Emil Lederer, Die Regelung der Lebensmittelversorgung während des Krieges in Deutschland (1915)

Published in 1915 in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Lederer’s article examines German food administration from the outbreak of war through early 1915. It traces the movement from price regulation toward grain requisitioning and organized distribution. Its central argument is that price controls cannot secure subsistence unless government also coordinates stocks, consumption, and competing agricultural uses.

Lederer begins by scrutinizing optimistic harvest expectations and Germany’s dependence on foreign supplies. Comparative estimates undermine confidence that an unusually favorable harvest could compensate for interrupted imports:

Jedenfalls ist nach den Schätzungen nicht anzunehmen, daß Deutschland in der Ernte besonders begünstigt war.

English translation: In any case, according to the estimates it is not to be assumed that Germany was particularly favoured in the harvest.

The problem extended beyond grain consumed directly by people. The loss of imported fodder connected livestock production to the availability of human food:

Namentlich die deutsche Schweinezucht ist auf den Import der russischen Futtermittel angewiesen.

English translation: German pig-breeding in particular is dependent upon the import of Russian feedstuffs.

Provisioning consequently appears as an interconnected economic system. Maintaining livestock could absorb supplies needed for human nutrition, while reducing herds required coordinated slaughter and meat preservation. Domestic substitutes for imported feed could not simply eliminate this conflict.

Lederer reconstructs the choices available at the war’s outset, beginning with nonintervention:

Bei Beginn des Krieges boten sich folgende Möglichkeiten: a) Man konnte auf jede Regelung verzichten und die Preisbildung dem freien Spiel der Kräfte überlassen.

English translation: At the beginning of the war the following possibilities presented themselves: a) One could dispense with any regulation and leave price formation to the free play of forces.

Unrestricted prices could reconcile demand with available supplies, but at the cost of hunger and undernourishment among poorer consumers. Price ceilings restrained this mechanism without ensuring that stocks would last until the next harvest. Isolation from world markets also strengthened sellers’ power: high prices were not a transparent measure of physical scarcity.

The account of initial intervention exposes the limitations of piecemeal regulation. Local retail ceilings could divert supplies elsewhere and remained vulnerable to unrestricted wholesale prices. The October 1914 grain ceilings largely accepted preceding price increases. Milling requirements, mixed flour, restrictions on grain feeding, and controls on additional commodities sought to conserve supplies, but left distribution insufficiently organized. Successive amendments demonstrated how intervention in one market redirected demand and price pressure toward others.

Inadequate knowledge of available stocks compounded these difficulties:

Das Zurückhalten mit den Vorräten war mangels einer Bestandsaufnahme nicht zu verhüten.

English translation: The withholding of stocks could not be prevented for want of an inventory.

Stocktaking was therefore an essential administrative instrument. Difficulty acquiring grain reserves helped propel the transition toward seizure, expropriation, and centralized distribution under the decree of 25 January 1915. Grain owners, mills, and retailers increasingly worked within an administratively directed supply chain.

Central control nevertheless depended on local organization of consumption. Municipal discretion produced uneven implementation, while flour allowances required substantial reductions in customary bread consumption. Drawing on household studies and consumption statistics, Lederer emphasizes the particular burdens on poorer households and bread-dependent rural populations. Equal quantities per person did not impose equal sacrifices; earlier intervention could have moderated later restrictions.

Lederer also distinguishes emergency administration from socialism. Fear of “state socialism” obstructed necessary measures, while enthusiasm for equal rations confused distribution with the transformation of production. Administrative allocation could sustain military power and preserve capitalism without socializing the productive system.

The conclusion extends the argument beyond grain to a stronger national provisioning authority, consumer and trade-union representation, potato requisitioning, cheaper sugar, and coordinated livestock reduction and meat preservation. Bread rationing shifted demand toward other foods without increasing total available nutrients. Higher livestock prices could encourage farmers to feed potatoes to animals instead of selling them for human consumption. Raising potato ceilings thus risked restoring hunger as the regulator of demand.

The closing notice on partial potato seizure captures an administration still developing its response. Throughout, Lederer judges policy by its capacity to secure nutrition across unequal social groups. Effective wartime provisioning required governing the interaction of prices, stock information, nutritional substitution, and distribution, rather than regulating isolated markets.