Of Common, Public, and Private Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization

Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s essay, first published in 2011 and republished in this 2021 version, grounds private ownership in conflict avoidance, original appropriation, and voluntary transfer. It moves from a definition of conflict through a village-road example to proposals for total privatization and restitution. Its organizing distinction concerns common resources and public ownership:

Second, I want to clarify the distinction between “common” goods and property and “public” goods and property, and explain the construction error inherent in the institution of public goods and property.

Hoppe treats public ownership as institutionally defective, not simply another form of collective use. To establish this claim, he distinguishes disagreement from incompatible actions. Different beliefs need not produce practical conflict; competing attempts to control scarce resources do.

Conflicts, then, are physical clashes regarding the control of one and the same given stock of goods.

This definition determines the normative framework. Property rules must assign control so as to prevent incompatible uses. Original appropriation establishes an observable connection between an actor and a previously unowned resource, whereas verbal declarations cannot establish ownership without presupposing agreement. Voluntary transfers preserve the legitimacy of acquisition. Hoppe presents privatization as necessary rather than merely expedient:

What is needed to avoid all conflict, then, is only a norm regarding the privatization of scarce things (goods).

The village-road example translates this principle into institutional terms. A commonly used, unowned road may initially need little management, but congestion and deterioration eventually require decisions about maintenance and access. Hoppe regards appropriation through visible maintenance as legitimate provided that residents retain established easements. Ownership may vest in an individual or a voluntary association with transferable shares. His distinction is therefore not simply between individual and collective ownership: voluntary participation, exit, and respect for prior rights are decisive.

Public authority, by contrast, imposes membership and charges residents for access previously available without payment. Because roads provide access to homes and fields, Hoppe argues that public ownership supplies leverage for taxation and interference with neighboring private property. The local example becomes a model of governmental expansion.

The proposed reversal begins with privatizing streets. Former taxpayers would receive tradable titles proportional to their contributions; owners would assume maintenance costs while respecting existing rights-of-way. Hoppe distinguishes these easements from unrestricted access to other localities. Private streets would permit exclusion of uninvited outsiders, linking his property theory to his criticism of “forced integration,” while residents would retain rights to invite guests.

Schools and hospitals would likewise pass to their funders, but without the inherited access rights attached to roads. Hoppe reasons that these facilities were produced goods rather than previously available common resources. Their owners could consequently restrict admission or change their use. The historical formation of each asset determines the obligations accompanying privatization.

The addendum develops restitution under different ownership histories. Where comprehensive state ownership coincides with lost legal records, current or former occupancy supplies an ascertainable basis for allocating workplaces, fields, and homes. Unoccupied resources become available for original appropriation. Hoppe also calls for trials of alleged perpetrators of state crimes and exclusion of convicted offenders from allocations. Where records survive, dispossessed owners or heirs recover property, although claims to subsequently constructed buildings may require bargaining between restored landowners and occupants.

In mixed economies, the principal recipients are private-sector net taxpayers rather than public employees supported by taxation. Revenue-producing public enterprises introduce qualifications depending on subsidies and earlier ownership. Privatization would also remove taxation and legislative restrictions while preserving private agreements. To handle dispersed assets and uncertain valuations, Hoppe proposes tradable claims registered against particular vacated properties, with competing registrations adjusting ownership shares.

The essay frames privatization chiefly as restitution, not as an efficiency-oriented sale of government assets. Its conclusions depend on the premise that legitimate exclusive control prevents conflict while compulsory public ownership perpetuates it. Its differentiated allocation procedures attempt to reconcile that premise with incomplete records, inherited access rights, and competing historical claims.