and explanations of factor prices from judgments about distributive justice. Whether Marx’s value theory is essential to his account of exploitation cannot, by itself, settle the necessity of subjective value within pure economics.

The essay ultimately separates terminology from the explanatory work performed by concepts.

Das kann selbstverständlich nur als rein äußere Zweckmäßigkeitsfrage entschieden werden, ist aber für inneren Gehalt und Aufbau der Theorie ohne jede Bedeutung.

English translation: That can of course be decided only as a purely external question of expediency, but it is without any significance for the inner content and construction of the theory.

Replacing the word Wert cannot permanently remove ambiguity, since substitute terms also acquire associations. Qualifying his necessity claim by the present state of knowledge, Vleugels advocates cumulative inquiry rather than repeated theoretical refoundation. The essay’s methodological force lies in insisting that criticism establish substantive conceptual disagreement before presenting a change of vocabulary as an advance in economic explanation.