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The Complete “Austrian School of Economics” Collection


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4,366 works (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.

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217–228 of 294 matches · 4,366 works total (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents)Page 19 of 25; every summary opens into its work.
  1. 1973
    Economic Freedom and Representative Government

    Economic Freedom and Representative Government

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 5 sections

    Thirty years after The Road to Serfdom, Hayek returns to its warning from the vantage of the inflationary 1970s, insisting he never claimed that limited intervention must automatically breed tyranny, only that bad principles corrode the market order on which political freedom rests. His diagnosis is constitutional: representative democracy has been wrongly fused with unlimited parliamentary sovereignty, so that parties bidding for majorities must buy support by granting favours to organized interests. Recovering the classical distinction between law as general rules of just conduct and command aimed at particular groups, he exposes social justice as continual coercive adjustment and sketches a deliberately utopian remedy, two assemblies, one governing and administering, the other confined to general law by long non-renewable terms, with a constitutional court policing the boundary between them.

    Although the threat to free institutions now comes from a source different from that with which I was concerned 30 years ago, it has become even more acute than it was then.

  2. 1973
    Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy

    Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 199 sections

    Between the grown order that no one designed and the made order that serves a chosen purpose lies the whole of Hayek's mature legal and political theory. Across three volumes gathered here in the one-volume form he originally intended, he distinguishes cosmos from taxis, the judge-discovered law of liberty (nomos) from legislative command (thesis), and the market's spontaneous catallaxy from the deliberate economy. The middle volume mounts a sustained assault on 'social justice,' which he calls an empty, quasi-religious incantation, since a spontaneous process assigns rewards to no one's design and so can be neither just nor unjust. Behind these arguments stands a warning that unlimited democracy, captured by organized interests, drifts toward the very totalitarian power classical constitutionalism was built to restrain, a danger he answers with proposals for constitutional redesign.

    The tragic illusion was that the adoption of democratic procedures made it possible to dispense with all other limitations on governmental power.

  3. 1973
    Ludwig von Mises: an Overview

    Ludwig von Mises: an Overview

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 1 sections

    Mises developed the foundations of his social thought while economic research remained a spare-time occupation alongside his duties at the Vienna Chamber of Commerce. In this memorial essay, first published in 1973 and reprinted here with editorial annotations, Hayek considers the tension between that intellectual achievement and Mises’s limited academic recognition. His admiring portrait also acknowledges the stubbornness that made Mises enemies, while showing how an informal seminar sustained his influence beyond the university. At its conceptual centre is a precise distinction: Mises’s criticism concerned socialism’s inability to allocate resources efficiently, not its literal impossibility. Readers encounter Hayek’s account of how economic calculation, political conviction, and institutional isolation shaped a scholarly life—along with the judgments of a participant in the same intellectual tradition.

  4. 1973
    The Place of Menger’s Grundsätze in the History of Economic Thought

    The Place of Menger’s Grundsätze in the History of Economic Thought

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 2 sections

    Only ninety-five years separated Menger's Grundsatze of 1871 from the Wealth of Nations, and a mere twenty-three from Mill's great restatement of classical doctrine, a chronology Hayek uses to argue that Menger arrived not after an intellectual vacuum but in the thick of a still-dominant orthodoxy. His achievement, on this account, was not the bare idea of diminishing marginal utility but the systematic extension of subjective value to higher-order goods, complementarity, opportunity cost, and price formation. Setting Menger against Mill's incomplete value theory, the historical school, Jevons, Walras, and Marshall, Hayek stresses methodological individualism and process over mathematical equilibrium, and traces the Grundsatze's delayed influence through Bohm-Bawerk and Wieser, its absorption into neoclassical economics, its Keynesian eclipse, and a coming Austrian revival that would restore causal explanation and market process to the center.

    Their scientific work seems to me to have sprung entirely from their awareness of the inadequateness of the prevailing body of theory in explaining how the market order in fact operated.

  5. 1974
    Keynesian Kaleidics

    Keynesian Kaleidics

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 1 sections

    In this brief 1974 letter to the Times Literary Supplement, republished here in 2022, Hayek challenges a reviewer’s account of Austrian economics—not Shackle’s Keynesian Kaleidics itself. Against the attribution of timeless, mathematically defined general equilibrium to the Austrian tradition, he insists on its commitment to process analysis. His correction includes a revealing concession: he and other younger Austrians did sometimes use equilibrium concepts, but, he says, they learned them from Walras and Marshall rather than their Austrian teachers. The letter offers a compact distinction between a school’s inherited method and the tools its adherents later borrowed.

  6. 1974
    The Pretence of Knowledge

    The Pretence of Knowledge

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 11 sections

    Accepting the 1974 Nobel Memorial Prize amid accelerating inflation, Hayek turned the occasion into an indictment of his own discipline. Economists, he charges, have made policy blunders by aping the physical sciences, a scientistic reflex that mistakes measurability for importance and prefers elegant aggregates like total demand management to the dispersed, local knowledge through which markets actually coordinate. Borrowing Warren Weaver's distinction between organized and unorganized complexity, he argues that social phenomena permit only falsifiable pattern predictions, never precise forecasts, and that inflationary stimulus buys employment by drawing labour into uses sustainable only under continued expansion. The lecture closes on the market as a spontaneous communication system and on a plea for humility against the charlatanry of social engineering.

    We have indeed at the moment little cause for pride: as a profession we have made a mess of things.

  7. 1974
    Wittgenstein

    Wittgenstein

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 1 sections

    A delay in permission to publish letters could be enough to end a biography. In this brief 1974 letter to the Times Literary Supplement, reprinted in 2022, Friedrich August von Hayek explains why he abandoned his sketch of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Defending information he had supplied to William Warren Bartley III, Hayek recalls that Elizabeth Anscombe, acting for Wittgenstein’s literary executors, withheld permission to reproduce letters to Bertrand Russell until their own publication. He acknowledges that he no longer possesses the correspondence that would prove his account, but cites a contemporary note alongside his memory. The letter offers narrowly focused testimony about the unfinished project—and a concrete distinction between refusing publication outright and postponing it until a writer’s work has stalled.

  8. 1975
    Die Erhaltung des liberalen Gedankengutes

    Die Erhaltung des liberalen Gedankengutes

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 5 sections

    The paradox is stark: the liberal market order had just delivered West Germany's soziale Marktwirtschaft and a quarter-century of prosperity, yet Hayek, in this 1975 Zurich lecture, judged its future bleak. Credit expansion, he argues, has trapped governments, since halting inflation would bring politically unbearable unemployment, so they suppress symptoms through price and wage controls that disable the very price mechanism and push society toward central direction. Behind the monetary danger lies an institutional one: legislatures of unlimited power that assemble majorities by dispensing privileges, eroding the older Lockean conception of law as general rules of just conduct. Distributive justice he calls a wholly empty notion outside a command organization; his remedy is a constitution that severs lawmaking from government direction.

    Er kann sich Sonderwünschen nicht versagen, solange er die Macht hat, sie zu befriedigen.

    English translation: “He cannot refuse special demands so long as he has the power to satisfy them.”

  9. 1975
    The Courage of His Convictions

    The Courage of His Convictions

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 5 sections

    Delivered in 1974 as a tribute to Ludwig von Mises, this address casts him not as a surviving nineteenth-century liberal but as a thinker who independently rediscovered classical liberalism after outgrowing the mild Fabian socialism of his Viennese youth. Hayek traces the arc: the early theory of money, the Chamber of Commerce years, the wartime turn to social order in Nation, State and the Economy, and the critique of socialist calculation that crowned his vision of a free society. He dwells on the cost, the ridicule and academic marginalization in Vienna that denied Mises a full professorship, and on the renewal that exile to Geneva and then America brought. Against Knight, Eucken, and Cannan, only Mises, he insists, supplied a comprehensive guiding philosophy.

    He knew. He suffered. But he persevered because what he expounded were his profound convictions.

  10. 1975
    Types of Mind

    Types of Mind

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 1 sections

    Fluent command of a subject is not the same as a capacity to change it. In this 1975 essay, Hayek draws on his own difficulties with recall and exposition to distinguish the accomplished scholarly “master” from the “puzzler,” who must reconstruct familiar arguments and may thereby uncover their hidden assumptions. His account makes intellectual awkwardness neither a virtue nor a disqualification: its value depends on what the struggle brings into view. This distinction leads to a provocative educational proposal—an alternative university route offering basic support and books to students willing to undertake years of austere study. The essay connects the intimate experience of finding one’s own words with the institutional question of how to recognize talent that examinations may miss.

  11. 1976
    Adam Smith's Message in Today's Language

    Adam Smith's Message in Today's Language

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 1 sections

    What made Adam Smith great, Hayek maintains in this 1976 essay, was not technical originality about value, distribution, or money, much of which had been anticipated before him, but his grasp of how complex cooperation becomes possible without anyone directing it. Recast in modern terms, Smith's division of labour becomes a theory of dispersed knowledge: the individual, guided by prices toward the likely gain of receipts over outlay rather than toward visible wants, serves a great society he cannot survey. Hayek corrects the old libel that Smith preached selfishness, insisting the argument is institutional, not ethical. And he enlists Smith's man of system, who would arrange people like pieces on a chessboard, against the constructivism behind modern demands for social justice and centrally assigned shares.

    The great society indeed became possible by the individual directing his own efforts not towards visible wants but towards what the signals of the market represented as the likely gain of receipts over outlay.

  12. 1976
    Address at the 33rd Annual Meeting of The Institute of Public Affairs

    Address at the 33rd Annual Meeting of The Institute of Public Affairs

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 2 sections

    An institution can perform services that nobody designed and few can explain. In this published transcript of his 1976 address to the Institute of Public Affairs, Hayek asks what follows for those who would replace inherited practices with rationally planned alternatives. His target is “constructivism”: the presumption that conscious design confers superiority. Prices provide his clearest counterexample, coordinating knowledge dispersed beyond any planner’s reach. His defence of inherited moral restraints presses the argument into more contentious territory, especially in his response to psychiatrist Brock Chisholm’s call to displace traditional right and wrong. The address offers a compact encounter with Hayek’s reasoning about institutional evolution—and with the difficult question of how to distinguish informed reform from destruction of functions we do not yet understand.

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