The archive.

Written in 1942 for Americans wary of economists whose earlier prosperity forecasts had failed, this plain-language essay defines inflation as an increase in money and money substitutes - deposit currency and bank credit - and traces where its losses fall. Mises shows that every creditor is silently robbed: savings, pensions, insurance claims, and Social Security benefits are all repaid in depreciated dollars, while salaried professionals watch living costs outrun their incomes. He weighs the usual escapes - gold, foreign currency, farmland, stocks - and finds each blocked by law or market. Gravest of all, he argues, are the moral and political effects: inflation destroys thrift, radicalizes the ruined, and breeds support for dictators and quack remedies. Its true cause is not necessity but the government's choice to finance itself by credit expansion rather than honest taxes.

For all these millions of people, every further step toward inflation means a further decline in the real value of the claims or credits they have saved up by years of toil and sacrifice.

Can an economy remain capitalist when private ownership survives but government dictates how enterprises operate? In this 1942 review of Maxine Y. Sweezy’s The Structure of the Nazi Economy, Ludwig von Mises praises her empirical research while contesting her classification of the system she describes. His criterion is effective control over production, not legal ownership or equality of incomes; on that basis, he calls the Nazi economy socialist. A particularly revealing tension concerns managers: deprived of independent authority, they may nevertheless preserve capital in the hope of recovering their businesses after the war. This brief review offers a concentrated encounter with Mises’s distinction between the outward forms of enterprise and the power to make economic decisions—and with his attempt to explain productive incentives within a system he condemns.

Could knowledge of the trade cycle prevent entrepreneurs from helping to set one in motion? In this short response to L. M. Lachmann, Mises accepts that a credit-induced boom depends on how businesspeople interpret easier borrowing, while denying that Austrian theory had overlooked this condition. His distinctive emphasis is on calculation rather than mere optimism: interest rates can mislead investors even when they appear normal or high, if they inadequately reflect monetary depreciation. The exchange clarifies where expectations enter Mises’s monetary explanation—and why recognizing credit expansion is harder than observing abundant loans or rising demand. It also leaves open a pointed possibility: entrepreneurs who understand the mechanism might respond differently, changing the outcome the theory explains.

Did European labor succumb to inadequate leadership, or to doctrines that left it unable to answer nationalism? In this 1943 review of Adolf Sturmthal’s The Tragedy of European Labor, 1918–1939, Ludwig von Mises shifts the explanation from personalities to economic ideas. He praises Sturmthal’s portraits of labor leaders but argues that Marxism and trade unionism obscured conflicts between workers protected by immigration barriers and those excluded from opportunity. His distinctive concern is the vulnerability of industrial countries dependent on imported food and raw materials: nationalist conquest offered, he argues, a vicious and unworkable answer to problems labor failed to confront. The review makes international mobility and trade central to Mises’s indictment of interwar labor politics—and to his bleak expectations for postwar recovery.

Shared vulnerability to aggression does not necessarily make nations willing partners in peace. In this 1943 review of Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer’s Victory Is Not Enough!, Ludwig von Mises tests proposals for European confederation against the persistence of tariffs, migration barriers and exchange controls. His imagined Ruritanian worker gives the objection a concrete edge: why support a federation that preserves other countries’ wage advantages while blocking access to their markets? Mises argues that political institutions cannot secure lasting peace while their members practise economic exclusion. Yet he warmly values the reviewed author’s realism, informed by experience in the League of Nations secretariat. This short review offers a pointed distinction between recognising a common security interest and accepting the economic changes that cooperation demands.

No sophisticated union-project and no diplomatic makeshifts can make peace durable in an environment of economic warfare.

A plea for peace becomes grounds for suspecting an economist’s financial motives: this episode anchors Ludwig von Mises’s review of S. Leon Levy’s biography of Nassau W. Senior. Mises praises Levy’s portrait of the liberal publicist while rejecting the title’s elevation of Senior into a prophet of capitalism. His sharper concern is the reception of Senior’s proposed arbitration of the Oregon boundary dispute, when even Macaulay questioned his impartiality rather than answering his arguments. Mises finds here a failure of reasoned debate within liberal Britain itself. This brief review reveals his standards for judging an intellectual predecessor: theoretical originality matters, but so does the independence to oppose national passions without being dismissed as cynical.

Older social philosophies held human interests to be naturally antagonistic, and so justified coercion, moral self-denial, and submission to inequality as the price of order. Against them Mises reconstructs the utilitarian and classical case that peaceful cooperation, not sacrifice, is what the division of labor makes possible. Delivered as a 1945 conference paper, the essay moves from Ricardo's law of association—proof that specialization benefits even the unequal—to what he names the Montaigne fallacy, the zero-sum belief that one man's gain must be another's loss. He traces that error through protectionism, exploitation theory, and just-price doctrine, and reframes profit as reward for foresight and the market as a consumers' democracy. Economics is called inhuman, he argues, only because it names the real cost of shielding inefficient producers.

Under capitalism, competition is the peaceful method to assign to every individual that place in society in which he renders the most valuable services to his fellow men.

Can a government make goods more accessible by holding their prices down while expanding the money supply? In this article, republished in 1952, Ludwig von Mises argues that ceilings frustrate their own purpose: producers withdraw, supplies shrink, and efforts to repair the shortages draw further production decisions under official control. German experience supplies his pointed test case. He distinguishes the survival of private ownership titles under Nazism from entrepreneurs’ actual authority to decide what to produce. His monetary argument turns on another distinction: expanding money and credit versus the rising prices that follow. Read together, these distinctions offer a concrete way to examine policies that promise affordable goods without confronting how government spending is financed.

"Planning," in the mouths of its advocates, almost always means socialism, Russian socialization or German Zwangswirtschaft, yet Keynes, Beveridge, and Hansen promised a third road that could plan for freedom without embracing either. Delivered to the American Academy of Political and Social Science in 1945, this address answers that the supposed third way is only interventionism, the old Bismarckian doctrine of Schmoller and Wagner in new dress. Mises argues that isolated coercive commands, minimum wages, easy money, restricted profits, disrupt the integrated market and defeat their own authors' purposes; depression follows credit expansion, and enduring joblessness follows wage rates propped above market levels. Profit and loss, not planners, are how consumers govern production. Between totalitarian control and liberty, he concludes, there is no durable middle ground.

The market and its inescapable law are supreme.

What can a peace settlement accomplish when neighboring national groups refuse to relinquish competing territorial claims? In this short 1945 review of Joseph S. Roucek’s edited symposium, Ludwig von Mises questions whether collecting national grievances explains the obstacles to peace. He distinguishes the benefits claimed by multinational rulers from the consent of those they govern: Czech assistance, he argues, does not answer Slovak and Ukrainian demands for independence. He also challenges a contributor’s acceptance of Soviet annexations as accomplished facts, asking how that reasoning differs from German Realpolitik. The review offers no alternative map. Its interest lies in Mises’s insistence that schemes for durable peace must confront the unwillingness to compromise that helped defeat earlier settlements.

They do not want to be "minorities" in a multinational state; they prefer to be majorities in their own country, even if it is only a small country.

For the reigning doctrines of the age, conflict is the natural condition of intergroup relations: nations, races, and Marxian classes are read as groups whose gain must come at another's loss, so that war and civil war become the logical conclusion of what people already believe. Mises answers with the classical case for a harmony of rightly understood interests. Caste society, bound by inherited legal privilege, bred real antagonism; capitalism replaced it with equality under law, under which shoemakers are merely competitors, not enemies. The genuine conflicts of the day, tariffs, immigration barriers, pressure-group politics, spring not from the unhampered market but from interventionist policies that revive mercantilism, protectionism, and guild-style exclusion. Utilitarian ethics, he warns, stands or falls with the science of economics.

Mercantilism was a philosophy of war.

Cheap money has a long pedigree of enemies of interest behind it, Bolshevik, Nazi, and easy-money reformers alike who picture creditors as idle rich and debtors as toiling poor. Mises overturns the picture: in a modern financial society the bondholders, savers, and insurance and social-security claimants harmed by depressed interest and depreciated currency are ordinary people. From the distinction between commodity credit, drawn from real savings, and circulation credit, conjured by banks as fiat money, he builds the familiar sequence, artificially lowered rates, false calculation, malinvestment, boom, and then either runaway inflation toward a 1923-style collapse or panic and mass unemployment. The crisis, he stresses, springs not from ending expansion but from the misdirection cheap money already produced. Interest expresses time preference and cannot be legislated away.

The artificial boom is not prosperity, but the deceptive appearance of good business.