Robert Meyer: Die drei Gesetze vom 28. Dezember 1911 (1912)

Robert Meyer’s German-language article examines the three laws concerning tax concessions for new buildings and nonprofit building associations and state support for housing welfare. Published in 1912, it situates their achievements within Austria’s protracted building-tax reform. Writing as a participant in legislative drafting and as the finance minister responsible for the successful narrower proposal, Meyer combines fiscal calculation with an assessment of political feasibility. His central distinction is between tax relief that increases existing property values and measures that can encourage construction and improve housing provision.

Meyer first reconstructs earlier reform proposals, comparing temporary exemptions and permanent reductions through the capitalized value of a building’s lifetime tax burden. On assumptions of an eighty-year building life and four-percent interest, six years of exemption followed by reduced taxation could be more advantageous than twelve years of preferential taxation. He expresses the government’s proposal as an equivalent immediate rate:

Der Vorschlag der Regierung, sechs volle Freijahre mit den darauffolgenden oben mitgeteilten ermäßigten Steuersätzen hingegen entspricht rechnungsmäßig einer sofort einsetzenden Besteuerung von 14·835%, bzw. 11·712%.

English translation: The government's proposal, by contrast — six full tax-free years with the subsequent reduced rates of tax reported above — corresponds arithmetically to an immediately commencing taxation of 14.835% and 11.712% respectively.

This method separates the apparent generosity of an exemption period from its long-term economic value. It also explains why temporary gains in state revenue do not disprove an eventual fiscal sacrifice: as the stock of permanently lower-taxed buildings expands, losses accumulate. Yet the proposal met persistent demands for greater concessions:

Gegen diesen Teil der Regierungsvorlage wurde zunächst in unzähligen Wiederholungen eingewendet, das Gebotene sei zu wenig.

English translation: Against this part of the government bill it was objected, at first in countless repetitions, that what was offered was too little.

Meyer does not equate greater concessions with better housing policy. Temporary exemptions could be capitalized by owners rather than passed on to tenants, while permanent reductions for new buildings might affect rents through increased supply. Even this influence remained limited, especially in the direction of rent reductions. General relief for existing buildings therefore appeared an expensive and poorly targeted instrument under conditions of housing shortage.

The treatment of older property was also a central obstacle to comprehensive reform:

Ich komme nun zu dem wichtigsten Punkte, der Behandlung der alten Gebäude, über die ja, wie aus Grünwalds Aufsatz ersichtlich, bereits bei der Enquête keine Einigung erzielt werden konnte.

English translation: I come now to the most important point, the treatment of the old buildings, concerning which, as is evident from Grünwald's essay, no agreement could be reached even at the inquiry.

The dispute exposed the difficulty of reconciling owners’ expectations, housing needs, and public revenues. Restrictions on local surcharges might assist construction, but they threatened the resources of autonomous authorities. Meyer consequently treats taxation as one component of housing policy rather than a sufficient remedy for housing scarcity.

The article’s institutional alternative is the Housing Welfare Fund established in 1910. Building cooperatives could often obtain first mortgages but struggled to finance the remaining construction costs. Public guarantees for second mortgages addressed this obstacle through supervision and reliable backing. The fund’s allocation rose to twenty-five million crowns, with subsidiary state liability for guaranteed obligations up to two hundred million. Its importance extended beyond credit: definitions of small dwellings and nonprofit building associations became foundations for subsequent tax concessions.

Meyer then explains the decision to separate incentives for new construction from comprehensive tax codification. Although this sacrificed legal coherence, it made practical legislation possible. The resulting concessions differentiated between construction generally, small dwellings, and qualifying public or nonprofit builders. Their accessibility, compared with earlier workers’ housing provisions tied to restrictions on rents, occupancy, and sanitary conditions, promised wider application.

His endorsement remains qualified. He questions exceptionally low nonprofit rates, criticizes transitional complexity, and distinguishes useful rebuilding from speculative redevelopment that removes inexpensive housing. Parliamentary additions also complicated any later assessment of which incentives actually stimulated construction. In discussing the companion laws, he supports relief from the costs of cooperative intermediation while warning against misuse and advances to inadequately capitalized associations.

Meyer’s conclusion defends selective legislation as a substantial achievement at a lower fiscal cost than general property-tax relief. The laws supported new housing and cooperative finance without resolving every question of building taxation. Their significance lies in separating attainable housing-policy objectives from the unfinished tasks of codification and the treatment of existing property.