The archive.

In this essay, first published in 1932 as Kapitalaufzehrung and here in English translation, Hayek opens what he called an 'economics of decline', the neglected theory of how a society consumes its own capital. His claim is stark: production costs held too high, with wages pushed above equilibrium against rigid money incomes, can make current consumption exceed current output, so that capital is quietly eaten away. The process betrays itself through a shortening of the structure of production, a shift toward quickly finished consumer goods, and a fall in the value of capital equipment before any physical decay shows; depreciation funds go unreinvested and circulating capital becomes unrecoverable. Drawing on Austrian and central European evidence, including Morgenstern's data on Vienna-listed firms, he warns that democratic anti-capitalist majorities may favour levies and public works that devour the very capital they depend on.

What we are confronting here, however, are economic problems towards whose explanation economics has as yet made little direct contribution, even if it offers us the necessary tools for doing so.

A seventy-one-page pamphlet on price formation in the German scholarly antiquarian book trade, trailing a bibliography of theoretical works 'von Gossen bis Wicksell,' is exactly the mismatch of apparatus and achievement Hayek finds intolerable. His single-paragraph notice grants that the subject—rare, heterogeneous goods with widely dispersed valuations—could have been theoretically revealing, then denies that Bruck makes anything of it. The yield for price theory is meagre; the factual information is thinner than a regular reader of booksellers' catalogues could assemble unaided, especially on the two matters that would have mattered most: the movement of antiquarian prices over time and the 'Streuung' of simultaneous prices for identical works. The verdict is disciplinary—casual market observation, bibliographic display and genuine value theory are not the same thing, and Bruck has confused them.

Die preistheoretische Ausbeute ist recht mager.

English translation: “The yield for price theory is decidedly meagre.”

Hermann Heinrich Gossen hoped his economic treatise would bring him the fame of Copernicus; its neglect instead led him to order the edition destroyed shortly before his death. In this brief encyclopedia entry, republished in 1937, Hayek sets that disappointment beside Gossen’s later recognition as a precursor of marginal-utility economics. His emphasis is precise: Gossen’s contribution lay in connecting diminishing satisfaction with the allocation of scarce resources and the explanation of subjective value. Readers can see how the choice between competing wants becomes a rule for maximizing satisfaction—and how the same reasoning extends to balancing productive effort against its burden. The entry offers a compact encounter with both an overlooked economist and the principles that made his work recognizable to later theorists.

The gold standard did not fail of its own defects; it was disabled, and then blamed for failing. First published in 1932 and reissued here with two supplements because the same misunderstandings still shaped policy, Hayek's report pins the interwar monetary collapse on central banks, above all the Bank of England, that refused to let gold outflows force the domestic credit contraction and wage adjustment the system demanded. Britain's 1925 return to prewar parity left costs too high; cheap money and appeals for central-bank cooperation masked the weakness rather than curing it. Behind the crisis lies his attack on price-level stabilization: propping up prices that ought to fall with rising productivity is inflation by another name, breeding the misdirected production that made 1929 unavoidable.

All this means that there has not been too little but too much cooperation between central banks, and that not the gold standard, but efforts aimed at making the gold standard inoperative are the causes of the present monetary troubles.

What would make a planned economy more productive—and by whose measure? In this 1933 review of Carl Landauer, presented in its 1997 English translation, Hayek presses two questions: how competing individual needs could become a single standard of social satisfaction, and how state-owned enterprises could choose investments without a free capital market. His respect for Landauer’s theoretical knowledge sharpens rather than softens the disagreement. He also challenges a comparison that judges markets by their observed defects while granting planning its imagined successes. This brief encounter lets readers see how Hayek connects disputes over valuation to concrete institutional choices: retaining trade between enterprises, he argues, does not by itself explain how productive resources would be allocated.

All this assumes an unambiguous yardstick for global social satisfaction, which does not in fact yet exist.

Equal rules can still look like measures aimed at a single country. In this brief letter to The Times, first published in 1933 and reprinted in 1997, Friedrich August von Hayek considers how that suspicion might obstruct German acceptance of international arms controls. His proposal turns on sequence: France, Great Britain and other willing powers should first submit themselves to mutual supervision, testing its effectiveness before seeking wider participation. The letter offers no technical inspection plan; its interest lies in Hayek’s distinction between formally universal rules and demonstrated reciprocity. It captures a concrete diplomatic wager: that controls already accepted by others would be harder for Germany to reject as discriminatory.

The health of business-cycle research is measured, Hayek insists in this 1933 Festschrift essay, not by the mounting heap of contemporary statistics but by insight into causes—facts being the ever-changing object against which theory is tested, never its substitute. Crisis theory, he judges, has outrun the theory of depression. He gathers the Wicksellian, Misesian and Spiethoffian strands into one diagnosis: credit expansion unbacked by voluntary saving lengthens and distorts the structure of production, and the resulting 'capital shortage' is identical with relative overconsumption. What remains unsolved is recovery—how relative prices, stocks and the direction of resources must be revalued, and how to distinguish price falls that undo prior maladjustment from secondary deflation that persists past its use. Capital maintenance, wage rigidity, expectations and cash balances he names as the field's next work.

Henry Dunning Macleod’s ambition to rebuild economics threatened to obscure the banking insights he actually achieved. In this compact biographical encyclopedia entry, republished in 1937, Hayek separates those insights from the larger system he judges inadequately worked out. He credits Macleod’s account of Bank of England policy, early grasp of discount policy, and detailed explanation of bank credit creation, while questioning his treatment of credit and capital. The distinction is pointed: theoretical vagueness did not, in Hayek’s judgement, lead Macleod to unsound monetary prescriptions. Alongside the failed bank, fraud conviction, and frustrated academic ambitions, readers encounter a discriminating assessment of what deserves preservation in an economist’s work even when his claims to have refounded the discipline do not.

Written in the spring of 1933, as Hitler consolidated power, this short essay confronts a comforting misreading head-on: that National Socialism was a conservative or capitalist reaction. Hayek argues the opposite, that it was a genuinely socialist and collectivist movement, the ripened fruit of an anti-liberal current running through German thought since the Bismarckian era. Its hostility to the Marxist parties, he contends, was national and cultural rather than economic, while its intellectual debts ran to Marxian relativism and anti-rationalism. Tracing how collectivist planning tends toward coercion, the suppression of intellectual freedom, and finally dictatorship, he warns that other Western nations expanding state control over economic life court the same descent. A compact statement of the themes Hayek would enlarge a decade later in The Road to Serfdom.

The inherent logic of collectivism makes it impossible to confine it to a limited sphere.

George Warde Norman’s place in the English currency school can obscure the range of his economic commitments. In this compact biographical encyclopedia entry, supplied in its 1937 republication, Hayek connects Norman’s monetary writings with his work as a Bank of England director and witness before parliamentary committees. He cautiously identifies Norman’s privately circulated 1833 pamphlet as probably the earliest statement of the school’s aims by one of its members. Yet the portrait also distinguishes Norman from his allies: he disputed protection with Colonel Torrens and advocated a single tax on all property. Readers gain a concise account of how one economist combined argument with institutional responsibility, alongside bibliographical leads extending beyond the monetary controversy for which he is chiefly remembered.

Why might economists oppose reforms whose humanitarian aims they share? In this 1933 inaugural lecture at the London School of Economics, Hayek locates the tension in the difference between intentions and consequences—and in the delayed influence of economic ideas on public opinion. His account of the Historical School argues that objections to intervention were often forgotten rather than refuted. Yet his defence of theory is not an unconditional defence of laissez-faire: economists must also identify useful government action. A concrete example gives the argument its force. Whether to retain old machinery or replace it depends not simply on technical efficiency, but on the competing uses of capital and other resources. The lecture shows how Hayek connects apparently wasteful individual decisions with coordination across an economy, while separating agreement about social purposes from agreement about policy.

What Hayek defends under the name 'neutral money' is a tool of theoretical analysis, not a norm for central banks—a distinction he presses against Koopmans and Egle. The concept names an imagined case in which a money economy would leave relative prices to the 'real' determinants of barter-equilibrium theory, a counterfactual for detecting when money becomes an independent force. Its starting point is that money breaks the identity of supply and demand that barter enforces in every market: hoarding, dishoarding, newly created and destroyed money each inject demand without supply, or the reverse. From this follows the benchmark of a constant money stream. Yet sticky prices, long-term money contracts and downward wage rigidity create frictions, so practical policy may need a compromise—perhaps stabilizing an index of original-factor prices—which must not be confused with neutrality itself.

Der Begriff neutrales Geld war bestimmt, als Instrument der theoretischen Analyse zu dienen und sollte keineswegs in erster Linie eine währungspolitische Norm bilden.

English translation: “The concept of neutral money was designed to serve as an instrument of theoretical analysis and by no means was intended primarily to constitute a norm for monetary policy.”