The archive.

Long after Böhm-Bawerk had dismantled Marx's economics, Marxism kept its prestige — and this lecture-essay asks why a doctrine attacking the whole social order went so long unrefuted as philosophy. The answer, Mises argues, lies in its unexamined core: historical inevitability, the malleability of man, and the mysterious 'material productive forces' that supposedly explain all culture yet are themselves never explained. He separates anti-Marxism from liberalism, defends Freud against the charge of materialism, and traces the vocabulary of 'organization' and 'social engineering' back to Comte and Saint-Simon, where human beings become raw material to be arranged. Against the planners he reframes the whole quarrel: not plan versus no plan, but whose plan shall rule — one dictator's, or the many plans of individuals who each, in acting, already plan.

It is impossible to defeat a philosophy if you do not fight in the philosophical field.

Every person acts on a philosophy, whether he can name it or not—and the reigning philosophy of the age, Mises contends in this 1952 lecture, is essentially Marxist, even among those who loudly reject Marx. The argument dismantles materialism in its several guises: the mechanistic view that treats man as a machine (La Mettrie, the newborn likened to a Ford car), the physiological reduction of thought to secretion, and the historical materialism that makes tools the engine of history. Against all of these Mises insists that tools are products of ideas, not their cause, and that Marx's theory of ideology—doctrines as mere expressions of class interest—destroys the notion of truth it depends on. Tracing Marx back to Hegel's teleology, he warns that once socialism is cast as history's destination, dissent is condemned in advance.

A machine doesn't achieve anything, doesn't do anything alone—it is always men or a number of men who achieve something by means of the machine.

Interest is not a fee charged for the use of money, but the market expression of a universal fact: present goods are valued above future goods. From this rooting of interest in time preference, Mises builds a theory of the trade cycle in which depressions trace not to capitalism's inner laws but to bank credit expansion. New credit lowers the market rate below what real saving would set, luring entrepreneurs into projects that falsified calculation makes look profitable; the boom is malinvestment, and the crisis merely discloses the scarcity that was there all along. His house-building analogy — foundations laid for a structure the available materials cannot complete — fixes the point. Credit expansion, he adds, lets governments spend without openly taxing, which is why sound money is finally a matter of limiting political power.

Credit expansion is fundamentally really a problem of civil rights.

Georges Sorel, alone among the thinkers who absorbed Marx, added something genuinely new: a cult of action, sabotage, the general strike, and political myth that would echo through Lenin, Mussolini, and Hitler alike. From that observation these lectures range across the fault lines Marx left unexamined - above all the principle of nationality, which Marx dismissed because he expected capitalism to dissolve national peculiarities before socialism arrived. Mises shows why free-trade optimism about the obsolescence of war, shared by Wilson and Norman Angell, collapses in an interventionist world of tariffs, embargoes, and raw-material controls. He follows the shifting vocabulary of socialism and communism from the 1830s through Lenin and Stalin, and reads the First and Second Internationals as bureaucracies that preached peace while ignoring the trade and migration barriers that actually make nations fight.

Lenin, Mussolini, and Hitler were all influenced by Sorel, by the idea of action, by the idea not to talk but to kill.

Profit and loss are signals before they are rewards: in a market economy they reveal what consumers most urgently want and pull capital toward the uses that serve them best. Working from that premise, Mises separates the physical capital goods inherited from the past - often specific, obsolete, or badly located - from the accounting abstraction of capital, and shows why technocratic schemes to scrap old methods for newer ones squander real wealth. Private property, on his account, is a social function, retained only by serving customers cheaply and well, and wholly unlike feudal ownership rooted in conquest and privilege. Taxation and interference, he warns, sap consumer sovereignty by starving new firms of the capital they need to grow. The essay closes by contrasting profit-and-loss management with the bureaucratic kind proper only to policing and other nonmarket services.

But capitalism is not dying; people are murdering it.

No civilization rises without saving - the patient accumulation of capital and the monetary calculation that lets a society know whether it is preserving its stock or consuming it. That is the thread Mises follows here, distinguishing the physical capital goods of production from the accounting concept of capital, and insisting that profit, income, and capital maintenance have meaning only inside a price system. Socialism, denied market prices, cannot make the reckoning at all. He turns his fire on the income-tax laws, inflation, and social-security schemes that quietly erode capital formation, and on the anti-saving and Keynesian doctrines that treat thrift as a danger and dread technological unemployment. More capital, he answers, means higher labor productivity and higher wages - the true engine by which the lives of ordinary workers were transformed.

If the children used up the nets and fish produced by their parents, capital accumulation would have had to start all over again.

Is opposition to totalitarianism enough to unite a movement for liberty? In this brief memorandum of December 31, 1946, first published in 2009, Ludwig von Mises challenges the intellectual basis of Hayek’s proposed association, which became the Mont Pèlerin Society. For Mises, recruiting defenders of government intervention risks reproducing the weaknesses of earlier liberal movements: freedom requires commitment to the market economy, not merely agreement against dictatorship. His distinctive move is to turn an economic claim—that intervention generates pressures for further controls—into a criterion for intellectual cooperation. The memorandum offers a pointed glimpse of the tension between building a broad coalition and settling its principles before it meets.

Written from New York in November 1961 to thank Alfred Müller-Armack for birthday wishes, this short letter turns quickly to a correction Mises wanted on record: he had been misunderstood as rejecting all political compromise. Theory and program, he insists, must be built consistently and without contradiction, yet the politician who cannot move the majority to adopt them must settle for whatever the given circumstances make attainable. The concession costs him nothing doctrinally—he restates his standing verdict that middle-of-the-road interventionism, in every variety, necessarily ends in full socialism. Writing as a European rather than American liberal, he closes by praising Müller-Armack and Ludwig Erhard for the postwar German recovery, a liberal achievement he can admire without endorsing its every interventionist remnant.

In der praktischen Politik kann man nur selten das Vollkommene erreichen. Man muss sich in der Regel damit begnügen, das kleinere Übel zu wählen.

English translation: “In practical politics one can only rarely attain the perfect. As a rule one must be content to choose the lesser evil.”

Did the banking crises of 1931 expose a failure of classical monetary theory, or institutions and policies that its principles could still explain? In this 1933 review, reprinted in 1990, Ludwig von Mises tests Nassau William Senior’s monetary lectures against exchange depreciation, protectionism, and international lending. His defence of Senior is not simply an appeal to authority: he distinguishes changes in banking arrangements from changes in the mechanisms of monetary adjustment. Especially revealing is his account of banks that promised immediate repayment while financing assets they could not readily sell. Mises locates the monetary danger less in capital flight itself than in newly created central-bank credit used to meet withdrawals. The review offers a compact encounter between classical arguments and interwar banking practice, separating explanations of policy choices from approval of their aims.